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Journalists reporting from conflict zones are increasingly at risk of injury or death. 
Not only are they at risk of becoming a casualty in the crossfire, they are now often 
directly targeted and killed because of their profession. The legal framework 
protecting journalists in conflict zones consists predominantly of International 
Humanitarian Law, supplemented by International Human Rights Law and 
International Criminal Law. The main body of law providing protection to journalists 
consists of the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, which are now 
several decades old. Since their drafting, there have been significant changes in the 
way we conduct wars, as well as in the way journalists operate and report from 
conflict zones. This raises the question whether this legal framework is still suitable 
for the protection of journalists in contemporary conflicts. 
 
This thesis confirms that the legal framework contains, at least in theory, a 
significant number of provisions that continue to provide protection for journalists in 
conflict zones. What is clear, however, is that there are significant differences in the 
protection awarded to journalists based on the type of journalist, for example whether 
they are embedded or function independently in conflict zones, the type of conflict 
they are covering and even their nationality. The result is a rather complicated legal 
framework that is not always easy to apply in practice.  
 
It has been argued by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a view also 
reflected in most of the academic literature, that the protection offered by the current 
legal framework is adequate, but that the enforcement of it is lacking. This is 
considered the predominant reason why journalists reporting on conflicts currently 
face such significant risks to their safety. While this is clearly part of the problem, 
this thesis challenges the notion that the legal framework provides all necessary 
protection and that only through stronger enforcement can protection be increased.  
In particular, it suggests that this ignores the effect that clarity and the 
comprehensiveness of the framework can have on enforcement. Having explored the 




dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in conflict zones in order to 








1. Introduction          p. 1 
 1.1 Research context         p. 4 
 1.2 Research question         p. 7 
 1.3 Terminology         p. 8 
 1.4 Methodology and structure       p. 9 
    
2. Historical background of conflict reporting and its protection under  
    International Humanitarian Law       p. 13 
 2.1 The evolution of conflict and conflict reporting in the 20th  
       century and beyond        p. 14 
2.2 The evolution of armed conflict       p. 24 
2.3 The development of protection for journalist under IHL treaties   p. 26 
2.4 Conclusion         p. 36 
 
3. International Humanitarian Law       p. 32 
 3.1 International Humanitarian Treaty Law      p. 35 
 3.2 Customary law         p. 36  
 3.3 Other international documents       p. 59 
3.4 Conclusion         p. 65 
 
4. International Human Rights Law       p. 69 
 4.1 Historic development of International Human Rights Law   p. 70 
 4.2 Do human rights apply during conflict?      p. 79 
 4.3 The relationship between International Humanitarian Law  
      and International Human Rights Law      p. 85 
 4.4 Relevant International Human Rights Law     p. 89 
 4.5 Customary International Human Rights Law     p. 95 
 4.6 International Criminal Law       p. 97 
 4.7 Conclusion         p. 98 
 
5. Enforcement of legal norms and impunity      p. 101 
5.1 Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law     p. 102 
5.2 Enforcement of International Human Rights Law    p. 109 
 5.3 Enforcement of International Criminal Law     p. 114 
 5.4 Impunity in relation to crimes against journalists    p. 118 
 5.5 UN work plan on the safety of journalists and the issue of  
                  impunity          p. 127 
 5.6 Conclusion         p. 129 
 
6. Protecting different types of journalists       p. 131 
 6.1 Accredited war correspondents       p. 132 
 6.2 Independent journalists        p. 139 




 6.4 Conclusion         p. 158 
 
7. Direct participation in the hostilities       p. 161 
7.1 The concept of direct participation in hostilities     p. 162 
 7.2 Media participation in hostilities       p. 173 
 7.3 Armed security teams and carrying weapons     p. 183 
 7.4 Consequences for the media       p. 185 
 7.5 Conclusion         p. 186 
 
8. A dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in  
    conflict zones          p. 189 
 8.1 Challenging the current legal framework      p. 191 
 8.2 A dedicated convention for the protection of journalists    p. 199 
 8.3 Conclusion         p. 216 
 
9. Conclusion           p. 221 
 9.1 Current legal protection        p. 222 
 9.2 Enforcement         p. 225 
 9.3 Issues with the current legal framework       p. 227 
 9.4 Amending the law for the protection of journalists in conflict  
      zones          p. 229 
 
List of Abbreviations         p. 235 
 









News reporting from conflict areas is becoming increasingly dangerous. Since the 
start of the war in Iraq in 2003, there has been a sharp increase in deaths amongst 
journalists. In 2013 alone, there were 70 known cases in which journalists were 
killed as a result of their work, which includes deaths on dangerous missions and 
deaths in crossfire.1 This statistic does not include cases of killings where no motive 
could be confirmed, which suggests the actual number of work-related deaths may be 
considerably higher. Of those 70 cases where motive could be confirmed, the 
majority took place in conflict territories and 51% of the journalists who were killed 
were covering a war.2 While conflict reporting is inherently dangerous due to the 
circumstances in which it takes place, a disconcertingly high percentage of deaths is 
not related to violence inherent to conflict, such as cross-fire. Journalists are 
increasingly targeted directly because of their work.3 There appears to have been a 
significant shift in the culture of respect towards journalists that previously existed 
amongst combatants. Journalists have gone from being protected by the unwritten 
rule of ‘don’t shoot the journalist’, to being a direct target in the hostilities.4 The 
current legal framework protecting journalists in conflict zones is thus based upon a 
cultural outlook of respect for journalists, which no longer seems to exist. 
 
Journalists play an essential role in society. They assist in the fulfilment of one of the 
key components of the right to freedom of expression, recognised in various human 
rights treaties: the right to receive information. This collective right “empowers 
populations through facilitating dialogue, participation and democracy”.5 However, 
                                                            
1 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “70 Journalists Killed in 2013/Motive Confirmed” (2014), 
available at: http://cpj.org/killed/2013/. Other organisations provide slightly different numbers, such 
2 CPJ (2014). 
3 F Smyth “Iraq War and the News Media: A look inside the death toll” (18 March 2013) CPJ, 
available at: http://cpj.org/blog/2013/03/iraq-war-and-news-media-a-look-inside-the-death-to.php.   
4 See for example: H Tumber and F Webster, Journalist under Fire: Information war and journalistic 
practices (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 167; D Bennett, “The Life of a War Correspondent is 
Even Worse than You Think” (10 July 2013) The Wire, available at: 
http://www.thewire.com/global/2013/07/life-war-.correspondent/67038/.  
5 UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” 
(27 March 2012) International Programme for the Development of Communication, available at: 
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journalism equally has the power to mislead and cause prejudice. The influential role 
journalists have in society is enhanced during conflict, when ordinary checks on 
government behaviour and breaches of law break down and most of the information 
that reaches local and international audiences comes through journalists, who can be 
the last observers present to witness and report on the conflict.6  
 
The need to protect journalists has long been recognised by International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). From the rise of the war correspondent during the Crimean 
War, IHL has attempted to provide protection to war correspondents. This protection 
has largely consisted of a single provision in the Geneva Conventions and other IHL 
treaties, which has seen little change from its first inclusion to the extensive revision 
of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.7 The first real reconsideration of the protection 
offered to journalists came with Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva 
Conventions,8 which recognised that reporting practices had changed to such an 
extent during the numerous conflicts post-WWII that the inclusion of a new 
provision to protect journalists was required. At the same time, there was significant 
discussion as to whether journalists reporting on conflicts should be protected 
through their own international convention. This suggestion was abandoned in favour 
of including a new, dedicated, provision for the protection of journalists in Protocol 
I, as it was felt it would be quicker and more effective and would have the added 
advantage of ensuring journalists were made fully aware of IHL.9 The suggestion of 
a dedicated convention has resurfaced several times over the last few decades, but 
has never resulted in significant efforts at the international level to create one. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expres
sion/Safety_Report_by%20DG_2012.pdf, p. 29. 
6 S Kagan and H Durham, “The Media and International Humanitarian Law: Legal protection for 
journalists” (2010) 16 Pacific Journalism Review, 96, p. 96.   
7 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949; 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention 
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (hereafter, 
the Geneva Conventions (1949)). 
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, Protocol I). 
9 ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, 
CDDH/I/Sr 31, Para. 11. 
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Over the last decade the focus of providing additional protection to journalists has 
switched from creating a new dedicated convention to improving enforcement of the 
legal protection currently available to journalists. Crimes against journalists suffer 
from exceptionally high rates of impunity, with worldwide impunity levels 
fluctuating between roughly 85-95% over the last decade.10 These statistics have 
influenced the idea that the legal framework for the protection of journalists in 
conflict zones provides sufficient protection, at least in theory, and that “the most 
serious deficiency is not a lack of rules, but a failure to implement existing rules and 
to systematically investigate, prosecute and punish violations”.11 This approach is 
strongly supported by the academic literature,12 and most international efforts now 
focus on combatting impunity. Consequently, the International Committee for the 
Red Cross’s (ICRC) four-year action plan for the implementation of humanitarian 
law, published in 2011, which calls for enhanced protection for journalists in conflict 
zones, does not suggest there is a need for a new treaty.13 The United Nations’ (UN) 
recent Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity14 
similarly does not suggest significant revisions to the legal framework are required.   
 
This thesis does not disagree with the strong international focus on combatting 
impunity to enhance the protection of journalists in conflict zones. It does, however, 
                                                            
10 CPJ, “1062 Journalists Killed Since 1992” (2014), available at: http://cpj.org/killed/.  
11 Robin Geiss, a legal expert for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), considered 
this issue in a 2010 interview: R Geiss, “How does International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists 
in Armed Conflict Situations?” (27 July 2010) ICRC Interview, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalists-interview-270710.htm.   
12 See for example: I Düsterhöft, “The Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How can they be 
better safeguarded?” (2013) 29 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 4; K Davies and 
E Crawford, “Legal Avenues for Ending Impunity for the Death of Journalists in Conflict Zones: 
Current and proposed international agreements” (2013) 7 International Journal of Communication, 
2157; H-P Gasser, “The Journalist’s Right to Information in Time of War and on Dangerous 
Missions” (2003) 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 367; K Dörmann,"International 
Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals Working in Armed Conflicts" (2007) 
ICRC, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/media-protection-
article-.htm. 
13 ICRC, “Four-Year Action Plan for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Draft 
resolution of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (28 November 
2011), Doc. No. 311IC/22/5.1.3 DR, Annex I, objective 3, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-
int-conference-4year-action-plan-11-5-1-3-en.pdf. 
14 UNESCO, “UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity” (2012) 
International Programme for the Development of Communication, CI-12/CONF.202/6. 
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take issue with the notion that there are no underlying issues with the current legal 
framework that require attention. As clearly articulated by the ICRC, above, the 
focus on combatting impunity is generally paired with the assertion that the legal 
framework is satisfactory and just not adequately enforced. This approach, however, 
potentially ignores one of the underlying causes of impunity: a lack of a clear and 
concise legal framework that can be easily implemented. The thesis will therefore 
explore the current international legal protection offered to journalists in conflict 
zones through IHL, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International 
Criminal Law (ICL) in order to ascertain whether the claim that there are no 
problems with the current legal framework for the protection of journalists in conflict 
zones is correct and, if not, to consider what further steps may be required. 
 
 
1.1 Research context 
 
There have been numerous suggestions as to how to address the increasing risks 
faced by journalists reporting from conflict zones. These include the creation of a 
distinctive emblem to identify journalists and avoid ‘accidental targeting’,15 the 
explicit classification of deliberate attacks on journalists as a war crime under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998,16 enhancing 
protection through advocacy and education,17 and, more ambitious still, the creation 
of a dedicated instrument for the protection of journalists in conflict zones.18  
 
                                                            
15 Though this suggestion had already been made during the drafting stages of Protocol I, the most 
ardent supporters, currently, of this proposal are the Press Emblem Campaign 
(http://www.pressemblem.ch/), further discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
16 One of the strongest supporters of specific inclusion in the Rome Statute is Geoffrey Robertson QC, 
see: E Goetz, “On the Front Line of Accountability: Should the killing of journalists be a war crime?” 
(26 January 2011)  International Criminal Law Bureau, available at: 
http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/on-the-front-line-of-accountability-should-the-
killing-of-journalists-be-a-war-crime/. 
17 This is strongly supported by a wide variety of actors and academics, concrete proposals focus on 
areas such as enhancing safety training and equipment for journalists, increasing knowledge of the 
current legal protection amongst different actors in conflict zones, etc. 
18 Such a convention was first mooted by the Draft United Nations Convention on the Protection of 
Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict, 1 August 1975, UN 
Document A/10147 and the suggestion has resurfaced periodically since. 
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As noted, the suggestion of a dedicated convention to address the risks journalist face 
when reporting from conflict zones is not new. It has resurfaced periodically since 
the 1970s when it was mooted through a UN draft convention. After the convention 
was replaced with the inclusion of a dedicated article in Protocol I, the suggestion 
has fallen out of fashion, largely due to the perceived difficulties of drafting and 
implementing international treaties. One of the few, relatively recent, proponents of 
the creation of a dedicated convention is Alexander Balguy Galois, who noted in 
2004 that there is an evident need for such a convention in order: 
On the one hand to reaffirm those elements of humanitarian law 
that apply to journalists and media personnel, and thus to re-
establish the authority of certain basic rules that are all too often 
flouted, and, on the other hand to improve existing law and adapt it 
to the requirements of today.19 
Galois’ article itself contains, however, few concrete suggestions as to how such a 
dedicated convention should look and there has been little interest in this solution 
over the last decade.20 While some authors acknowledge that there may be grounds 
for amending and changing the current legal framework, the suggestion is generally 
discarded on the basis that attaining the necessary global agreement on international 
treaties is slow and generally suffers from a low success rate, without any 
engagement with the value and content of such a dedicated convention.21 But is the 
mere difficulty of drafting and implementing international treaties sufficient 
justification for shifting focus away from the legal framework? Given the sharp rise 
in the number of deaths amongst journalists in various conflicts since the last 
                                                            
19 A Balguy-Gallois, “The Protection of Journalists and News Media in Armed Conflicts” (2004) 86 
International Review of the Red Cross, 37, p. 37. This article was partly a response to the declaration 
of Reporters without Borders “on the safety of journalists and media personnel in situations involving 
armed conflict”. 
20 One notable exception is the Press Emblem Campaign (PEC), which is essentially trying to create a 
new convention, though the primary focus is on the creation of a protective emblem, see: 
(http://www.pressemblem.ch/). 
21 See for example: K Davies and E Crawford, “Legal Avenues for Ending Impunity for the Death of 
Journalists in Conflict Zones: Current and proposed international agreements” (2013) 7 International 
Journal of Communication, 2157, p. 2157; I Düsterhöft, “The Protection of Journalists in Armed 
Conflicts: How can they be better safeguarded?” (2013) 29 Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law, 4, pp. 17-18; see generally on the issues of revising international law: M Evangelista 
and D Wippman (eds.), New Wars, New Laws? Applying the laws of war in twenty-first century 
conflicts (Ardsley (N.Y): Transnational Publishers, 2005). 
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outspoken support for the creation of a new international legal framework,22 it is time 
to revisit the notion of a dedicated convention. After all, the current international 
legal framework forms the core for the protection of journalists in conflict zones and 
it is therefore illogical to attempt to address declining protection while ignoring 
potential issues with the underlying framework which provides the basis for that 
protection. This thesis will therefore contribute to the current research in not only 
setting out a case for renewing efforts towards creating a dedicated convention for 
the protection of journalists, but by setting out the approach such as convention 
should take to increase its chance of reaching international consensus and thus 
significant ratification, as well as the subject matter such a convention should 
address. 
 
Currently, most journalists do not have a special status under international law. 
Though they are named as a category of persons, unlike for example medical 
personnel, the Geneva Conventions (1949) only provide them with the protection it 
provides to all civilians: they are classed as civilians and receive protection as such. 
But this status under international law is not necessarily a comfortable fit with the 
reality of conflict reporting. There are essentially two statuses under IHL, you are 
either a combatant or a civilian, but there is little in between. While, given those two 
options, journalist should therefore be classed as civilians in the context of IHL, 
equating them to ‘ordinary’ civilians, in terms of required protection under 
international law both ignores their function and their behaviour in conflict zones. As 
acknowledged by the commentary on Protocol I “The circumstances of armed 
conflict expose journalists exercising their profession in such a situation to dangers 
which often exceed the level of danger normally encountered by civilians.”23 
Journalists are more likely to run towards the fighting than away from it, they have 
generally no interest in being removed from the conflict and seek to access areas 
ordinary civilians will often have no interest in accessing. Furthermore, they are 
                                                            
22 The PEC were the last, or most recent, group to propose a dedicated convention for the protection of 
journalists in conflict zones in 2007, though their campaign is still ongoing, as will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 8.  
23 H-P Gasser, “Article 79 – Measures of Protection for Journalists”, in: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and B 
Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 3245. 
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likely to collect large amounts of information, potentially from both sides of the 
conflict, which can be seen as suspicious behaviour by local authorities and 
combatants.24 Yet they do not receive any specific protection under IHL. The legal 
framework currently presumes that journalists comfortably fit in the ‘square hole’ of 
general civilian protection and that this ‘hole’ provides sufficient guarantees to 
ensure their physical safety. But can we really fit journalists in the general protective 
legal framework of civilians in conflict zones, or are we trying to force a round peg 
in a square hole?  
 
 
1.2 Research question 
 
This thesis will review the legal framework protecting journalists in conflict zones, 
assess its strengths and weaknesses, evaluate aspects which are unclear, explore to 
what extent it falls short in providing the necessary protection and consider the scope 
for addressing any potential shortfalls through the creation of a dedicated convention 
for the protection of journalists. It will do this through the following research 
question:  
Is there scope for increasing the physical protection of journalists 
in conflict zones through amending the current international legal 
framework?  
It is important to note that this thesis will be strictly concerned with the physical 
protection of journalists and will not consider wider issues such as freedom of speech 
and quality of reporting unless they impact on physical safety. While this is a 
significant limitation, it stems form the principle that we first must ensure that 
journalists can physically survive reporting from conflict zones, before we can 
engage with broader journalistic (content) issues. This is reflective of the approach 
taken by IHL, which solely concerns itself with the physical protection of journalists 
from the harmful effects of conflict and does not concern itself with the right to 
obtain and disseminate information.25 This thesis thus aims to provide a base line for 
                                                            
24 M Campbell, “Under Cover of Security, Governments Jail Journalists” (2013) CPJ, available at: 
http://www.cpj.org/2013/02/attacks-on-the-press-misusing-terror-laws.php.  
25 Gasser (1987), para. 3246. 
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protection, which solely seeks to protect the lives of journalists, on which further and 
wider protection subsequently can be built to improve issues relating to journalistic 
content and freedom of speech. This thesis is further limited to the approach taken to 






One of the challenges of discussing the protection of journalists under international 
law is that there is no single standard definition of the term ‘journalist’ in the 
international context. Different documents use different definitions and there is 
extensive discussion on who should and should not be included in the definition.26 
This thesis will discuss the definitions for the different legal framework where 
relevant, but will generally not attempt to provide a general definition of the term 
‘journalist’. It is sufficient to note here that where the term journalist is used in this 
thesis, this term includes media support staff, such as cameramen and technicians, 
and not just journalists themselves, which is in line with some of the more widely 
accepted international definitions of the term that will be discussed in this thesis. 
 
This thesis considers different types of journalists in conflict zones. Based on their 
legal status and function it is possible to discern three distinct groups of journalists: 
war correspondents, (independent) journalists, and local journalists. This thesis will 
follow the legal terminology of the Geneva Conventions (1949) to distinguish these 
different categories of journalists. War correspondents are civilian journalists who 
travel with, and are accredited to, a military unit. As discussed in the next chapter, 
this has been the predominant reporting style up to WWII. Currently, reporters who 
are embedded with the military are generally placed in this category during 
international armed conflict, though there is some discussion as to the validity of this. 
Post-WWII a new style of reporting became popular amongst journalist: reporting on 
                                                            
26 See for example: E Ugland and J Henderson, “Who Is a Journalist and Why Does it Matter” 
Disentangling the legal and ethical arguments” (2007) 22 Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 241; I 
Shapiro, “Why Democracies Need a Functional Test of Journalism Now More Than Ever” (2014) 
Journalism Studies (online). 
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a conflict by travelling independently through conflict territory. These journalists, 
now the majority, are generally simply referred to as ‘journalists’, though where 
necessary to differentiate this specific section of journalists from journalists in 
general, the term ‘independent journalist’ will be used in this thesis. While local 
journalists generally fall under the class of ‘independent’ journalists, they form a 
distinct category when discussing the protection of journalists under international 
law, as protection can differ based on nationality. 
 
Arguably, there is a fourth category of journalists: military correspondents. Military 
correspondents are members of the armed forces that are acting as journalists in the 
military’s own press corps. This thesis does not consider this particular group of 
journalists as their status is clear under international law and significantly different 
rules apply to them compared to the other groups of journalists. Military 
correspondents are full members of the armed forces and are therefore considered 
‘combatants’ under the relevant legal framework, a status completely distinct from 
the civilian status of the other two groups of journalists, whose exact protection is 
subject to significant discussion. 
 
The term ‘conflict’ is used to describe situations of armed violence, in preference to 
the term ‘war’.  This is in line with the approach of the ICRC, which avoids the use 
of the term as it generally has a political connotation and is more limited than the 
term ‘conflict’.27 The exact definition of this term depends on the legal document in 




1.4 Methodology and structure 
 
This thesis comprises a legal study of the media. Due to its subject matter a wide 
variety of legal and non-legal sources are used, which differ significantly depending 
                                                            
27 J Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 : Commentary - Vol. 1, Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field  (Geneva: 
ICRC, 1952), p. 32. 
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on the topic under discussion. To place the development of the current legal 
framework into context use is made of historic social and legal secondary materials, 
dating back to the mid-19th century, when the first war correspondents emerged. For 
the discussion of independent journalists, material post 1950 is most relevant when 
independent reporting emerged as a practice in conflict zones. For the discussion of 
the legal framework and its application extensive use is made of both primary and 
secondary source material. In terms of primary sources, significant use is made of the 
Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols, various international 
human rights treaties, with a focus on the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), case law 
of international courts and tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court, the 
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia,  the declarations and resolutions of various international bodies such as 
the United Nations and the Council of Europe and the travaux préparatoires of the 
Geneva Conventions. Secondary materials include the official commentary on the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, legal and social science academic writing, as 
well as policy documents and papers by various professional and civil society 
organisations, such as Reporters without Borders, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists and the International News Safety Institute. 
 
To understand the current legal framework protecting journalists in conflict zones, it 
is essential to understand the motivation for the development of this framework. This 
thesis will therefore commences in chapter 2 with a brief history of the development 
of war reporting, starting from the Crimean War and the subsequent Brussels 
Declaration, which contained the first provision concerning war correspondents in an 
IHL treaty, as well as a brief history of the evolution of armed conflict itself.  This is 
designed to help us understand those challenges journalists faced in the past and are 
facing now when reporting from conflict zones and how the legal framework has 
tried to respond to these challenges. The travaux préparatoires of article 79 of 
Protocol I, which recognised the need to supplement the traditional protection 
offered by IHL treaties in light of changing journalistic practice, are of particular 
interest here. 
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Chapter 3 considers the current legal framework of IHL, exploring the extent to 
which it provides protection to journalists in conflict zones. Both treaty-based IHL, 
which in this context consists of the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional 
Protocols (1977), as well as customary IHL are considered here, the latter providing 
an insight into the extent to which customary law provides protection over and above 
that of the relevant IHL treaties. Customary IHL is generally considered to exist 
where usus, state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis, the belief that this 
practice is necessary, required or prohibited (depending on the rule in question), can 
be demonstrated.28 The existence of IHL is thus especially relevant here as 
customary law addressing issues not covered by the Geneva Conventions can signal 
potential international support for amending the current legal framework. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the protection offered by IHRL and ICL, noting that the 
application of both relies to a significant extent on state cooperation, which can limit 
their value in practice. An additional challenge is that a significant number of human 
rights can be derogated from or limited in times of war and other national 
emergencies. This chapter also considers the relationship between IHL and IHRL 
which can apply concurrently but also have the potential to contradict each other, 
leading to conflicting results when evaluating the legality of actions taken against 
journalists.  
 
Chapter 5 moves beyond a theoretical study of the legal framework to consider the 
extent to which the various legal regimes offer practical protection to journalists in 
the field. It considers the application of IHL, IHRL and ICL by a variety of courts 
and international organisations. In addition it explores the limitations of the existing 
rules in regulating conduct and explores in detail some of the reasons for the high 
levels of impunity that exists in relation to crimes against journalists. In so doing, it 
hopes to enhance our understanding of the practical effect of the current legal 
framework and why it may fail to adequately protect journalists in practice.   
 
                                                            
28 J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: 
Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. XXXVIII. 
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Chapter 6 explores the practical application of the current legal framework for 
journalists in more detail by considering the two different categories of journalists 
under the legal framework: war correspondents and independent journalists. It 
examines to what extent the legal protection covers journalists operating in modern 
conflicts, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of this protection. It further 
considers a number of concrete cases where journalists have been exposed to 
significant violence in conflict zones, in some cases resulting in death, and considers 
the extent to which the legal framework has the capability to shield journalists from 
these dangers. 
 
Chapter 7 considers the situation where legal protection no longer applies by taking a 
closer look at the notion of ‘direct participation’ in hostilities by journalists and how 
media stations may become legitimate military targets, which can result in loss of 
protection under the legal framework, thus effectively allowing journalists to be 
direct (legal) targets of violence. It focuses on international practice, statements, 
guidance and case law to explore the extent to which reports in the media produced 
by journalists can be deemed to contribute to the hostilities.  In particular, what type 
of reports fall within the protective scope of the legal framework and what types will 
result in a loss of protection? 
 
Chapter 8 draws the research together by considering whether there is scope to 
address the existing gaps and deficiencies of the legal framework highlighted in 
previous chapters through the creation of a dedicated convention for the protection of 
journalists in conflict zones. It discusses some of the questions in terms of scope and 
content that must be taken into account in such a project and seeks to put forward 
provisions that strike a balance between an ideal level of protection for journalists 
and what is realistically possible in an international context. This is followed by a 
short conclusion on the practicality and feasibility of such a dedicated convention.  
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2. Historical background of conflict reporting and its protection 
under International Humanitarian Law 
 
 
Journalists operating in conflict areas have long been offered (limited) protection by 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) treaties. One of the first IHL provisions to 
specifically mention journalists operating in conflict zones can be found in the 1874 
Brussels Declaration.29 Since 1874 there have been significant changes to warfare, as 
well as to the ways journalists report on those wars to the audience at home. 
Important developments in IHL have followed the major conflicts in the 20th century, 
when the IHL framework often proved inadequate to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities.30 Technological and scientific progress has changed the way wars are 
fought giving rise to situations and behaviour which were not always envisioned by 
the relevant legal framework. Both World War I and World War II led to substantial 
revisions in the Laws of War with the Geneva Conventions of 192931 and the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.32 The Additional Protocols of 197733 were added to deal with 
some of the challenges of conflict that had (partly) developed after the drafting of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 due to changes in warfare. The protection offered to 
journalists under IHL, however, did not change significantly under most of the 
substantial revisions and updates to the IHL framework. By the time the 1977 
Protocols to the Geneva Convention were drafted, the situation for journalists in 
conflict zones had however changed enough to warrant a new provision in the 
                                                            
29 Brussels Conference, Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, discussed in more detail below. 
30 D Wippman, “Introduction: Do new wars call for new laws?” in: D Wippman and M Evangelista 
(eds.), New Wars New Laws? Applying the laws of war in 21st century conflicts (Ardsley: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 2005), 1-30, p. 2. 
31 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929. 
32 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (hereafter Geneva Convention I);32 Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter, Geneva Convention 
II);32 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter Geneva Convention 
III);32 and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter 
Geneva Convention IV). 
33 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
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Geneva Conventions.34 To understand the legal framework which protects journalists 
in conflict zones, it is necessary to understand the circumstances these legal 
frameworks were responding to.  
 
Any argument that the provisions found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 are no longer sufficiently capable of dealing with the 
realities and dangers of modern conflict, should start from the premise that there has 
been a significant change in the challenges war correspondents face in modern 
conflicts compared to the conflicts fought pre-1977. In order to establish this, it is 
necessary to ascertain the changes that have taken place in the character of conflict as 
well as the changes that have taken place in war reporting since the latest significant 
revision of the IHL framework in 1977. In order to do so, this chapter briefly 
considers the historical development of war reporting and the way journalists have 
operated throughout different conflicts during the last century. It also discusses the 
evolution of the protection afforded journalists under the relevant treaties that form a 
part of the IHL framework. 
 
 
2.1 The evolution of conflict and conflict reporting in the 20th century and 
beyond 
 
During the last century there have been technological and scientific advancements in 
weaponry that have changed the way conflicts are fought. Other technological and 
scientific advances have changed the way that news is reported to, and consumed by, 
the public. These changes have created different challenges for journalists covering 
conflict in different parts of the world. For example, aerial bombing campaigns are 
more difficult to observe and report on than ground wars where journalists can 
follow or accompany the military, while increasing involvement of non-state actors 
makes it more difficult to distinguish journalists from combatants in conflict zones. 
Journalist equipment has also changed from a notepad and sketchbook, to television 
cameras and satellite uplinks. Modern technology now requires reporters to get 
                                                            
34 Art. 79 Protocol I. 
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closer to the action in order to get the material demanded by home audiences. In 
addition, where news would once take several days to reach the home audience, it 
now takes mere seconds, if that, which can lead journalists to expose themselves to 
increasing danger in order to ‘get the story’ to fulfil the continuing demand.35 
 
2.1.1 War reporting pre-1945: The patriotic war reporter 
News, in whatever form presented, has long been concerned with the coverage of 
international conflict. Until the mid-19th century, news concerning war came not 
from independent reporters but mostly from the military itself, or was copied from 
foreign media.36 The ‘modern’ concept of a civilian war reporter, writing reports 
specifically for a civilian audience at home, is generally considered to have started 
during the Crimean War, in the mid-19th century, when the Times sent William 
Howard Russell to the cover the conflict from the frontline.37 Russell followed the 
British army in its campaigns during the war, dressed in parts of mismatched military 
uniform and armed with a sword.38 He stayed mostly out of the action and based his 
reports on the eyewitness accounts of every officer or soldier he could find to 
question about the battle.39 Less than a decade later, the civilian war reporter had 
become a well-established concept and the American Civil War saw a surge in war 
reporters being sent to the front. More than 500 correspondents were sent to cover 
the war for the North alone, European correspondents were sent to cover the war 
directly for the audience in Europe and the conflict would eventually firmly establish 
war correspondence as a separate section of journalism.40 The wide-scale use of the 
telegraph network made relaying news faster and more extensive than before, though 
it incurred high costs for newspapers.41 The reporters were often young, 
inexperienced, underpaid and under immense pressure to produce news, which did 
                                                            
35 H Tumber and F Webster, Journalists under Fire (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 119. 
36 P Knightly, The First Casualty (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 2. 
37 Ibid, pp. 2-3; “War Correspondents, Past and Present” (16 February 1907) The Spectator; see also 
more generally: W Russel, The War from the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan 
(London: George Routledge & Co., 1855). 
38 As he was not provided with a uniform, but felt he should wear one, he ended up with: “a gold-
banded commissariat officer’s cap, a rifleman’s patrol jacket, cord breeches and butcher’s boots”, 
Knightly (2004), p. 7. 
39 Ibid, pp. 7-8; T Royle, War Report: The war correspondent’s view of battle from the Crimea to the 
Falklands (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1987), pp. 27-28. 
40 Knightly (2004), pp. 19 and 41. 
41 J Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), p. 
6. 
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not lead to the most accurate of reporting.42 They were firmly attached to the ‘side’ 
of the war that sent them, and as such at risk from the other side, which viewed them 
as much as the enemy as the soldiers themselves.43 The concept of an independent, 
objective account of war was not yet in use.  
 
In the period between the American Civil War and the First World War (WWI), war 
correspondents were sent to cover a wide variety of conflicts. The rise of the popular 
press and the increasing coverage of the telegraph network ensured fast delivery of 
news and accounts of conflicts were highly popular with the audience at home.44 
What is interesting to note is that war reporters, though technically mostly civilian, 
were by no means considered ‘non-combatants’. They rode with military units, were 
generally armed, and more importantly not unwilling to use these weapons in battle, 
not just in self-defence.45 This behaviour of war correspondents led to their 
protection under IHL as being treated mostly on a par with military personnel, when 
captured, as discussed below. The lines between war correspondents and soldiers 
were, however, by the late 19th century becoming more defined. The British War 
office issued a ruling after the Sudan Campaign in 1898 that no man should be both 
correspondent and soldier.46 This rule was in practice during the Boer wars, though 
still bypassed at times, most notably by Winston Churchill, who seemed unable to 
make up his mind whether he was primarily a soldier or a war reporter.47 The 
negative newspaper response to his active participation in a battle over an armoured 
train during the conflict, in which he both fought and claimed non-combatant status 
as a newspaper reporter after his capture, shows that the principle that newspaper 
reporters should be and act as non-combatants at all times had taken hold.48  
 
                                                            
42 Knightly (2004), pp. 22-26. 
43 Andrews (1985), pp. 18-19. 
44 Knightly (2004), pp. 43-44. 
45 M Roth, Historical Dictionary of War Journalism (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 7; 
Knightly (2004), p. 45. 
46 Knightly (2004), p. 70 and W Churchill, My Early Life: A roving commission (London: Macmillan 
& Co., 1944), p. 320. 
47 Knightly (2004), p. 69; Churchill (1944), throughout, buts see in particular pp. 266 and 320. 
48 For an overview of some of the articles appearing in newspapers in response to the incident see: 
Churchill (1944), pp. 314-315. 
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War correspondents were deeply unpopular with the army, as their reports brought 
home the horrors of battle, which previously had been kept largely away from the 
people at home. They criticised the military at times, and could expose sensitive 
information that could aid the enemy.49 The censorship and unpopularity of war 
correspondents with the military led to few correspondents receiving permission to 
accompany military units at the start of WWI. Especially on the British side, where 
strict censorship was combined with an order to arrest and expel any war 
correspondent found in Belgium, many journalists went to cover the war 
clandestinely, away from the military units they had accompanied during previous 
conflicts to report on the fighting.50 The Germans were far more supportive of war 
correspondents, which consequently meant that the majority of the information about 
the war that made it into the newspapers now came from the German side of the 
war.51 This forced the French and the British to accredit at least some war 
correspondents,52 only two of them photographers, who, while heavily censored, 
were allowed to travel with military units, as they had in previous conflicts, wearing 
military uniforms.53 Journalists from neutral countries fared better in the early stages 
of the war, with access being provided to the front. This changed soon after the 
fighting and the losses on all sides intensified. A British and subsequent German 
ruling forced neutral correspondents to commit to one side of the war, if they were 
found reporting from the other side, they would be executed as spies.54 
 
The Second World War changed little in the way war correspondents operated in the 
field, though technological advances had led to radio reports now being made 
directly from war zones, and the use of video cameras became more common, 
                                                            
49 A good account of the military’s feelings towards war correspondents can be found in: G Wolseley, 
The Soldier’s Pocket -Book for Field Service (London: Macmillan and co., 1871) which speaks of the 
“the newly-invented curses to armies – I mean war reporters”, p. 82. 
50 Knightly (2004), pp. 91-94. 
51 Knightly (2004), p. 100. See also: M Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” (1919), who praised the 
German press for its critical assessment of the Kaiser and the Imperial German General Staff and their 
leadership during WWI, pp. 11-12, available at: http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf.  
52 Largely under pressure of the Americans, who pointed out that the French and British refusal to 
engage with war reporters and allow them at the front, meant that the only war news written by 
American war correspondents trusted by the American public now came from the German side, which 
was harming Britain’s cause in the US, see: Knightly (2004), p. 100. 
53 Knightly (2004), pp. 100-102.; also Royle (1987), pp. 106-107.  
54 Knightly (2004), p. 122. 
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allowing for more varied news production. News became valued in terms of its 
service towards the war effort.55 While this was not a new development, allied 
leaders had accepted the view that publicity rather than silence benefited the conduct 
of war by a nation since 1915, it became more pronounced during the Second World 
War.56 This view risks exposing journalists to pressures to create news stories that 
provide the best obtainable contribution to the war effort, rather than truthful and 
accurate reporting and most stories, partly through censorship, were essentially 
propaganda. All material, written, broadcast or photographed, had to be passed by 
censors before publication, which did mean, however, that there were few 
restrictions on access to frontlines and military campaigns.57 
 
 Especially the written press, by far the largest group of journalists in the field, still 
often travelled with the military. They accompanied military units into battle while 
wearing the uniforms of officers.58 These journalists were however not meant to take 
arms against the enemy and were officially non-combatants, though they still 
occasionally drifted towards acting as combatants when under attack.59 They were 
mainly viewed as being part of the military of the country they represented. General 
Eisenhower explicitly stated that as far as he was concerned war correspondents were 
military personnel and would be treated as such.60 During the D-Day invasion the 48 
correspondents reporting for the BBC were given military training, uniforms and 
were assigned to specific units.61 The Americans were the first to award military 
decorations to civilian war correspondents and in the later stages of the war, carrying 
guns became more commonplace for civilian war correspondents.62 There are even 
accounts of ‘jeeploads’ of journalists arriving in towns ahead of the allied forces and 
essentially ‘liberating’ those towns and accepting surrenders.63 ‘Neutral journalists’ 
                                                            
55 J Mathews, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 175. 
56 Ibid. 
57 J Sylvester, and S Huffman, Reporting from the Front: The media and the military (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 13. 
58 Royle (1987), p. 148; For American reporters see: D Porch, “No Bad Stories: The American media-
military relationship” (2002) 55 Naval War College Review, 84, p. 88. 
59 Knightly (2004), pp. 333-334. 
60 “I regard war correspondents as quasi staff officers (…) as staff officers your first duty is a military 
duty (…)”. A copy of the speech can be found in Royle (1987), p. 148. 
61 Royle (1987), p. 160. 
62 Knightly (2004), pp. 345-346. 
63 Ibid. 
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who didn’t accompany military units to the front also reported on the war. Groups of 
them were based, for example, in Germany and Russia, but they formed a minority 
and were dependent on material provided to them by Officials which tended to be 
mostly propaganda or heavily censored reports.64 Germany took a different approach 
and conscripted a large number of artists, writers, photographers etc. in the 
Propaganda division of the Army, essentially turning them into military 
correspondents. They received basic training and were expected to fight, leading to a 
high casualty rate, on par with the German infantry.65  
 
2.1.2 War reporting 1945-1975: Strained media-military relationship 
At the start of the Korean War in 1950, a large majority of the press both in Britain 
and the US were supportive of the decision to intervene in South Korea, after North 
Korea invaded the country, though six months into the war support began to waver.66 
Faced with a somewhat hostile press, full military censorship was imposed by the 
Americans from 1951 to the end of the war.67 Television reporting was still in its 
infancy at the time of the Korean War and it was not a conflict that was extensively 
reported on. The distance of Korea in combination with a war that posed no real 
immediate physical threat to the West, caused the media in both the UK and US to 
lose interest as the war went on.68 Those correspondents at the front, from a variety 
of nationalities, were, as they were in WWII, mostly carrying weapons, some for 
self-defence, but others with less justifiable motives.69  
 
By the time the Vietnam War broke out, television was starting to become part of 
daily life and provided a more intimate and graphic picture of the war than news 
bulletins through radio, cinema or newspapers delivered during previous wars. While 
there was no official censorship policy in place, all journalists had to be accredited 
by the Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) to cover “the operational, advisory and 
support activities of the Free World Military Assistance Forces”, which also 
                                                            
64 Knightly (2004), pp. 240-241; also Mathews  (1957), pp. 180-181. 
65 Knightly (2004) pp. 240-241. 
66 M Hudson and J Stanier, War and the Media (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1997), pp. 90-97; Royle 
(1987), p. 177. 
67 Royle (1987), p. 193; Knightly (2004), pp. 376-377. 
68 Hudson and Stanier (1997), p. 94; Royle (1987), p. 177. 
69 Knightly (2004), pp. 368-369. 
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provided military transportation services.70 Conversely, the lack of an official 
censorship policy made military officials more reluctant to talk to the press and as 
transport could virtually only be obtained from the military, reporting could be 
limited by denying access to transport.71 Unlike in the Second World War, journalists 
no longer wore military clothing, but most wore tailor made safari jackets which 
roughly resembled a military uniform, from a distance, which allowed them to be 
less conspicuous in the field.72 The question of whether correspondents could carry 
weapons came up for discussion again during the Vietnam War. The official line was 
that they should not, or risk being viewed as legitimate targets by the enemy, but 
many continued to carry personal weapons, mostly for self-defence.73 
 
Vietnam was one of the first major conflicts where the media seemingly actively 
withdrew their support for a conflict and the patriotism that had been characteristic of 
reporting in previous conflicts disappeared.74 While later studies showed the press 
was largely supportive of the war until the Tet Offensive and didn’t form public 
opinion as much as followed it,75 this was not the view held by the military. General 
Westmoreland, in command of all US military operations in Vietnam from 1964-
1968, famously noted that “Vietnam was the first war ever fought without 
censorship. Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the public mind”, 
a viewpoint which influenced the media-military relationship in subsequent 
conflicts.76 Vietnam was also the conflict where questions underlying the ethics of 
war reporting became more pronounced and openly discussed, with a stronger ‘to 
observe, but not interfere’ mentality emerging.77 It was a war that was difficult to 
                                                            
70 Royle (1987), pp. 204-205. 
71 R Keeble, “Words as Weapons:  History of war reporting – 1945 to present” in: R Fortner and P 
Fackler (eds.), The Handbook of Global Communication and Media Ethics (Chichester: John Willey 
and sons ltd., 2014), 193-214, p. 197; Hudson and Stanier (1997), p. 106. 
72 Knightly (2004), p. 443. 
73 Knightly (2004), p. 445. There have been instances where correspondents set out to kill and/or have 
killed during the conflict, but they are rare: Ibid. 
74 Hudson and Stanier (1997), pp. 110-118; C Thayer, “Vietnam: A critical analysis,” in: PE Young 
(ed.), Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War (New York: Frank Cass, 1992), 89-115, pp. 91-
94.  
75 See for example: C Thayer, (1992); WM Hammond, Public Affairs: The military and the media, 
1968–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1996). 
76 Porch (2002), pp. 91-92; C Paul and J Kim, Reports on the Battlefield: The embedded press system 
in historical context (Santa Monica: Rand, 2004), pp. 36-38. 
77 Knightly (2004), pp. 448-450. 
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report on,78 with no clear front line, leading journalists to travel through dangerous 
territory in search of something to report.79 The death toll of the conflict was high; 
more than 70 local and foreign journalists were killed in the field.80 Some of them 
were highly experienced correspondents, and causes of death varied from landmines 
and helicopter crashes to being killed directly by the Vietcong.81 
 
2.1.3 War reporting 1975 - present: The rise of the embedding system 
The 1980s saw a variety of conflicts, some of which were heavily reported on in the 
international media. The Falklands War posed difficulties for the press in terms of 
access, leaving them heavily reliant on the military for transportation, which led a 
number of journalists to accompany the military to the Falklands, rather than report 
on the conflict independently.82 During the conflict in Grenada in 1983, largely in 
response to the negative press during the Vietnam War, the US military refused to 
allow any media to accompany the Marines during the first 48 hours of the 
invasion.83 The resulting lack of coverage resulted in a backlash which led to the 
creation of a press pool in the US, a group of pre-selected and screened reporters 
who could cover late-breaking, or secret, military operations at short notice.84 The 
system failed at the first major hurdle in Panama, where the press pool was kept 
away from the battlefield, while a number of reporters not part of the press pool, 
managed to get to the action on their own and provide better coverage than those in 
the press pools.85 The subsequent review of the failure to include the press in 
Panama, led General Collin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 
send a directive to all major military commanders stating (in part) that: 
“Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations are 
important (...) and warrant your personal attention. (...) Media coverage and pool 
                                                            
78 There was no clear battle objective as there had been in previous wars. Complex political issues 
were mixed in with military aspects and propaganda and news management made reporting even more 
challenging. See: Knightly (2004), p. 423.  
79 Royle (1987), pp. 205-206. 
80 Keeble (2011), p. 197. 
81 The journalists directly killed by the Vietcong were ambushed, and in spite of shouting “press” in 
Vietnamese were shot: Knightly (2004), p. 445. 
82 Hudson and Stanier (1997), pp. 169-170. 
83 Paul and Kim, (2004), p. 39; Hudson and Stanier (1997), pp. 195. Access was allowed thereafter, 
though all the fighting was over by that point. 
84 Paul and Kim (2004), p. 20. 
85 Porch (2002), p. 95. 
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support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational plans and 
should address all aspects of operational activity (…).”86 The directive assisted in 
changing the military’s attitude towards the media and began to improve the 
integration of them with the military in combat missions.87 Though the press pools 
were maintained during the Gulf War, there were still lingering problems and they 
were unpopular with journalists for a variety of reasons, in particular as they offered 
many restrictions and very little exclusive access to information.88 Many journalists 
chose therefore to function independently of the military outside the pool system 
during the conflict.89 This, combined with technological advancement allowing ‘live’ 
broadcasting from the battlefield for the first time during a major conflict, 
complicated the regulation of information for security purposes.90 
 
The dissatisfaction with the press pool system and the propensity of reporters to 
bypass it, led to the eventual development of the embedding-system.91 The term 
‘embedded-press’ was first used in 1995 in Bosnia, where reporters were being 
assigned to a unit and lived and deployed with them on a long-term basis.92 The 
character of the subsequent Kosovo Conflict, which was largely an aerial campaign, 
granted less access to the embedded reporters than a ground campaign and reporters 
once again looked to alternative sources for information. The conflict proved that in 
the information age it has become very difficult for the military to fully limit media 
access to information and a propaganda war, where both sides try to win public 
support, is easily started.93 Similarly, the Kosovo conflict showed that ‘information 
operations’, or managing the public image of a conflict, has now become an essential 
                                                            
86 F Aukofer and W Lawrence, America’s Team: The odd couple – A report on the relationship 
between the media and the military (Nashville: Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), p. 
45. 
87 Ibid, see also: D Moore “Twenty-first Century Embedded Journalism: Lawful targets?” (2009) 
31The Army Lawyer, 1, p. 7. 
88 For an overview of the issues associated with the press pools see Porch (2002), pp. 95-97; see also: 
Paul and Kim (2004), pp. 44-45. 
89 Porch (2002), p. 95. 
90 Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), p. 11. 
91 Or re-introduction thereof, albeit in more formalised form as the reporters had been effectively 
embedded with military units during World War II and to some extent Vietnam, see: Porch (2002), p. 
97. 
92 Paul and Kim (2004), p. 48. 
93 Paul and Kim (2004), p. 50. 
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part of military operations.94 This opens the door to considering the work of reporters 
to be part of a country’s military strategy, which exposes them to becoming potential 
military targets, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Journalists have 
noted they feel the war in Bosnia has been some form of turning point in terms of 
respect for journalists. As noted by Marie Colvin of the Sunday Times: “So many 
journalists have been killed in the last few years… We used to have almost an 
unofficial diplomatic status. We were seen unofficially as objective and unofficially 
as neutral. And now we’re actually targets”.95 
 
The move towards embedding reporters has, in part, also been enacted in response to 
the problems posed by changes in the character of warfare. Whereas it is relatively 
straightforward for a reporter to follow ground-troops to the front, as had been the 
case in past wars, modern wars are no longer predominantly fought this way. War 
now tends to consist of coordinated air-, land- and sea-action, with high-speed 
‘manoeuvre warfare’, with pockets of action, rather than a clear front line.96 The 
rapid movement of troops and fighting means the most effective way for reporters to 
follow the war is to be placed with a military unit, preferably before fighting breaks 
out and to travel with them.97 Similarly coverage of humanitarian operations poses 
their own challenges.98 The Iraq invasion saw the embedded press system become 
the preferred method of allowing the press access to the action, while still keeping 
some control over the flow of information.99 The battle phase of the invasion was 
covered by around 2100 ‘unilateral’ reporters, independent journalists not attached to 
a military unit, and roughly 600 embedded reporters of different nationalities who 
                                                            
94 Porch (2002), p. 101. 
95 Quoted in: H Tumber and F Webster, Journalist under Fire: Information war and journalistic 
practices (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 119; see also: D Bennett, “The Life of a War 
Correspondent is Even Worse than You Think” (10 July 2013) The Wire, available at: 
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96 Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), pp. 45-46. 
97 Ibid. 
98 For an overview of the issues associated with media coverage of humanitarian operations, see: 
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were embedded with different parts of the military.100 Embedding has also been 
proven to be safer for journalists than travelling through conflict zones 
independently, with far fewer deaths occurring in Iraq amongst embedded reporters 
than amongst ‘unilaterals’.101 Embedding is now seen as the future system of choice 
for media coverage of large-scale combat operations.102  
 
 
2.2 The evolution of armed conflict 
 
It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to give a full account of the evolution of 
armed conflict over the last century, but some consideration must be given to the 
changes in the way conflicts are fought that impact on the operation and protection of 
journalists in conflict zones. 
 
At the time of the first appearance of civilian war correspondents on the battlefield 
during the Crimean War, wars were fought very differently from the way they are 
these days. Weaponry available to combatants largely dictates the conduct of 
warfare. The wars of the 19th century, with weapons limited in range, were generally 
fought along a clear front.103 This made it relatively easy for journalists to cover a 
war, as all fighting took place along clearly identifiable lines. Subsequent wars saw 
advances in weaponry but remained fought across fairly clear fronts. The advantage 
of a clear battle front is that journalists can travel relatively safely through a conflict 
zone, as fighting is concentrated along certain lines behind (or before) which it is 
generally safe to travel. While reporters in these early conflicts were mostly at risk 
from disease or being shot or stabbed by the enemy, the advance of chemical warfare 
during World War I, added to the risks they faced when being close to the fighting, 
though the risks posed by disease diminished with the advances made in medicine.  
                                                            
100 Paul and Kim (2004), pp. 54-55; B Katovsky and T Carlson, Embedded: The media at war in Iraq 
(Guilford: Lyons Press, 2003), p. XIV.  
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By the time of the Vietnam War, the experience for reporters in the field had 
changed. It was one of the first major wars that had no clear front. There were 
pockets of fighting across a large area, but no frontline that was moving forward or 
backwards. While the character of the conflict cannot be simply classed as guerrilla 
warfare,104 it had some of its characteristics, which made a clear overview of the 
progress of the war difficult to obtain and report on and travelling through the 
territory dangerous.105 It was also, as discussed above, a war where the potential 
influence of the media on the outcome of a conflict became more pronounced. These 
two changes to warfare: the lack of a clear front line and the perceived influence of 
the media on public support for a conflict, have remained part of and, to some extent, 
intensified in later conflicts. As stated by Colonel Jack Ivy during the Kosovo 
Conflict; “public information is a battle space (…) that must be contested and 
controlled like any other.”106 The bombing of the Serbian Television station in 1999 
and subsequent attacks on television stations have showed that media equipment is 
increasingly perceived as a military target within a conflict, as are journalists 
themselves.107 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted that it is possible to 
identify two main features of armed conflict in recent years. Firstly, armed conflict is 
now fought in a diversity of situations, which range from conflicts where the most 
advanced weapon systems are deployed in asymmetric confrontations, to low 
technology conflicts with a high degree of fragmentation of the actors involved.108 
Importantly, the majority of conflicts can no longer be classified as international 
                                                            
104 See for example:  J Record, “Vietnam in Retrospect: Could we have won” (1996-1997) 26(4) 
Parameters, 51. 
105 See Knightly (2004), p. 423. 
106 Porch (2002), p. 101. 
107 See for example: ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” 13 June 2000, available 
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Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 28 November-1December 2011, available at: 
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armed conflict, 109 as wars are now often fought against non-state actors and will 
therefore be classified as non-international armed conflict. This is especially 
problematic in terms of the legal protection offered to journalists, as they derive their 
protection largely from the Geneva Conventions, which are not fully applicable in 
non-international armed conflict,110 as will be discussed in the next chapter. The 
second main feature of modern conflict is the change in the duration of conflicts. 
Enduring situations of armed conflict have become more common, where the conflict 
fluctuates between phases of high and low intensity and instability without a 
reasonable expectation of lasting peace in the near future.111 Similarly unresolved 
inter-state disputes have resulted in long-term occupation.112  
 
The increasing complexity of armed conflicts has given rise to concerns over the 
adequacy of the current IHL framework to deal with these conflicts. Legal issues that 
have given rise for concern are the adequacy and practicability of the existing armed 
conflict classifications in relation to the new realities of organised armed violence, 
especially the current criteria for determining the existence of international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict.  
 
 
2.3 The development of protection for journalist under IHL treaties 
 
IHL, sometimes referred to as the law of armed conflicts, is defined by the ICRC as: 
“a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed 
conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the 
hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.” IHL is made up of a body 
of treaty laws and customary law, the latter consisting of rules that, through the 
development of custom and state practice during the conduct of war, have become 
                                                            
109 Ibid. 
110 For an overview of the issues associated with these classifications see: R Bartels, “Timelines, 
Borderlines and Conflicts: The historical evolution of the legal divide between international and non-
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accepted as legally binding.113 While treaty law is generally only binding on the 
states party to these treaties, customary law is binding on all states.114 Treaty law can 
however contain, or consist entirely of, provisions that are seen as declaratory of 
customary law, in which case the provisions are binding to all states, including those 
not party to the treaty.115 
 
Examples of customs governing the conduct of warfare can be found throughout 
history under different civilisations.116 Historically, most texts considering the 
conduct of war between states, such as the de Jure Belli ac Pacis,117 described 
customary law, rather than containing multi-party treaty law. Customs were often 
confined to a specific territory and changed over time. It was not until the mid-19th 
century that attempts were made to create a body of international laws, codified in 
treaty form and signed by multiple state-parties that were to govern the conduct of 
warfare between those parties.118 One of the first such treaties was the first Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the 
Field,119 signed by 16 countries in 1864. This was followed by the Hague 
Declarations of 1899120 and the Hague Conventions of 1907.121 They form, together 
with the Geneva Conventions the basis for IHL, which now consists of a multitude of 
treaties governing aspects of war such as the use of biological and chemical 
weapons, the protection of cultural property during armed conflict and the protection 
of children in armed conflicts, as well as a growing body of customary law. IHL now 
covers two main areas: the protection of persons not, or no longer, taking part in 
conflict; and the conduct of warfare, such as the use of certain types of weapons and 
                                                            
113 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University 
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tactics.122 There are currently no multi-party international treaties that specifically 
seek to protect journalists in conflict areas. 
 
While at first glance it may seem logical to assume journalists operating in conflict 
zones will be classed as civilians under IHL provisions, as they generally do not 
participate in a conflict but are there to observe and document, the legal framework 
shows that the situation is not as straightforward as this. As has been shown above, 
journalists operate in different ways in conflict zones, and practice has changed over 
time, impacting on their legal status under IHL. Journalists accompanying a military 
unit making use of the equipment and protection offered by the military may be 
classed differently from journalists travelling through conflict zones independently. 
While the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977 contain 
several provisions that are relevant to journalists, few mention journalists 
specifically.  
 
2.3.1 The development of the Geneva Conventions 
The first Geneva Convention, the “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” was adopted in 1864, after a 
conference organised by the Swiss government. The conference was an extension of 
the work undertaken in the previous years by a committee established by the Geneva 
Public Welfare Society, which sought to alleviate the suffering of the wounded 
soldiers in the wars that were taking place in Europe.123 The committee would go on 
to become the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1875. The first Geneva 
Convention consisted of a set of 10 basic provisions aimed at improving conditions 
for wounded soldiers and protecting the medical personnel providing services in the 
field. Several international treaties were enacted in the years following the adoption 
of the first Geneva Convention, such as The Hague Conventions, and the Geneva 
Convention itself was eventually replaced by the second Geneva Convention 
“Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
                                                            
122 ICRC, “Treaties and Customary Law: Overview” (29 October 2010), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/overview-treaties-and-customary-
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Armies in the Field” in 1906. This Convention, consisting of 33 articles, provided 
considerable progress in terms of detailed provisions and was more precise in its 
terminology than its predecessor. The Convention remained in force until the last 
state party to the Convention acceded to the later Geneva Convention of 1949 in 
1970.124 While more detailed than the first Geneva Convention, no specific 
consideration was given to war correspondents, which is largely due to the character 
of the treaty and the content. There are however other (older) international treaties on 
the laws of war which do give specific consideration to newspaper correspondents in 
conflict zones. These treaties would go on to form the basis of the Geneva 
“Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” of 1929 which was the 
first Geneva Convention to give specific consideration to correspondents. 
 
One of the first international declarations concerning the laws and customs of war to 
mention war correspondents specifically in one of its articles is the 1874 Brussels 
Declaration. The Declaration, consisting of delegates from 15 European states, 
adopted a draft of an international agreement concerning the laws and customs of 
war submitted to them by the Russian Government.125 While it was never ratified and 
largely ignored at the international level,126 it formed the basis for the later Hague 
Conventions which were more successful and would become a binding convention. 
Article 34 of the Brussels Declaration states:  
Individuals in the vicinity of armies but not directly forming part of 
them, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, sutlers, 
contractors, etc., can also be made prisoners. These prisoners 
should however be in possession of a permit issued by the 
competent authority and of a certificate of identity. 
The proceedings of the conference, as far as they have been published, show that 
there was no discussion on whether war correspondents are deserving of prisoner of 
                                                            
124 ICRC, “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in 
the Field”, Geneva, 6 July 1906”, available at: 
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war status, nor if this is the best protection that can be granted to them.127 The content 
of article 34 of the Brussels Declaration was subsequently adopted into the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,128 with alternative wording, as the original 
formulation of the article was considered to be confusing. It seemingly states that 
persons who accompany the army without being part of it can be made prisoners if 
they have been provided with a permit by a competent authority, suggesting that if 
they do not have a permit they can go free, which was not the intention of the 
provision.129 There are however, again, no recorded deliberations at this point on 
whether war correspondents are entitled to prisoner of war status, or whether this the 
most suitable protection for them.130 All that is said in this regard is: “This text keeps 
in sight that these persons cannot really be considered as prisoners of war at all. But 
it may be necessary to detain them either temporarily or till the end of the war and in 
this case it will certainly be advantageous for them to be treated like prisoners of 
war.”131 
 
The “Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” of 1929 
sought to complete the earlier Hague Treaties of 1899 and 1907 concerning the 
treatment of prisoners of war, which had proven inadequate during World War I.132 
The Convention was signed by 47 nations and clarified state obligations to treat 
prisoners of war humanely. While the Convention is no longer in operation after the 
universal acceptance of the later Geneva Convention of 1949, it is the first Geneva 
Convention in which ‘correspondents’ and ‘news reporters’ are given express 
consideration. Article 81 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which is nearly identical 
                                                            
127 See the notes of A Horsford, the British delegate to the conference, which provide an extensive 
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to the previously discussed wording of article 13 of the Hague Convention of 1899 
and 1907, which applies the convention to certain categories of civilians: 
Persons who follow the armed forces without directly belonging 
thereto, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, sutlers, or 
contractors, who fall into the hands of the enemy, and whom the 
latter think fit to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners 
of war, provided they are in possession of an authorization from the 
military authorities of the armed forces which they were following. 
The article still only gives consideration to those correspondents who accompany the 
army, which reflects the reporting practice of the time as discussed above. While the 
article offers correspondents some protection, it also places them in a vague legal 
category of people who are and remain civilians, but are simultaneously considered 
prisoners of war.133 This provision is continued in the Geneva Convention of 1949, 
which is currently in force. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were enacted in 
response to the deficiencies in the Geneva Convention of 1929, which proved unable 
to stop the many atrocities committed by different states during World War II. While 
WWII had yet to come to its conclusion, the ICRC announced in February 1945 their 
intention to revise the convention on prisoners of war and create a new convention to 
protect the civilian population from the effects of war.134 The Conventions, while 
based on the previous Geneva Conventions and The Hague Conventions, were also 
heavily influenced by a number of international treaties and agreements that had 
been enacted between 1929 and 1949, as well as the national and international 
positions to war crimes taken during the Second World War.135  
 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions had significantly broadened the scope of the previous 
Geneva Conventions and, most importantly, added protection for the civilian 
population to the Conventions. By the 1970s however, more than two decades after 
the implementation of the 1949 Conventions, several wars had been fought which 
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exposed several issues with the Conventions. While the 1949 Conventions sought to 
protect the civilian population from arbitrary action by enemy parties, it did not seek 
to protect the civilian population from the effects of hostilities in general.136 This gap 
is addressed in the Additional Protocols. It was clear from the start of the process that 
there was no intention to rewrite, or completely revise, the Geneva Conventions, as it 
was felt this could have weakened them. It was considered to be sufficient to extend 
them, where needed, to include matters not covered by the 1949 Convention and to 
clarify some contentious points, which is how the idea of the Additional Protocols 
was developed.137 Two protocols were eventually added to the Geneva conventions 
in 1977, which not only updated and added to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 but 
also updated and codified the Hague Convention, which had not been revised since 
1907: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 
June 1977, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977. The provisions of the Geneva Conventions (1949) and 





The civilian war correspondent is a relatively new phenomenon which developed in 
the mid-19th century when the first civilian correspondents were sent to cover the 
Crimean War for the audience at home. Civilian war reporters quickly grew in 
numbers and had become a distinct and sizeable group within journalism by the time 
of the American Civil War. Around the same time the protection of journalists was 
incorporated in IHL treaties. The protection offered, reflected the reporting practice 
of the time and saw little change in subsequent revisions of IHL. By the 1970s 
reporting practice had changed, with fewer journalists travelling through conflict 
zones with military units and increasing numbers preferring to cover conflicts with 
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little restraints to their movements. A rise in the number of journalists killed in action 
saw the incorporation of an article in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions in 1977, aimed at increasing protection for journalists travelling 
independently through conflict zones. This has been the last update of the IHL 
framework to consider journalists.  
 
Since 1977 there have been significant changes in the way journalists operate in 
conflict zones, their perceived influence on the audience at home and the way in 
which conflicts are fought more generally. These changes may affect the ability of 
the current IHL framework to protect journalists. Concerns have similarly arisen over 
the adequacy of IHL in general, questioning whether the current body of substantive 
norms is capable of dealing with the reality of modern conflict, as well as concerns 
over its applicability in certain cases.138 One thing is clear; journalists perceive the 
dangers in reporting from war zones to be increasing,139 which seems to be supported 
by the statistics provided by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),140 which is a 
worrying development. During the past century the Geneva Conventions have been 
revised roughly every 25 years, which may suggest it is time for another international 
conference to consider changing the laws of war to deal with the challenges of 
contemporary armed conflicts. Given the fact that the deaths of 17 foreign 
correspondents in 1970 was sufficient reason for the UN to propose a dedicated 
convention for the protection of journalists, the death of 28 journalists in Syria alone 
in 2013, with 70 deaths worldwide,141 might indicate the time has come to take 
serious action in this area. The next chapters will consider the exact protection 
offered by the provisions of the IHL framework, as well as additional protection 
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offered by International Human Rights Law and will consider whether these together 
are still capable of providing adequate protection for journalists in conflict zones. 
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3. International Humanitarian Law 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or the law of armed conflict, consists of a set 
of rules which govern the way armed force can be used during hostilities.142 It forms 
part of the larger framework of public international law. This body of law comprises 
international conventions, international custom, general principles and, as a 
subsidiary source, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists.143 IHL seeks to protect both combatants and non-combatants from the 
effects of armed conflict, by limiting unnecessary suffering and by protecting those 
who are not, or no longer, involved in the conflict.144 The IHL framework is 
primarily made up of treaty law, which is only binding on those states which are 
party to the treaty, and customary law, which consists of state practices which have 
developed over time and are now considered legally binding on all states.145 The 
laws of war have primarily been developed in the context of wars between states and 
while IHL applies fully to international armed conflict, fewer provisions apply 
during non-international, or internal, armed conflict as will be discussed below. This 
is becoming increasingly problematic in terms of the legal protection of journalists as 
the provisions that provide the most specific protection to them, may not fully apply 
in the majority of the conflicts journalists now cover.  
 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the current framework of IHL that 
protects journalists in conflict zones. It will set out the relevant provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions (1949) and its Additional Protocols, as well as other relevant 
international documents concerned with the protection of journalists. It will further 
consider the application and interpretation of the relevant provisions in different 
types of conflict, such as international and non-international armed conflict, as well 
as differences in protection offered to different types of reporters. 
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3.1 International Humanitarian treaty Law 
 
Humanitarian treaties have developed historically as contracts between two or more 
states on the basis of reciprocity. However, the underlying principles of humanitarian 
law became more pronounced during the period following the First World War 
(WWI), as demonstrated by the significant expansion of the provisions in the Geneva 
Convention (1929) concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and the further 
extension of the material field of application of the Conventions (1949). The 
Conventions (1949) became consequently less regarded as a set of reciprocal 
contracts drawn up in national interest and more as “solemn affirmations of 
principles respected for their own sake, and as a series of unconditional engagements 
on the part of each of the Contracting Parties 'vis-à-vis' the others.”146 This can be 
seen in the suggested pre-amble for the Conventions, which stated: “Respect for the 
personality and dignity of human beings constitutes a universal principle which is 
binding even in the absence of any contractual undertaking.”147 Though the proposed 
pre-amble met with no objections, it was later abandoned when no agreement could 
be reached on a number of suggested additional clauses.148 However, the underlying 
principle runs throughout the Conventions (1949) and is most notable in terms of the 
widening of the application of some provisions to non-international armed conflict, a 
field IHL had not been previously concerned with, as will be discussed in paragraph 
3.1.3.  
 
There are several provisions in the Geneva Convention and their Additional 
Protocols that provide protection to journalists working in conflict zones. While 
these provisions seek to protect journalists from harm, they do not concern 
themselves with journalism and make no statements on the legality or justification of 
journalistic activities in such areas.149  
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3.1.1 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
Conventions I-III were based on previous Conventions, though they significantly 
expanded and revised previous subject matter, while the addition of Convention IV 
brought a new field of application to IHL by seeking to protect the civilian 
population from the effects of war, an area of law not previously covered by IHL.150 
Another important addition was made in the form of article 3 common to all four 
Conventions. While the entire text of the Conventions only applies to international 
armed conflict, common article 3 extends the application of some provisions, mainly 
those concerned with humane treatment of civilians and captured combatants, to 
‘armed conflict not of an international character’,151 as will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
The Conventions were eventually adopted on the 12th of August 1949 and are made 
up of four treaties, combined into a single charter adopted on the 12th of August 
1949. They consist of Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (hereafter Geneva Convention I);152 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter, Geneva Convention II);153 
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter Geneva 
Convention III);154 and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (hereafter Geneva Convention IV).155 They entered into force on the 
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Article 4A(4) Geneva Convention III and article 13(4) Geneva Convention I-II 
Only one article in the Geneva Conventions (1949) directly concerns the protection 
of journalists, which is included in nearly identical wording in the first, second and 
third Convention. Article 13(4) in Geneva Convention I and II, and article 4A(4) in 
the Geneva Convention III consider war correspondents: journalists who accompany 
the armed forces and have been given authorisations by the armed forces to do so. 
Conventions I and II state in article 13(4) that the Conventions shall apply 
respectively to the wounded and sick and to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at 
sea, belonging to the following categories: 
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft 
crews, war correspondents, (..) provided that they have received 
authorization from the armed forces which they accompany. 157 
This provides war correspondents with the same protection offered to that of 
combatants during a conflict. Article 4A(4) of the third Geneva Convention follows 
the exact wording of this article to state that this category of persons, is entitled to 
prisoner of war status upon capture, though the article adds that the armed forces 
“shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed 
model.” Article 13 is mostly included out of a desire to be precise, as it does not 
confer significant new rights to war correspondents, who would already be receiving 
the same care that article 13(4) confers to them, under customary law.158  
Furthermore, there is little difference between being considered a category 13(4) 
civilian or an ‘ordinary’ civilian under Convention IV; in both cases the care and 
protection they (should) receive will largely be essentially the same. As the 
commentary on the Conventions states: Conventions I and IV “are entirely 
complementary, and cover the whole field of human suffering”.159  
 
Article 4A(4) is, however, generally referred to as the main (and only) article 
concerning war correspondents as it conveys significant new rights to them. When 
captured, war correspondents will be classed as prisoners of war, granting them the 
                                                            
157 This provision will for the remainder of this thesis be referred to as art. 4A(4) as this is seen as the 
main article concerning war correspondents. 
158 Pictet (1952), p. 145. 
159 Ibid.  
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full scope of protection offered under Convention III.  The article differs from the 
previous provision in article 81 of Geneva Convention (1929) in that it no longer 
states that war correspondents are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, it actually 
gives them the status of prisoner of war. The article in question is one of the most 
discussed articles of the Geneva Conventions and has undergone several changes 
from its original draft to its eventual adoption.160 Most of the discussion focussed on 
who exactly is deserving of prisoner of war status, with the status of resistance 
movements or ‘partisans’ proving especially contentious.161  The principle that war 
correspondents should be treated as prisoners of war if captured, however, did not 
come under discussion.162 This seems to have been a well-established principle of 
law, which since its appearance in the Brussels Convention of 1874, has been 
incorporated in several important international treaties concerning humanitarian law, 
without coming under serious discussion. 
 
The term ‘war correspondent’ is not defined in the Geneva Conventions, but the 
article itself contains two requirements, which aid identification: 1) they should be 
accompanying the armed forces and 2) they should have received authorisation to do 
so. This excludes most journalists from this category as the majority of journalists 
now travel independently through conflict zones, as will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6. Given the description of a ‘journalist’ considered appropriate for the 
interpretation of article 79 Protocol I, discussed below, a war correspondent can be 
described as any personnel who work for the media as their principal occupation and 
are following the armed forces with authorisation from the armed forces to do so. 
The exact definition of war correspondent is not of great concern here, as article 
4A(4) provides an indicative list of civilians who should receive prisoner of war 
status if captured, rather than an exhaustive one.163 Obtaining an identity card from 
the armed forces would prove beneficial for clarification purposes and is advisable 
                                                            
160 See the discussion on art. 3, which eventually became art. 4A in the final version of the 
Convention, in: ICRC, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I- III, 
(Berne: Federal Political Department, 1949), pp. 243-296. 
161 J Pictet, “The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims” (1951) 45(3) The 
American Journal of International Law, 462, p. 471. 
162 ICRC, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II, (Berne: Federal 
Political Department, 1949), pp. 243-296. 
163 ICRC, Report on the Work of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims (Geneva, 1947), p. 113. 
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for journalists travelling in this position. The Geneva Convention (1929) which 
contained a similar article, made the carrying of an identification card mandatory for 
receiving prisoner of war protection. This has been abandoned in the Geneva 
Conventions (1949), which state that carrying an identity card is not a requirement 
but rather a supplementary safeguard to clarify status.164 A model for the identity 
card is contained in Annex IV to the third Convention which requires basic 
information such as a photo, name, place of birth and the capacity in which the 
civilian accompanies the armed forces.  
 
The rationale behind this provision is that though war correspondents, and the other 
persons mentioned in article 4A(4), are civilians, combatant forces may need to 
detain them during military operations for security reasons.165 When this happens, it 
is important that they have the same rights and receive the same protection as 
prisoners of war, due to the access to information about the armed forces they are 
likely to have in this situation. Convention III provides additional protection over and 
above that of ‘ordinary’ civilians. It provides prisoners of war, with the right, for 
example, not to have to answer during questioning (article 17) and should they be 
captured with the military unit they are accompanying, they cannot be accused of 
being a spy.166 
 
3.1.2 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1949) 
Article 79 Protocol I: protection for journalists 
Article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention protects war correspondents: those 
reporters who have special authorisation to follow the armed forces without actually 
being a member thereof. The article offers no protection to journalists who travel 
independently through conflict zones. To remedy this, article 79 was drafted and 
incorporated in Protocol I, without opposition to the proposed text or modifications 
other than minor drafting changes.167 The article is the first time journalists who are 
                                                            
164 Pictet (1960), p. 65. 
165 Pictet (1960), p. 49. 
166 For a general overview of the provisions concerning spies, see: Fleck (ed.) (2008), paras.  322-235. 
167 H-P Gasser, “Article 79 – Measures of Protection for Journalists”, in: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and 
B Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
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not travelling with an army unit are given special consideration under international 
humanitarian law. This reflects the changing practice in war reporting at the time, as 
discussed previously, where reporters increasingly entered conflict zones 
independently. As argued during the deliberations of the draft for article 79, which 
noted the increase in deaths of journalists in conflict zones: “too frequently journalists 
engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict do not enjoy 
adequate protection.”168 
 
It is interesting to note that the article did not result from the original ICRC draft for 
the Diplomatic conference, but was based on a draft United Nations Convention on 
the Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed 
Conflict of 1975. The need for increased protection for journalists was brought to the 
attention of the UN when in 1970 seventeen foreign correspondents disappeared in 
Cambodia.169 While the majority of the consulted government experts were in favour 
of providing special protection for journalists, the consulted Steering Committee for 
Human Rights (CDDH) suggested that the protection should be included in general 
IHL, rather than a special convention.170 As stated by the delegate from Canada 
during the discussion of the draft of article 79:  
The inclusion of the new article in draft Protocol I would be a 
quicker and more effective means of ensuring the necessary 
protection for journalists engaged in dangerous professional 
missions than the drafting of a separate convention. Moreover, it 
would have the practical advantage of making the journalists in 
question more familiar with the Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocols.171  
                                                            
168 ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. X, 
CDDH/219 rev. 1, para. 190ter. 
169 UNESCO, New Communication Order 4: Protection of journalists (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), p. 2.  
170 ICRC (1987), para. 3252. 
171 ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, 
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The draft article, based on the UN Convention, was adopted without opposition and 
only minor drafting changes to the text.172 The discussions during the various 
Committee meetings focussed mainly on what information was to be included on the 
identity cards for journalists and the question of whether journalists should wear a 
protective emblem to make them easily identifiable from a distance during conflict, 
the latter of which was decided against, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
8.173 
 
Unlike the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Protocol I has not achieved universal 
acceptance and has not been ratified by significant military powers such as the 
United States and Iran.174 This may be problematic in terms of protection for 
journalists in conflicts involving these military powers, though this is partly negated 
by customary law, as will be discussed further below. 
 
Article 79 of Protocol I is the only article of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols specifically aimed at the protection of journalists. Article 79 
states that: 
1. Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas 
of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the 
meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1. 
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this 
Protocol, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their 
status as civilians, and without prejudice to the right of war 
correspondents accredited to the armed forces to the status 
provided for in Article 4A(4)  of the Third Convention. 
3. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex 
II of this Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by the 
government of the State of which the journalist is a national or in 
                                                            
172 For a collection of the full discussions at the various stages of the drafting process of art.79, see: H 
Levie (ed.), Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, Vol. 4, (Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1981), pp. 119 -143. 
173 See for the discussion on the protective emblem especially: ICRC, “Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/Sr 35, Paras. 14-40. 
174 A list of the current state parties to Protocol I can be accessed at: 
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whose territory he resides or in which the news medium employing 
him is located, shall attest to his status as a journalist. 
  
The first paragraph of the article confirms that journalists are civilians under IHL. 
This remains true even when using military logistical support for, for example, 
transportation, or when accompanying the military other than as an accredited 
correspondent under article 4A(4).175 The article is not meant to create new law, it 
simply is intended to confirm and clarify the status of journalists in conflict 
territory.176 The wording of the article is somewhat confusing though, as journalists 
should not just be considered civilian, they are civilian. This issue was raised during 
the drafting stage, though the original wording was kept to avoid re-opening the 
discussions when there was already consensus on the text.177 The deliberations make 
clear though that the article is not meant to suggest anything other than that 
journalists are civilians under IHL.178 The Geneva Conventions do not define the 
term journalist, though the draft UN convention on which article 79 is based does:  
The word ‘journalist’ shall mean any correspondent, reporter, 
photographer, and their technical film, radio and television 
assistants who are ordinarily engaged in these activities as their 
principal occupation.179  
The term ‘journalist’ therefore covers a broad set of media personnel but does 
seemingly require that their work for the media is their primary occupation, which 
can pose a problem for freelancers, as will be discussed in chapter 8. The reference to 
“dangerous professional mission” in article 79, covers all activities journalists engage 
in in a conflict zone.180 While concerns can be raised about the clarity of the 
language of the article, it is important to keep in mind that the aim of the article is to 
confirm that journalists are civilians. Even where it could be argued that, for 
example, a part-time non-professional journalist does not meet the definition of 
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journalist under this article, it is unlikely that this person would be considered 
anything other than a civilian and would therefore find the same protection under the 
Conventions as if they were classed as journalists under article 79. This, however, 
also demonstrates the relative weakness of article 79: it does not provide any 
protection to journalist over and above that of ‘ordinary’ civilians, even though 
journalists often behave very differently in conflict zones and thus face different 
risks, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
 
The second paragraph of the article reiterates that journalists, as civilians, receive the 
full protection the Conventions and Protocol I offer to civilians, as long as they take 
no action adversely affecting their status. This roughly entails that journalists are 
protected as long as they do not take on the role of combatant, as will be discussed 
below. It’s important to note here that while the Conventions give them the right to 
protection as civilians, their own actions may effectively negate this. Journalists may 
not be directly targeted in battle, though if they are close to a military unit or other 
legitimate target during battle, they may be caught in the crossfire and killed without 
violating the Conventions.181 Finally, the second paragraph notes that this article 
does not affect the protection of war correspondents as defined by article 4A(4) of 
Convention III, effectively creating two categories of journalists in conflict zones: 
war correspondents who travel with and are accredited to a military unit and 
independent civilian journalists not accredited to a military unit. 
 
The final paragraph of article 79 considers the identity card for journalists. A model 
for the card is given in Annex II to Protocol I. The language of the article, “may 
obtain a card” clarifies that an identity card is not imperative for receiving civilian 
protection. Without the card they would still be civilians, the card simply clarifies 
their status and the protection they receive as civilians. The model card, which is 
based on the model card for war correspondents, states in five different languages: 
This identity card is issued to journalists on dangerous professional 
missions in areas of armed conflicts. The holder is entitled to be 
treated as a civilian under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and their Additional Protocol I. The card must be carried at 
                                                            
181 Ibid, paras. 3269-3270. 
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all times by the bearer. If he is detained, he shall at once hand it to 
the detaining Authorities, to assist in his identification.182 
The card should include the name of the country issuing the card. The model 
contained in Annex II is a suggestion only, while the card should contain the 
information on the model card, information may be added to this by national 
authorities.183 By leaving it with national authorities to supply the card, it is up to 
individual states to decide who to supply these cards to, thus leaving the definition of 
‘journalist’, essentially with national authorities.184 Whether this is the best option in 
this case, or whether there might be advantages to working towards harmonising the 
definition of journalist, will be discussed in chapter 8. 
 
Article 50 and 51 Protocol I: definition and protection of civilian population 
The protection offered to journalists, as civilians, is set out in articles 50 and 51 of 
Protocol I. Article 50 defines civilians as: 
A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the 
categories of persons referred to in Art 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the 
Convention and art 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
The article therefore essentially employs a negative definition: if a person is not a 
member of the armed forces, he is a civilian.185 As noted, article 79 removes any 
doubts that journalists are classed as civilians. Article 50 clarifies that the presence of 
non-civilians in a civilian population does not change the character of that population 
and they should still be protected as civilians. Parties to the conflict are obliged under 
article 58 Protocol I to keep civilians away from military objectives, to the maximum 
extent feasible, to avoid them being caught in the crossfire. This raises the question 
whether this article requires journalists, as civilians, to be kept away from military 
objectives. If so, this could hamper their ability to carry out their professional duties. 
The article has clearly not been drafted for this situation, as it is one of several 
articles in the Protocol which requires parties to the conflict to protect the civilian 
population where possible and allow them the opportunity to remove themselves 
                                                            
182 Annex II to Protocol I. 
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184 Ibid, paras. 3274-3275. 
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from the lines of fire for as far as feasible during the conflict. It was not drafted to 
provide parties to the conflict with a legal measure to remove a civilian from a 
military objective against his or her own wishes, but rather to give those civilians that 
wish to be removed from the fighting the opportunity and right to be removed.186 
However, nothing in the wording of the article prohibits the removal of persons 
against their will. This is a clear demonstration of how journalists’ behaviour in 
conflict zones is different from the behaviour of civilians, which can cause 
difficulties under the legal framework. Journalists may want to stay near military 
objectives to cover the action, a situation not considered by the Conventions, 
whereas ‘ordinary’ civilians are less likely to elect to stay close to danger when given 
the opportunity to remove themselves from the situation.   
 
Article 51, one of the most important articles of Protocol I, considers the protection 
the civilian population should receive during conflict in further detail. The article 
aims to protect civilians as far as possible from the effects of conflict and prohibits a 
number of actions, such as direct attacks on,187 or reprisals against,188 the civilian 
population. With regards to journalist article 51(2), which states that “the civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”, 
provides important protection as it prohibits journalists being made the direct object 
of an attack. Article 85(3)a of Protocol I lists wilful direct attacks against civilians 
which cause death or serious injury to body or health as a grave breach of Protocol I, 
which will generally also be classed as a war crime.189  
 
Civilians lose all protection offered by article 51 when taking direct part in 
hostilities, but only for as long as they are taking a direct part.190 Once they cease to 
take a direct part in hostilities they regain their protection as civilians. According to 
                                                            
186 See C Piloud and J de Preux, “Article 58 – Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks” in: Y 
Sandoz, C Swinarski and B Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
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the Commentary on Protocol I, ‘direct participation’ in hostilities are acts which, “by 
their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and 
equipment of the enemy armed forces”.191 Included in this can be preparation for, 
and returning from, combat.192 Participation in the war effort is not the same as 
participation in hostilities, which can often be required from a civilian population 
during a conflict. These two actions should thus be treated as two distinct (legal) 
categories.193 There can be discussion as to when exactly journalists can be 
considered to be participating in the war effort and when they start taking an active 
part in the hostilities. There is, for example, much discussion regarding the extent to 
which the media can influence the outcome of a conflict and to what extent they have 
become part of military strategy through information operations, and thus potentially 
the war apparatus, in modern conflict. Especially where the media perform a 
significant propaganda role within a conflict area and incites action against an 
enemy, it can be questioned whether media personnel consequently lose their civilian 
status. This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Article 52: protection of civilian objects 
Civilian objects, which include for example TV stations and (civilian) transmission 
equipment, like civilian themselves, are protected under the Geneva Conventions. 
Article 52 of Protocol I states that civilian objects “shall not be the object of attacks 
or reprisals”. As with the term ‘civilian’, the article operates a negative definition: 
“civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives.” It defines military 
objectives as:  
limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or 
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage. 
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An object must therefore both make an effective contribution to military action and 
its capture, destruction, or neutralisation must offer a definite military advantage. 
The article concludes by stating that in case of doubt whether an object normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to 
military action, the presumption should be against military use. Article 51 is 
especially important for the media, in that it protects media equipment from attacks. 
As with ‘participation in hostilities’, there can be discussion as to when media 
equipment, such as TV or radio stations, become a military objective due to its 
potential contribution to military action. In recent conflicts there have been several 
instances where radio and television stations have been attacked, for example during 
the Kosovo conflict when a Serbian TV and radio station was bombed by NATO194   




The Geneva Conventions seek to regulate armed conflict and limit the effects 
thereof. Protocol I supplements the Geneva Conventions and follows the scope of 
application of the 1949 Conventions, which is set out in common article 2, while 
Protocol II roughly follows the application of common article 3 Geneva Conventions 
(1949), which regulates internal armed conflict and will be discussed in more detail 
below.196 Article 1 of Protocol I extended the scope of article 2 in 1977 to include 
“armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination (…)”.  
 
                                                            
194 ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, 13 June 2000, paras. 71-79, 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, early developments of IHL treaties solely 
sought to regulate conduct between state parties.197 This changed with the inclusion 
of common article 3 in the Geneva Conventions (1949) which applies to internal 
conflicts. IHL thus recognises two separate categories of conflict: international and 
non-international armed conflict. Article 2 common to the Geneva Convention states 
that the full Geneva Convention shall be applicable during the first type of conflict, 
while only article 3 common to the Geneva Conflicts regulates the second type. 
Conflicts may evolve from one type into the other, but legally speaking there are no 
other categories of armed conflict currently recognised under IHL.198   
 
International armed conflict 
The full Geneva Conventions only apply where armed conflict has arisen between 
two or more of the ‘High Contracting Parties’: 
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.199 
The article clearly states that the Conventions shall apply to the full extent in cases of 
declared war, whether this declaration is made by all parties to the conflict or just 
one. In this case the application of the Geneva Convention is clearly defined. More 
difficulties arise in cases where there is no declaration of war by any party, but an 
armed conflict has arisen nonetheless. While the 1907 Hague Conventions provide 
that hostilities should not commence without a (conditional) declaration of war,200 
experience post-1907 proved that these formalities were not always followed and 
many international armed conflicts displaying all characteristics of war arose without 
                                                            
197 D Akande, “Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts” pp. 32- 79, in: E 
Wilmshurst (ed.) International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University 
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such declarations.201 Difficulties arose in cases of capitulation or annexation of 
territory, leading to the ‘disappearance’ of a state and therefore, arguably the state of 
war, and cases where a state contested the legitimacy of an enemy government and 
therefore refused to recognise them as a party to the conflict.202  
 
The 1949 Conventions sought to remedy this by including in common article 2 “any 
other conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties”. By the inclusion of “any other armed conflict” the application of the 
convention is no longer based on state-recognition of a conflict, but is to be evaluated 
depending on objective criteria.203 Any armed conflict will trigger the application of 
the Geneva Conventions, from the moment hostilities commence. If during the 
course of a conflict a territory becomes occupied by a foreign power, the full Geneva 
Conventions will apply in the occupied territory as the occupation is a component of 
the armed conflict to which the Geneva Conventions apply. The article additionally 
notes that in the event that occupation of a territory is not met with armed resistance, 
the full Geneva Conventions will still apply, thus extending the Conventions to 
‘peaceful’ occupation of foreign territory not part of a wider armed conflict.  
 
The difficulty that arose from situations where only one of the parties to a conflict 
had signed up to a treaty regulating their behaviour in times of war, has been 
remedied by the Geneva Conventions (1949) with the inclusion of a final paragraph 
to article 2 stating that: 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the 
present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall 
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore 
be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the 
latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
While a treaty cannot, in principle, bind those who are not a party to the treaty, the 
provisions seeks to give the Conventions the broadest possible application. The 
commentary on the article suggests that contracting parties should apply the 
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Conventions until the non-contracting party has had a chance to consider and state its 
intentions on applying the convention.204 The article requires non-contracting parties 
to ‘accept’ and ‘apply’ the Conventions to bring them into force during a conflict 
with a contracting party should they wish to do so. The universal application of the 
Geneva Convention renders such discussion moot, however, where the Conventions 
of 1949 are concerned, as they have achieved universal acceptance.205 Such 
discussion remains, however, relevant for Protocol I, which has not achieved 
universal acceptance and has not been ratified by military powers such as the United 
States and Iran.206 
 
The Geneva Conventions do not attempt to define the term ‘armed conflict’, whether 
internal or international. The term ‘armed conflict’ was chosen over the use of the 
term ‘war’ for the application of the Geneva Conventions, as the latter is more 
limited in its scope.207 There is no single definition of armed conflict, though the 
concept is described in the official commentary on article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions:  
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the 
meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence 
of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, 
or how much slaughter takes place.208 
and 
 Any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict 
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies 
the existence of a state of war.209  
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has provided 
a definition of international armed conflict in the Tadić case: “an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”.210 This definition 
has subsequently been adopted by other international bodies, such as the 
International Law Commission,211 and is widely recognised as authoritative.212  
 
Non-international armed conflict 
As discussed above, the full Geneva Conventions apply during international armed 
conflict. During non-international armed conflict taking place in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, only common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
(1949) applies. For the application of common article 3 it is irrelevant whether the 
conflict takes place between two different armed groups (without Government 
involvement) or between an armed group and the Government; in both cases common 
article 3 will apply.213 The article contains no specific provisions concerning 
journalists, but protects those not or no longer taking part in hostilities, a group which 
journalists would be classed under. During the negotiations of the Geneva 
Conventions 1949, it was clear that contracting parties did not intend to apply 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to all types of non-international conflict 
and in particular not to any type of anarchy or rebellion against the government. The 
possibility of defining the term ‘armed conflict’ in this context was discussed, though 
ultimately abandoned.214  
 
The discussion of the conditions that should be met to trigger the application of the 
Geneva Convention does provide, however, some valuable insight in what type of 
conflicts article 3 seeks to regulate. Most notably it requires a certain level of 
organisation of the insurgent party to the conflict and requires them to have a level of 
                                                            
210 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić , Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para.70. 
211 See for example: United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission: 60th session (2008) 
General Assembly, Official records, supplement no 10 (A/63/10), p. 90.  
212 S Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 155. 
213 Moir (2002), pp. 103-105; UK Ministry of Defence (2004), para. 3.5. 
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authority over the members of their group.215 In 1995 a more precise definition of 
non-international armed conflict was provided in the ICTY Tadić case, which defined 
non-international armed conflict as: “protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a state.”216 This definition has been adopted and utilised by both international 
criminal courts as well as other international bodies.217 As with the discussions during 
the drafting stage of article 3, this definition also requires a certain level of 
organisation within the armed group. It does, however, place more emphasis on the 
requirement that a certain level of violence is reached.218 Violence that does not reach 
the required level to trigger article 3 is likely to be classed as internal disturbances or 
tensions. These terms, cited in article 1(2) Protocol II, are currently not defined in 
law.219 Defining and identifying non-international armed conflict remains 
problematic and the subject of heated debate.220 
 
The substantive provisions of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions reflect 
customary IHL,221 by stating that the sick and wounded must be collected and cared 
for and, where necessary, an impartial humanitarian body may offer its assistance to 
parties to the conflict. It similarly provides that those not, or no longer, taking part in 
                                                            
215 ICRC, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, Vol. II-B (Berne: Federal 
Political Department, 1949), p. 121. For a more extensive overview of the relevant factors in 
determining whether art. 3 should apply, see: Pictet (1952), pp. 49-50. 
216 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić , Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para.70. 
217 For example the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICC, the International Law Commission, and 
the ICRC. For a more extensive overview see: Sivakumaran (2012), p. 166. 
218 S Vité, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal concepts and 
actual situations” (2009) 91 International Review Red Cross, 69, pp. 75-77; see also for example:  
ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić , Judgement (Trial Chamber),  7 May 1997, paras. 561-568; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v Boskoski, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 175. 
219 For more information on these terms see: Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), paras. 
4475-4476; A Eide, “International Disturbances and Tensions” in: Henry Dunant Institute, 
International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (Paris: Unesco, 1988), 241-256; H-P Gasser, 
“Humanitarian Standards for Internal Strife: A brief overview of new developments” (1993) 33 
International Review of the Red Cross, 221; D Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), para. 1205. 
220 Sivakumaran (2012), p. 155;  
221 This has been confirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua v US (Judgement of 27 June 1986) (Merits) 1986 
ICJ Rep. 14, which states in para 218 that “Art 3 (..)in the Court’s opinion, reflect what the Court in 
1949 called ‘elementary considerations of humanity”. See also in ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadić , Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 
October 1995, para 98; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
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hostilities must be treated humanely. It specifically prohibits under any 
circumstances: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees that are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.222 The commentary refers to this 
article as ‘a Convention in miniature’ that applies to all non-international armed 
conflict, without the requirement of reciprocity.223 The sole fact that armed conflict is 
taking place within the territory of a High Contracting party is sufficient to require 
all parties to the conflict, not just those party to the Conventions, to observe these 
humanitarian requirements which form the basic principles of the Geneva 
Conventions.224 Article 3 thus binds, to a certain extent, parties which have not 
signed up to the Geneva Conventions. This is not without controversy, and is much 
debated in academic literature.225 Sivakumaran sums up the most common theories in 
a helpful manner: 
“Either there is a rule of customary international law according to 
which [nonstate armed groups] are bound by obligations accepted 
by the government of the state where they fight, or the principle of 
effectiveness implies that any effective power in the territory of a 
state is bound by the state’s obligations, or they are bound via the 
implementation or transformation of international rules into 
national legislation or by the direct applicability of self-executing 
international rules.”226 
                                                            
222 Art. 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions 1949. 
223 Pictet (1952), p. 48. See further for application of this principle for example Nicaragua v US 
(Judgement of 27 June 1986) (Merits) 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, at 114; Report No 55/97 (30 October 1997) 
Case No 11.137 (Argentina), para 174. 
224 Common art. 3 states: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply 
(..)”. See also for example: L Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 52-58. 
225 See for example: C Ryngaert, “Non-Sate Actors and International Law” (2008) Institute for 
International Law Working paper, available at: 
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP146e.pdf;  Sivakumaran (2012), pp. 236-254; A 
Cassese, “The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed 
Conflicts” (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 416, pp. 420-430. 
226 M Sassòli, ‘Transnational armed groups and international humanitarian law’ (2006) 6 HPCR 
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Article 3 also requires that “parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring 
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the 
present Convention”. This urges parties to consider applying, on a voluntary basis, 
the wider set of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict, which can 
be beneficial to all parties, especially when the conflict intensifies and the basic 
principles of article 3 prove insufficient to regulate all conduct during the conflict. 
The article finally notes that: “The application of the preceding provisions shall not 
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict”. This sentence is added to the 
article to avoid interference with a state’s internal affairs. The mere application of 
article 3 does not constitute recognition of the legality or authority of a government-
opposing party, nor does it limit a government’s right to suppress a rebellion.227 It 
does, however, require them to act humanely while doing so. 
 
The application of article 3 proved problematic as the lack of definition of armed 
conflict in this context led to different interpretations of the term and the existence of 
a non-international armed conflict was often denied by state parties, significantly 
reducing the practical application of the article.228 Protocol II sought to clarify the 
rules applicable to non-international armed conflict, but did not want to affect the 
application of common article 3.229 It however failed in this aim and the resulting 
Protocol II did little to clarify the concept of non-international armed conflict, 
creating significant discussion as to its application.230 The Protocol, which develops 
and supplements the rules contained in common article 3, has a slightly different 
field of application and is almost a self-contained instrument, in spite of dealing with 
the same subject matter: non-international armed conflict.231  While it can be argued 
that this has created two types of non-international armed conflict: ‘common article 3 
conflict’ and ‘Protocol II’ conflict, this was not necessarily the intention of the 
Protocol,232 nor does the distinction significantly affect the protection of journalists 
under IHL for the purpose of this thesis. This is largely due to the additional 
                                                            
227 Pictet (1952), pp. 60-61. 
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protection offered by customary law, discussed below, which makes no distinction 
between the two types.233 I will therefore refer to ‘non-international armed conflict’ 
in general in my research. 
 
Protocol II does provide a more detailed indication of what should be considered 
armed conflict in a non-international setting (under this Protocol):  
[A conflict taking] place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
The Protocol further specifically states that it does not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, “such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”, confirming that not all 
internal conflict will lead to the application of the  Convention. While journalists are 
not specifically mentioned in Protocol II, they are entitled to the basic general 
protection provided to civilians under that protocol. The Protocol is thus designed to 
safeguards journalists from, amongst other things, violence to life, health and 
physical or mental well-being; collective punishments; taking of hostages; acts of 
terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity; slavery and the slave trade in all their 
forms; pillage and threats to commit any of these.234 Where article 3 binds all parties 
to the conflict, including non-state parties such as insurgents, the situation is not as 
clear for Protocol II, and its application by non-state parties depends on their 
willingness to apply it, which limits the practical application of the Protocol.235 
Protocol II is not as detailed as Protocol I or the Geneva Conventions and only 
contains 15 substantive regulations.  
 
Non-international or international armed conflict 
The lines between international and non-international armed conflicts are not always 
clear. This is problematic given the significant differences in the applicable law, 
                                                            
233 S Vité, “Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual 
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depending on the typology of the conflict. There are three principal ways a non-
international armed conflict can be brought under the law of international armed 
conflict: belligerency, wars of national liberation and intervention of an outside state 
in the conflict.  
 
The first situation, belligerency, requires the formal acknowledgement of a State that 
an existing conflict between an armed non-state group within a territory and the 
central government of that territory constitutes a civil war. While the exact practice 
and requirements are much debated,236 it is sufficient to note here that this formal 
recognition is required to bring the law of international armed conflict into force. The 
recognition of belligerency has not been common and is no longer in active use, 
partly due to the increase in regulations applicable to non-international armed 
conflict.237 The second situation, a war of national liberation, must satisfy the 
requirements laid down in article 1(4) of Protocol I: “(..) peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination”. Where these requirements are satisfied the 
Geneva Conventions will become applicable in full. The practical effect of this 
provision is, however, fairly limited.238 The third situation is currently the most 
common. Where a foreign power intervenes in an existing internal conflict, this may, 
depending on the level of involvement, ‘internationalise’ the conflict. There is much 
discussion on this subject,239 which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Relevant 
factors include on which ‘side’ of the conflict intervention takes place and the level 
and type of intervention itself. It is sufficient to note here that it is possible to 
internationalise a non-international conflict. 
 
For civilian journalists, the change in the character of a conflict from non-
international to international will not significantly impact on their protection, as 
                                                            
236 See for example: Sivakumaran (2012), pp. 9-20. 
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civilians should receive more or less the same protection in both types of conflict, 
though the provisions concerning their protection are far less detailed under non-
international armed conflict. The real impact would be felt by war correspondents 
who, in international armed conflict, find protection under article 4A(4) of Geneva 
Convention III (1949). They would not be classed as prisoners of war should they be 




The duration of the application of the four Geneva Conventions is different, due to 
the nature of their subject matter. Convention I, concerning the wounded and sick 
armed forces in the field, simply states in article 5 that: “For the protected persons 
who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, the present Convention shall apply until 
their final repatriation”. The only side note that must be made here is that once the 
wounded and sick are cured, they cease to fall under the category of ‘protected 
person’ under Convention I and ‘move on’ to be classified solely as prisoners of war 
under Convention III, which has a different duration of application. The second 
Convention II, concerning the wounded, sick and shipwrecked armed forces at sea, 
applies only for as long as the armed forces are physically at sea; as soon as they set 
foot on land they are subject to the relevant provisions of the first, third and/or fourth 
Convention.241  
 
Geneva Convention III, concerning prisoners of war, states in article 5 that it applies 
“from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and 
repatriation”. This entails that prisoners of war fall under the protection of Geneva 
Convention III until they are reinstated in the situation they were before being 
captured.242 If this repatriation is to an occupied territory, the Geneva Conventions 
will ‘re-apply’ as soon as they are re-interred in their home country under article 4B, 
which concerns the treatment of persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed 
forces of an occupied country. Where there is any doubt concerning the status of a 
                                                            
240 In Non-international conflicts fighters cannot claim treatment as prisoners of war upon detention: 
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prisoner, i.e. whether he is eligible for prisoner of war status or not, the Convention 
will apply until their status is decided by a competent tribunal.243  
 
Geneva Convention IV, concerning the protection of the civilian population during 
times of war, applies “from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in 
Article 2” and will cease at “the general close of military operations”.244 In the case 
of an occupied territory, the application of the Convention normally ceases one year 
after the general close of military operations, though there are some exceptions.245 
The exceptions concern the situation where an occupying force remains to exercise 
governmental functions in the occupied territory.  The term from ‘the outset’ has 
been used to clarify that the Convention should take effect from the first act of 
violence and from the moment troops come in contact with the civilian population.246 
The end of the application of this Geneva Convention, the “general close of military 
operations”, will be relatively straightforward where the conflict concerns only two 
states, for example the moment of the signing of an armistice or capitulation.247 
Where multiple states are involved this may be more complicated and is generally 




3.2 Customary law 
 
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as other 
international treaties, provide extensive regulation for the conduct of hostilities and 
offer protection to a wide range of persons during international armed conflict. 
Treaty law is by its nature, however, limited in application to those states that have 
ratified a treaty. One of the inherent drawbacks from treaty law is thus that the 
applicable law will vary from conflict to conflict, dependent on the parties involved. 
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Another problem is caused by the fact that current IHL treaty law only provides 
limited regulation of non-international armed conflicts,249 which a large portion of 
the conflicts currently being fought would be classed as.250 The IHL treaties that do 
regulate non-international armed conflict provide less detailed regulation than those 
that concern international armed conflict.251 This gap is partly filled by customary 
law, which provides significant regulation of both non-international and international 
armed conflict. 
 
Customary law can roughly be described as “a general practice accepted as law”.252 
It has widely been accepted as source of International law,253 and is applied by 
international courts such as the ICTY and the International Criminal Court (ICC).254 
Many treaties, such as the Rome Statute of the ICC codify generally accepted norms 
of international law.255  
 
Proving the existence of a rule of customary law can be challenging and in practice it 
is mostly courts, tribunals and other influential bodies that determine the existence of 
such a rule, which is subsequently confirmed or denied by states.256 For a rule of 
                                                            
249 Those that do apply are: the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), the Statute of 
the ICJ (1946), the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of Anti-Personnel mines (1997), the 
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customary law to exist, two elements are generally required: usus, state practice and 
opinio juris sive necessitatis, the belief that this practice is necessary, required or 
prohibited (depending on the rule in question).257 These two elements have been the 
subject of much discourse and can be difficult to fully separate as they often 
overlap,258 but both need to be present for a rule of customary law to exist.259 In 
customary IHL greater emphasis is placed on the opinio juris element than in other 
international customary law.260 As stated by the ICTY in Tadić:  
In appraising the formation of customary rules or general principles 
one should therefore be aware that, on account of the inherent 
nature of this subject-matter, reliance must primarily be placed on 
such elements as official pronouncements of States, military 
manuals and judicial decisions.261 
The burden of proof concerning customary law will generally lie with the party 
arguing the existence of such a rule.262 As considered in more detail below, while 
consistent practice is important in establishing a rule of customary law exists, the 
existence of inconsistent practice is not necessarily a barrier to proving a rule of 
customary law exists, as long as such practice is considered a breach of the rule.263  
 
In 1995 the ICRC received a mandate from the 26th conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, with the assistance of experts in IHL and experts from governments 
and international organisations, to compose a report on the customary rules of IHL 
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governing both international and non-international conflicts.264 The resulting study 
has been described as taking the ‘classic’ approach to establishing customary law, 
which has been set out by the ICJ in a number of cases.265 While the exact 
methodology and some of the results of the study have been criticised,266 the general 
approach to formulating rules of customary law applied in this study provides a 
useful indication of how the existence of such rules will be established in practice. 
 
The study considered in terms of state practice: official physical and verbal acts of 
states; the practice of executive, legislative and judicial organs of a state; actions and 
communications from certain international organisations; and the practice of armed 
opposition groups.267 It also noted that actions of states that are never disclosed 
cannot contribute to establishing state practice, nor can the decisions of international 
courts, as they are not state organs, though the latter can provide evidence of the 
existence of state practice.268 State practice has to be sufficiently ‘dense’ to create 
customary law:269 it must by virtually uniform, extensive, representative and some 
time may need to have elapsed before something can be considered state practice, 
though this is not a ‘hard’ requirement.270 Opinio Juris often overlaps with state 
practice and requires the practice to be carried out ‘as of right’.271 The ratification, 
implementation and interpretation of treaties can provide an indication of the 
existence of a rule of customary law, as they can show how a state views specific 
rules of international law.272  
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3.2.1 Rules concerning Journalists 
The study on customary law undertaken by the ICRC was concluded in 2005 and the 
results were incorporated in a database in 2010, which is updated regularly to reflect 
ongoing changes in customary law.273 One should keep in mind when discussing the 
rules included in this database that the same degree of emphasis cannot be placed on 
the wording of a rule of customary law as on a rule of treaty law. The formulation of 
customary law is imprecise because of the very nature of customary law, and 
customary law provides a certain ambiguity and elasticity as to the exact details of a 
specific rule of law.274 Neither is the study intended to be exhaustive, but rather a 
starting point from which discussion and further study can take place.275 The study 
does include a rule on the protection of journalism though, which I will discuss in 
this context. 
 
Rule 34, of the Customary Law database concerns the protection and respect for 
journalists. The rule is placed under the Part II of the database: “Specifically 
Protected Persons and Objects”. The rule states: “Civilian journalists engaged in 
professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and protected as 
long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities.” The wording of the article 
reads as a basic summary of article 79 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 
containing essentially the same message, though in much less detail, which is partly 
due to the nature of customary law. The rule is, importantly, considered to be 
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict and can be 
found in a wide range of military manuals, as well as in official statements and 
practice,276 thus extending the protection of article 79 to non-international conflicts 
in which the full Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols are not 
applicable, as well as extending the obligation to protect journalists to those states 
that are not party to Protocol I. There is currently no official practice contrary to rule 
                                                            
273 ICRC, “Customary IHL Database”, available at: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. 
274 TLH McCormack, “Australian Perspective on the ICRC Customary study” in:  AM Helm (ed.), 
The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and use of force – International Law Studies Vol. 82 
(Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War college, 2006), 81-97, p. 88. 
275 Foreword to the study by Dr Yves Sandoz in: Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. XXIII. 
276 For an overview of this see: J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 661-
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34, neither in international nor in non-international armed conflict and any 
intentional attacks on journalists have generally been condemned.277  
 
It is interesting to note that rule 34 not only calls for the protection of civilian 
journalists, but also calls for ‘respect’ to be afforded to them. This goes further than 
the protection offered by article 79 and is based on practice which condemns 
measures specifically taken to dissuade and/or hamper journalists from carrying out 
their professional activities.278 This benefit is not offered under treaty law in either 
international or non-international conflicts and enforcement of this rule may be 
difficult. This will be considered in more detail in chapter 6. It is also important to 
keep in mind that civilian journalists are entitled to the full protection offered to 
civilians in general under customary law, which includes all the rules contained in 
Part V of the database: “Treatment of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat”. These 
rules protect journalists from a wide variety of actions, such as inhuman treatment, 
discrimination, violence to life, deprivation of liberty and hostage taking.279 
 
3.2.2 Application 
As discussed above, the application of customary humanitarian law is not subject to 
the same constraints as treaty law. Many rules of customary law are not just confined 
to situations of armed international conflict, but apply equally in armed non-
international conflict.280 As noted, treaty provisions can become binding on those not 
party to a treaty where they reach the status of customary law. As discussed above, 
several criteria will have to be met and the acquiescence of non-parties will be 
especially relevant here.281 Whether a provision of customary law applies in a 
conflict will have to be assessed separately for each rule though, as there are no 
general rules concerning the application of customary law as a whole in different 
types of conflict. Though the rules of customary law are often less detailed than those 
                                                            
277 Ibid. 
278 See for example: UN General Assembly, Res. 53/164 calling to refrain from harassment and 
intimidation of journalists in the Kosovo conflict and UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 
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of international humanitarian treaty law, they provide important protection in 
situations where most treaties will not be applicable (in full). The wider applicability 
of customary law also has important consequences for the application of some treaty 
provisions, such as those of the Geneva Conventions (1949), which by achieving 
status of customary law, attain a much wider field of application then they did in 
their original treaty form. 
 
 
3.3 Other international documents 
 
There have been a number of recommendations and declarations by international 
bodies and non-governmental organisations aimed at reducing violence against 
journalists. Though these are non-binding in nature, they emphasise the existing 
provisions and provide more detailed recommendations for the protection of 
journalists, flagging up potential weakness in the current legal protection. They also 
emphasise the internationally recognised value of journalistic work to society. 
 
In 1996, the Council of Europe, which has regularly been involved in the protection 
of journalists, adopted a recommendation concerning the protection of journalists in 
situations of conflict and tension.282 Though not binding, this recommendation shows 
recognition for the need for more concrete protection of journalists in conflict 
situations than is currently available. The Council reaffirms the importance of the 
protection offered by article 79 of the Geneva Convention, but mostly seek to 
emphasise the need to respect journalists as well as protect them, as is reflected in 
rule 34 of customary law. The principles contained in the appendix of this document 
call on member states to improve on a wide variety of issues: such as access to 
territory, freedom of movement, confidentiality of sources, and impunity.283 
 
In 2003, in response to a sharp rise in the number of deaths of journalists in conflict 
zones, Reporters without Borders (RwB) published the Declaration on the safety of 
                                                            
282 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R(96)4 On The Protection of Journalists in Situations of 
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journalists and media personnel in situations involving armed conflict. The aim of 
this Declaration is to reaffirm the principle rules of IHL concerning journalists as 
well as proposing a number of improvements to bring the law up to date with 
present-day requirements.284 In 2007 the Press Emblem Campaign (PEC) launched 
the ambitious Draft proposal for an International Convention to strengthen the 
protection of journalists in armed conflicts and other situations including civil unrest 
and targeted killings,285 reaffirming some aspects of IHL, but further calling for the 
creation of a protective emblem for the press, which has proven controversial and 
more ambitious provisions such as a right to information and freedom of movement. 
Both will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
 
In 2007, 200 media professionals adopted the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Medellin Declaration on Press Freedom286 at a 
conference organised by UNESCO. The Medellin Declaration emphasises the need 
to avoid impunity in cases where rights of journalists are violated. Though this 
Declaration is not specifically aimed at journalists in conflict situations, it contains 
provisions relevant to journalists in that situation. The Declaration further urges 
states to comply with the 1997 Resolution 29,287 adopted by UNESCO’s General 
Conference to combat impunity of crimes against journalists and Resolution 1738,288 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, condemning attacks against 
journalists in conflict situations.  
 
These, and several other documents in similar spirit, call for a number of different 
measures. Though a coherent approach is distinctly lacking, they do all ask for the 
reaffirmation of IHL and for those states that have not yet ratified the Additional 
Protocols to do so.  
                                                            
284 A Balguy-Gallois, “The Protection of Journalists and News Media in Armed Conflicts” (2004) 86 
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As we have seen above, there are two articles in the current IHL framework that 
specifically seek to protect reporters in conflict zones: article 4A of Geneva 
Convention III which protects war correspondents and article 79 of Protocol I (1977) 
which protects civilian reporters. The application of these articles is, however, 
confined to international armed conflicts, which hampers their effectiveness. During 
non-international armed conflict, currently one of the most common type of conflicts, 
a limited number of provisions of the IHL framework apply, which only provide 
basic protection for civilians and therefore journalists in conflict areas. This gap in 
legislation is partly addressed by customary law, which contains protection for 
journalists in both international and non-international conflict. The protection offered 
by customary law goes further than current treaty law, in the sense that it requires 
respect for journalists as well as protection. Yet it is also more limited, in the sense 
that it does not provide special protection to those civilian journalists accompanying 
the armed forces, who would, during international conflict, find protection under 
article 4A(4) Geneva Convention III. 
 
The variety of declarations, recommendations and proposals aimed at the protection 
of journalists in conflict zone that have been drafted over the last two decades show 
that it is a subject which receives international attention. While the reaffirmation of 
the current IHL framework for the protection of journalists in these documents is a 
strong indication of the importance of IHL in this area, it also shows that the IHL 
framework is currently not (yet) protecting journalists to the required level. The 
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4. International Human Rights Law 
  
 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian law (IHL) 
share at their core a central value: the protection and integrity of the human 
person.289 They are, however, two distinct frameworks which govern different 
relationships and are derived from different backgrounds, with different underlying 
values. Historically they have been viewed as two separate, mutually exclusive, 
regimes,290 though this has changed over the last decades. IHRL, which was 
originally drawn up to apply during peace time, has slowly been accepted to apply 
equally during conflict, offering potential additional protection to journalists in 
conflict zones. This does however raise significant questions on which of the two 
frameworks, takes precedence where both apply and potentially conflict.  
 
This chapter will consider the changing attitude towards the application of IHRL 
which has led to the application of the framework to some, but not all actors during 
armed conflict. It will then consider the approaches that may be taken where IHRL 
conflicts with IHL and discuss the human rights provisions which are relevant for 
journalists working in conflict zones. The discussion of these topics will be fairly 
limited compared to the amount of academic literature on this topic. The focus of this 
thesis requires establishing whether journalists can find protection under IHRL 
during different types of conflict. This chapter therefore examines if, and to what 
extent IHRL applies during armed conflict. It will attempt to provide a brief 
overview of the extensive academic discussion on the interaction of IHL and IHRL 
in conflict zones and the potential impact this interaction can have on Journalists’ 
safety.  
 
There are a large number of human rights treaties that are relevant in this area with 
different territorial application and significant overlap in subject matter, which can 
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unfortunately not all be discussed here.  The UN currently has nine291 core human 
rights treaties which are referred to as the main international human rights 
conventions.292 Of these the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is the most important treaty for the protection of journalists in conflict 
zones. The other relevant treaty is the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). This treaty contains a 
limited number of human rights, but will be mentioned where relevant to the 
protection of journalists in conflict zones. The remaining seven are, however, of 
limited use to the protection of journalists. Aside from the world-wide UN human 
rights treaties there are several regional systems which promote and protect human 
rights: The Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States and the African 
Union.293 Below the discussion of specific rights will be limited to the ICCPR, as one 
of the most widely ratified international human rights conventions, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has served as a model for the adoption 
of regional treaties in other parts of the world.294 
 
 
4.1 Historic development of International Human Rights Law 
 
IHRL and IHL developed as two separate legal frameworks, which had little to do 
with each other until the 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapters, the laws of 
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war have developed over millennia, becoming consolidated into an international 
system of humanitarian laws from the Middle Ages onwards.295 Human rights are not 
as old and are generally considered the product of the Age of Enlightenment, though 
their roots can be traced much further back in time.296 Human rights instruments 
emerged during the Enlightenment as instruments of social and political change.297 
IHL has focussed, from its inception, on the relationship between states and is one of 
the oldest fields of public international law. Human rights law on the other hand, 
originally, solely consisted of national law concerning the rights of the individual 
versus the power of the state.298 This changed in the period after WWII when IHL 
developed in response to the atrocities committed during the war, moving human 
rights from domestic regulation to the field of public international law.299 This 
resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 as a non-binding 
resolution,300 which would go on to inspire a rich body of IHRL.301 
 
While the UDHR and the significant revision and expansion of the Geneva 
Conventions were prepared during the same post-war period, there is little cross-
referencing between the two works in their respective travaux préparatoires, nor 
does legal doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s mention IHRL when discussing IHL and 
vice versa.302 Kolb identifies several reasons for this strict separation between the 
two fields of law. As discussed in the previous chapters, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions contained a significant expansion of the subject matter, moving a field 
of law which was previously viewed as a set of reciprocal contracts drawn up in 
                                                            
295 R Kolb, “The Relationship between International Law and Human Rights Law: A brief history of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions” (1998) 38 
International Review of the Red Cross, 409, p. 410. 
296 MH Randall, “The History of Human Rights Law” in: R Kolb and G Gaggioli (eds.), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2013), 3-34, pp. 5-9. 
297 Ibid, p. 7. 
298 See for example Kolb (1998), p. 410; Randall (2013), p. 10. 
299 Kolb(1998), p. 410. 
300 UN General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
301 Provost (2002), p. 2. 
302 R Kolb, “Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law between 1945 and the 
Aftermath of the Teheran Conference of 1968” in: R Kolb and G Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), 35-
52, pp. 39-41. 
	  72	  
national interest to “solemn affirmations of principles respected for their own sake”. 
The emphasis of the Conventions on respect and dignity for human beings caught up 
in conflicts opened the door to a closer relationship with human rights, but this 
ideological change was still very young in the 1940s and 1950s.303 Similarly the 
UDHR was one of the first major developments in the field of IHRL, which was 
during the post-WWII period still in its infancy, with hardly any positive law at the 
international level.304 Another reason was that the fields were ‘championed’ by two 
distinct sets of lawyers: IHL was the concern of military, politically neutral, lawyers, 
while Human rights law was the concern of civil society lawyers, who were often 
highly politicised and there was little trust between these groups.305 Furthermore, 
IHL and IHRL have distinct institutional backgrounds as IHRL was during this 
period largely produced by UN political organs, while the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) was responsible for IHL. The independent ICRC did not 
wish to open the field of IHL to the political organisation that was the UN, fearing it 
would affect the neutrality of IHL, while the UN considered the ICRC re-drafting 
rules of war as a suggesting the UN would be unable to fulfil its principal aim: to 
maintain peace.306 Finally there were issues concerning the material (including 
temporal) field of application as, during the first decades after WWII, IHRL was 
generally considered to apply (solely) during peacetime, while IHL applied during 
armed conflict, rendering the two mutually exclusive.307 
 
The strict separation between the two fields of law disappeared over time, when 
IHRL grew increasingly stronger and developed positive international law.308 In the 
1960s, the continuing development of IHL had come to a halt due to little 
international support for an extension of the existing Geneva Conventions, while, in 
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contrast, support for ongoing development of IHRL was still going strong.309 There 
was a pressing need however, for increased protection for victims of war in several 
of the ongoing conflicts throughout the world, which was sought in a partial fusion of 
the increasing number of international human rights treaties and IHL.310 The turning 
point of the relationship between IHL and IHRL is generally considered to be the 
1968 Teheran Conference on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts.311 One of the 
resolutions of the conference was Resolution XXIII Respect for Human Rights in 
Armed Conflicts, which though not explicitly stating that human rights should apply 
during armed conflicts, stated that “even during the periods of armed conflicts, 
humanitarian principles must prevail”.312 This resolution was followed by several 
more resolutions from the UN General Assembly,313 amongst them Resolution 265 
which explicitly affirmed that: “fundamental human rights, as accepted in 
international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully 
in situations of armed conflict”.314 The two fields have continued to grow closer to 
each other, with some IHL now bearing close resemblance to IHRL, 315 though 
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4.2 Do human rights apply during conflict? 
 
The increasingly close relationship between IHL and IHRL has led to the general, 
though not universal, acceptance that human rights apply during conflict.317 As 
described above, historically, legal scholars have subscribed to the separation theory 
for the relationship between IHL and IHRL, which considers the two areas of law to 
be two distinct branches that are deemed mutually exclusive. The reasoning behind 
this is that they apply in different situations and to different relations: IHL applies 
during wartime, while IHRL applies during peace318 and where IHL largely governs 
the relationship between states, IHRL governs the relationship between the state and 
the individual.319 The concept of strict separation of the two fields has however 
eroded over the last few decades and is no longer the dominant approach.320  
 
4.2.1 Current practice 
There are several judicial decisions from international courts which consider the 
application of human rights during conflict. One of the first international courts to 
address the issue directly was the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in their often 
cited Nuclear Weapons Advisory opinion: 
The Court observes that the protection of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of 
war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national 
emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a 
provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
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one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain 
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of 
life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced 
from the terms of the Covenant itself.321 
While this paragraph clearly states that the ICCPR continues to apply during armed 
conflict, proponents of the separation theory have pointed out that the reference to 
IHL as the lex specialis, means that while human rights may, in theory, remain 
applicable during armed conflict, they are replaced by IHL and therefore cease to 
apply in practice.322 Subsequent decisions of the ICJ make this interpretation of the 
above citation unlikely though. The ICJ Advisory Opinion in Wall states in 
paragraph 106:  
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, 
save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to 
be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three 
possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of 
international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters 
of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law.323 
This view, that IHL and IHRL both apply during conflict is not only expressed by 
international courts and tribunals, but is also supported by important international 
bodies such as the ICRC324 and the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), which has 
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stated that “both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive”.325 This 
is the preferred interpretation for journalists in conflict zones as well, as it provides 
the most extensive protection. By allowing the two spheres to complement each 
other, journalists are entitled to protection from a wider set of regulations, especially 
as human rights consider certain issues relevant to journalists, which are not covered 
by IHL, such as freedom of movement and freedom of speech. Assuming that both 
bodies of law apply, this raises the question as to the exact extent states are bound 
during conflict by the human rights treaties they have signed up to.326  
 
4.2.2 The extraterritorial application of human rights during armed conflict 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, IHL, by its very nature, stipulates the 
conduct of the armed forces of a state both inside that state during internal armed 
conflict and outside the territory of the state during international armed conflict. The 
same does not necessarily apply to IHRL. Human rights law has traditionally sought 
to regulate the relationship between the state and those in its own territory. During 
international armed conflict, the military of a state is likely to operate outside its own 
territory, which raises questions as to the extraterritorial application of human rights 
law. IHRL stems from a wide variety of treaties as well as a number of customary 
international human rights norms, most of which operate under different terms, 
which makes it impossible to provide general rules for its application.327 Public 
International Law provides no assistance here as there is no general rule on the 
extraterritorial application of treaties, nor a default presumption in favour or against 
extraterritorial application.328 To consider the extent of the scope of state obligations 
under IHRL we must therefore consider the relevant treaty provisions in this area. 
 
The ICCPR states in article 2(1) that: “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. A narrow reading of 
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this article, suggests that states must apply the Covenant only where individuals are 
both in their territory and under their jurisdiction, negating possible extraterritorial 
application of the Covenant. Both the United States and Israel follow such a narrow 
interpretation of the Covenant.329 Other states, international bodies and the majority 
of academic discourse do not subscribe to such a narrow interpretation of the 
jurisdiction clause of the ICCPR.330 As the ICJ states in one of their Advisory 
Opinions: “[T]he International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable in 
respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory”.331 This view is echoed by the HRC: “[A] State party must respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective 
control of the State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State 
Party”.332 The view that the ICCPR applies in all cases where individuals are within 
the jurisdiction of a state signed up to the Covenant, brings the jurisdiction clause of 
the ICCPR into line with the jurisdiction clause of the ECHR.333 The ECHR states in 
article 1: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. Unlike 
the ICCPR, it does not mention territory at all and only requires jurisdiction for the 
convention to be applied. What next must be answered is thus when exactly 
individuals are considered to be under the jurisdiction of a state during conflict. 
Generally speaking, there is significant consensus amongst both international bodies 
                                                            
329 M Sassòli, “The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of 
Armed Conflicts” in: O Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law: Pas de deux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34-94, p. 64;  Wall Advisory 
Opinion, paras. 102 and 110; HRC, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America” (28 November 2005) CCPR/C/USA/3, pp. 109-
11. 
330 See for example: Sassòli (2011), p. 64; A McBeth, J Nolan and S Rice, The International Law of 
Human Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 634-635; H King, “Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Obligations” (2009) 9(4) Human Rights Law Review, 521; Milanović (2011a), p. 11. 
331 Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 111. 
332 HRC (2004), para. 10. For application of this see Wall Advisory Opinion, para 111 and 179; see 
further Ibrahima Gueye et al. v. France, Communication No. 196/1985, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (1989); Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.13/57, 
U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 157 (1982). 
333 This also brings it more into line with some of the other human rights treaties which have similar 
jurisdiction clauses to the ECHR, such as the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), see: Milanović (2011a), pp. 11-12. 
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and states that human rights law obligations apply extraterritorially where states 
exercise ‘effective control’ over territory or individuals outside their borders.334 
 
The European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated in Loizidou: “Bearing in 
mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a Contracting 
Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or 
unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory”.335 
The ECtHR motivated this on the grounds that any other decision would create a 
vacuum in which no human rights apply. The Court thus looks at the measure of 
effective control over a territory to establish jurisdiction, echoing General Comment 
31 of the HRC. 336 A body of case law has arisen on what can be considered 
‘effective control’ over either territory or persons. The position of the ECtHR on 
‘effective control’ has been set out in Banković, where the ECtHR stated that it only 
recognises the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a contracting state under 
exceptional circumstances: it has only found jurisdiction “when the respondent State, 
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a 
consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that Government”.337 Banković thus required a 
state to be physically present in order to have effective control and jurisdiction for 
the purpose of the ECHR, a view that was heavily criticised for being too narrow.338  
 
The ECtHR has, however, recently accepted extraterritorial jurisdiction where there 
was no physical presence, but individual’s rights were violated directly by state 
actions, bringing it more into line with some of the other major human rights treaties. 
In Issa, which considered the allegation of the killing of an Iraqi national by Turkish 
                                                            
334 Hathaway et al. (2012), p. 1893. 
335 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), ECtHR, 23 March 1995 (Application no. 15318/89), 
para 62. 
336 HRC (2004). 
337 Banković et al. v Belgium et al. (admissibility), ECtHR, 12 December 2001 (Application 
no. 52207/99), para 71.  
338 Sassòli (2011), p.64; McBeth, Nolan and Rice (2011), p. 638; E Roxstrom, M Gibney, T Einarse, 
“The NATO Bombing Case (Banković et al. v Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human 
Rights Protection” (2005) 23 Boston University International Law Journal, 55. 
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forces in Northern Iraq during military operation, the ECtHR found jurisdiction 
beyond the limits of Banković:  
A State may also be held accountable for violation of the 
Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory 
of another State but who are found to be under the former State's 
authority and control through its agents operating, whether lawfully 
or unlawfully, in the latter State. Accountability in such situations 
stems from the fact that Article 1 cannot be interpreted so as to 
allow a State Party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on 
the territory of another State which it would not be permitted to 
perpetrate on its own territory.339 
The ECtHR further noted in this case that it is possible that as a consequence of 
military action temporarily effective control over a particular portion of a foreign 
territory arises.340  
 
The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction was further clarified in Al-Skeini, where the 
ECtHR confirmed that where state agents, such as the military, exercise physical 
control and authority over an individual outside its territory, both in another Council 
of Europe (CoE) Member State as well as a state outside the CoE, the rights 
contained in the ECHR should be secured for that individual.341 The Court further 
reiterated its finding in Loizidou that a state, through lawful or unlawful military 
action, can exercise effective control over an area outside its national territory.342 
Though Al-Skeini provided some clarifications, the ECtHR’s case law on this issue 
remains inconsistent and does not provide a clear indication of when and under 
which circumstances exactly ‘effective control’ can be established.343 The case law 
currently seems to suggest that jurisdiction may be found where state agents detain or 
exercise physical power and control over an individual outside the state’s territory 
                                                            
339 Issa and others v Turkey [2005] 41 EHRR 27, para. 71. See also Pad et al. v Turkey (admissibility), 
ECtHR, 28 June 2007 (Application no. 60167/00), where Turkey accepted jurisdiction over the deaths 
of seven Iranians outside Turkish territory were killed by Turkish helicopter gunships. 
340 Issa and others v Turkey, para. 74.  
341 Al Skeini and others v United Kingdom [2011] 53 EHRR 18, paras. 137 and 142. 
342 Ibid, para. 138. 
343 S Miller, “Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A territorial justification for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the European Convention” (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law, 1223, 
p. 1229; the inconsistency in ‘effective control’ cases of the ECtHR has also been criticised by 
national courts, see for example: Al-Skeini and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 
26, paras. 65 and 67. 
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and where states are, through occupation or other method, effectively in control of a 
territory outside their own state, leaving a potential gap where state agents target and 
kill a person on foreign territory which is not subject to the state’s effective 
control.344 
 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is clearer and more univocal on the issue of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction than the ECtHR. One of the first decisions to consider 
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR was the 1981 Lopez Borgos case, in which 
the HRC stated: “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the [State’s] 
responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could 
not perpetrate in its own territory.”345 This statement has been echoed by the ECtHR 
in the later Banković case discussed above. The HRC further clarified its position in 
General Comment 31: 
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that 
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State 
Party (..) This principle also applies to those within the power or 
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its 
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a 
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international 
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.346 
As discussed above, there are a small number of states who deny the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR based on the wording of article 2, though this view has 
been explicitly rejected by the ICJ in 2004.347  
 
                                                            
344 RK Goldman, “Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights to Life and Personal Liberty, 
Including Habeas Corpus, during Situations of Armed Conflict” in: R Kolb and G Gaggioli (eds.), 
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345 HRC, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, 
para. 12.3. 
346 HRC (2004), para 10. See also: HRC “Concluding Observations on Israel”, 21 August 2003, UN 
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In spite of the protestations of some states and the more narrow view of 
extraterritorial application taken by the ECtHR, there seems to be a growing 
international consensus that states must apply the provisions of IHRL in situations of 
effective control over persons or territory outside their own state.348 This ensures 
stronger protection for journalists, as state actors essentially ‘take their human right 
obligations’ along when they interact with journalists during conflict. Outside the 
situation of effective control, the extraterritorial application of IHRL is currently 
unclear and will likely depend on the nature of the situation and the human rights 
involved.349 
 
4.2.3 Which groups are bound by IHRL during conflict? 
Having established that IHRL is likely to apply during conflict, the question arises 
who are bound by this field of law. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) binds all parties to the conflict, 
both state and non-state actors, due to its customary law nature. The same does not 
necessarily apply for IHRL. Human rights law is traditionally concerned with the 
relationship between the state and the individual and only creates positive obligations 
for state actors. Consequentially, IHRL only addresses states as duty holders.350  
Under the traditional interpretation of IHRL, IHRL therefore does not bind non-state 
actors. In practice, the situation is not so clear cut and there are situations in which 
non-state actors are now bound, at least to a certain extent, by IHRL as will be 
discussed below. 
 
During armed conflict, the military will be bound by IHRL as they are acting as a 
state agent. If they are fighting a non-state armed group, however, their opponent is 
likely not to be bound by the same laws. Conversely, a state may be held responsible 
for the human rights violations of non-state actors. This is the case where actions of 
                                                            
348 F Coomans and M Kamminga, “Comparative Introductory Comments on the Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties” in: F Coomans and T Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2004), 1-8, pp. 4-5. 
349 McBeth, Nolan and Rice (2011), p. 636. 
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non-state actors can be attributed to the state or where the state failed to take 
adequate measures to protect individuals within their territory.351 Acts can still be 
attributed to a State if they are committed by a non-state organ empowered by the 
law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority and the organ 
acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.352 
Furthermore, acts committed by (a group of) person(s) can be attributed to the State 
if a (group of) person(s) is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.353 During armed conflict 
situations it is, however, unlikely that a non-state actor can be considered to fall 
within the full control of a state and if neither the state nor the non-state actor is 
responsible for the human rights violations committed by the latter, this would leave 
victims without any protection from IHRL.  
 
The general consensus in the academic literature is that armed non-state actors, for 
example armed groups or individual fighters, are in principle not bound by IHRL 
during armed conflict situations, though there are exceptions.354 The reason for 
treating non-state actors differently from state actors in this situation is that human 
rights law is based on a vertical relationship between the state and an individual in 
which the state has significant power and control.355 This is not necessarily the case 
to the same extent for the relationship between non-state actors themselves, or non-
state actors and individuals. Non-state actors may therefore not be capable of 
fulfilling certain human rights obligations, especially in conflict situations.356 There 
is additional concern that extending human rights obligations to armed non-state 
actors may dilute the human rights responsibility of states themselves, as it could 
                                                            
351 De Schutter (2010), pp. 366-379; McBeth, Nolan and Rice (2011), p. 642.  
352 Art. 4-7 United Nations, “Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts”, General 
Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 
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reduce their responsibility for certain actions taking place in their territory.357 
Furthermore, as with IHL in the past, there is a general reluctance from states to 
place international law obligations on armed non-state actors as this is perceived as 
affording them legitimacy, recognition and status under international law.358 There 
are, however, several arguments put forward in the academic literature which argue 
for the application of IHRL to armed non-state actors.359 Forcing state actors to 
observe human rights law to an adversary who does not reciprocate creates a 
significant imbalance between parties in relation to a conflict and non-state actors 
can have a significant impact on civilian suffering. Furthermore, human rights law 
covers situations that are not covered by IHL, thus creating a significant 
disadvantage for a population, as well as journalists, operating in a territory 
controlled by a non-state actor.360 Similarly, where a conflict has not reached 
sufficient intensity to invoke the application of IHL but actions of armed non-state 
actors are already significantly affecting individual’s rights, IHRL could bridge an 
important gap in the protection of civilians.361 Under current practice, two situations 
must be considered: the situation where armed non-state actors have significant 
control over a territory and the situation where they do not. 
 
In situations where non-state actors have significant control over a territory and are 
acting as the defacto government of that territory, there is strong doctrinal support for 
placing human rights obligations on those actors.362 The UN, for example, recognises 
that non-state actors have human rights obligations in this situation. As stated by the 
                                                            
357 See for example: UN Commission on Human Rights, “Report of the Working Group on Enforced 
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UN Truth Commission on El Salvador: “when insurgents assume government 
powers in territories under their control, they too can be required to observe certain 
human rights obligations that are binding on the state under international law”.363 
Similar statements have been made by the UN Security Council, UN Special 
rapporteurs and experts and several other UN Committees.364 In situations where 
control is taken over from a state which results in the formation of a new government 
for that territory, the situation under the ICCPR is clarified in General Comment 26 
of the HRC: “once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the 
Covenant, such protection devolves with the territory and continues to belong to 
them, notwithstanding a change in the government or state party, including 
dismemberment in more than one state or state succession”.365 While this does not 
bind non-state actors during the conflict while they are still non-state actors, it can be 
relevant for the protection of journalists when during an ongoing conflict the 
leadership of a state or territory changes. 
 
There is no evidence of human rights obligations for armed non-state actors in 
territories not under their control. The current consensus is here that they are not 
fully subject to human rights obligations, though they may be subject to jus cogens or 
peremptory norms of customary law, discussed below.366 This situation will however 
be rare and will largely only occur where non-state actors have made explicit 
statements committing to abide by certain standards. This in turn will assist in 
establishing the development of customary norms in this area, as discussed above, at 
3.2.  
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International organisations are classed as non-state actors in this context and are 
therefore in principle not bound by IHRL, though they can be bound by customary 
international law. International organisations can currently not become parties to a 
significant number of IHL and IHRL treaties, including the Geneva Conventions.367 
This is logical in that there are a large number of provisions that an international 
organisation could not observe, for example because they require parties to have 
courts or tribunals.368 Some international organisations, however, have undertaken to 
observe IHL and IHRL provisions for as far as possible in their situation.369 While 
the organisations themselves are not necessarily subject to IHL and IHRL provisions, 
the individuals working for them may still be held accountable under these laws. 
This arises mostly in the context of peacekeeping missions, for example by the 
NATO or the UN. Troops are provided by states, which are bound by IHL and IHRL, 
to an international organisation which is not bound, raising questions whether actions 
by personnel in the field should be attributed to the state or the international 
organisation they work for during that peacekeeping mission.370 Under recent case 
law their actions should be attributed to the international organisation and they fall 
therefore outside the scope of IHL and IHRL.371 They may however still be subject 
to customary law norms or be individually responsible under international criminal 
law, discussed below. 
 
 
4.3 The relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law 
 
As we have seen in chapter 3, IHL applies in full during international conflict. 
During non-international armed conflict common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions 1949 applies, supplemented by customary IHL. Where violence does 
not reach the required duration or intensity to be classed as armed conflict, IHL does 
not apply and only IHRL and local laws remain. During armed conflict, as discussed 
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above, IHRL continues to apply, which can lead to situations where both sets of 
norms are equally applicable. There are situations, in which only one of the two sets 
of norms provides an answer and is therefore the applicable norm. An example 
would be a bombardment of a media station installation during international armed 
conflict. While in that situation IHL and IHRL may be equally applicable, IHRL 
provides no regulation for what is a military objective which can be attacked and 
what constitutes a civilian object, which cannot lawfully be attacked under most 
circumstances. IHL will therefor govern this aspect of the fighting.372 In this case 
there is simply no norm conflict. This can similarly be the case where IHRL governs 
a situation during conflict which is not covered by IHL, for example when a 
journalist claims the right to freedom of expression when writing controversial 
content, which is not an aspect IHL is concerned with. 
 
There are situations, however, where both sets of norms provide detailed regulation 
for a specific event/aspect of fighting. Where the two sets of rules lead to the same 
result few problems arise,373 but there are cases where the two lead to contradictory 
results. As discussed, IHL and IHRL are related and share some common features, 
but there are also significant differences, for example in the context of use of deadly 
force, where simultaneous application of both sets of norms is seemingly 
challenging. In these situations one of the two must take precedence. Some authors 
argue that such norm conflicts may be resolved through creating a stronger 
complementary approach, taking elements of both areas of law creating one fully an 
integrated framework of norms.374 This is however not the case in current practice, in 
which norm conflicts do arise. 
 
The ICJ has approached the issue by stating that “some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
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law”.375 There is some consensus that problems arising from the simultaneous 
application of IHL and IHRL can be resolved by the lex specialis derogat legi 
generali principle, though the exact interpretation of the principle in this context is 
subject to extensive debate.376 The ICJ has, for example, on occasion given 
precedence to IHL as the lex specialis during armed conflict, but has also clarified 
that this will not always be the case,377 suggesting that decisions must be made on a 
case-to-case basis.378 It has further been suggested that the lex specialis approach is 
an oversimplification of the norm-conflict between IHL and IHRL that cannot so 
easily be dealt with.379 Several models have been put forward which seek to address 
the difficulty of parallel application of IHL an IHRL but there is no consensus on this 
issue.380 Few authors argue that IHL should always be considered the lex specialis in 
armed conflict situations and there is a strong consensus from states, international 
bodies, courts and tribunals, derogation clauses and academic literature on the 
complementary nature of IHL and IHRL and their joint application during conflict.381 
There is similar agreement that the joint application of the two frameworks should, 
where possible, lead to a harmonious interpretation, to avoid norm conflicts. 
 
Judging what the lex specialis is in a given case is not a straightforward matter. The 
rationale behind the lex specialis approach is that a specific rule is more to the point 
than a general one, which means it is better able to take account of and deal with the 
relevant circumstances, thus regulating the matter more effectively than general rules 
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by providing greater clarity.382 To resolve a conflict between IHL and IHRL in a 
given situation it must therefore be established which of the two is more ‘precise’ in 
a given situation: which norm explicitly addresses the problem and in the greatest 
detail.383 Another relevant factor can be which norm offers a solution that is closest 
to the systemic objective of the law, though this is more controversial.384 It should be 
noted that by selecting the lex specialis in a given situation of armed conflict, the lex 
generalis is not discarded, but remains relevant according to the dominant view.385 
As stated above, where possible a conflict between the two should be avoided, thus 
leaving the lex generalis to influence the interpretation of the lex specialis,386 
working towards a harmonious interpretation of norms. Some argue that this is not a 
true application of the lex specialis principle as it is meant to operate as a method of 
conflict avoidance, not conflict resolution.387 In practice, it is sufficient to establish 
here that norm conflicts do arise and that there is no standard practice for resolving 
these conflicts, creating some uncertainty for those fighting and living in armed 
conflict situations. Such conflicts are however relatively rare and as there is 
significant support for resolving conflicts between IHL and IHRL through the lex 
specialis derogat legi generali principle, in the most common situations what the 
rules are will be relatively clear for army lawyers, though likely not for those less 
aware of the legal framework, which can impact on their observance.388 
 
It should further be noted that there is little scope for a norm conflict between rules 
of customary law due to the way customary law is formed. Customary law is based 
on state practice and opinio juris in relation to a specific situation which results in a 
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Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), 53-64, pp. 57-61. 
386 See for example: J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 299.  
387 Milanović (2011b), pp. 113-116. 
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‘standard’ practice for that situation, it is unlikely that two conflicting ‘standard’ 
practices will form, especially in fields as closely related as IHL and IHRL. 389 
 
 
4.4 Relevant International Human Rights Law 
 
There are several human rights provisions that are relevant to the physical protection 
of journalists in conflict zones, namely the right to life, the right to personal liberty 
and security, the right to fair trial and freedom of expression. Their protective value 
during conflict is limited, however, as most rights can be derogated from during war 
or other state of emergency which ‘threatens the life of the nation’.390 This must be 
done through notifying the international community of the derogation and 
establishing that a state of emergency exists, as well as providing reasons why the 
derogation is strictly necessary and proportionate under the circumstances.391 State 
practice shows that the use of the derogation clause is limited; during international 
armed conflict states generally do not officially derogate and the practice with non-
international armed conflict is mixed. 392 Derogations can further not be made where 
they violate state obligations under international law and can therefore not be made 
where they would violate IHL obligations, which limits the practical application of 
the derogation clause in the ICCPR and ECHR.393 The discussion of specific human 
rights relevant to journalists in paragraphs 4.4.1-4.4.5 below, will note which rights 
are derogable and which are non-derogable. All rights discussed below are subject to 
extensive discussion in academic literature as well as detailed case law. I will only 
consider the most relevant aspects of these rights to journalists in conflict zones, to 
flag up potential protection under IHRL, rather than discuss this protection in detail, 
                                                            
389 Sassòli and Olson (2008), p. 605. The ICRC study into customary law, discussed in the previous 
chapter, demonstrates this by extensively referring to human rights in conflict situations to establish 
customary humanitarian law. 
390 See for example art. 4 ICCPR and art. 15 ECHR. The ECtHR has defined public emergency as “an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which afflicts the whole population and constitutes a 
threat to the organised life of the community of which the community is composed” Lawless v 
Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15. 
391 See for example: S Tierney, “Determining the State of Exception: What role for parliament and the 
courts?” (2005) 68(4) Modern Law Review, 668. 
392 C Droege, “The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict” (2007) 40 Israel Law Review, 310, p. 319.  
393 Mathews (2013), p. 637; also Moir (2002), pp. 196-197. 
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which is difficult in the context of armed conflict where much will depend on the 
exact circumstances of the case. 
 
4.4.1 Right to life 
Article 6 ICCPR and article 2 ECHR establish the non-derogable right to life,394 
which provides that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of their life, though the 
articles provide exceptions to this rule. This is the most basic human right which 
protects journalists in conflict zones. It is also one which is often seen as conflicting 
with IHL, which allows for the killing of persons under certain circumstances. In the 
context of journalists operating in conflict zones, this means a conflict between IHL 
and IHRL norms may arise where journalists become ‘collateral damage’ in a 
military attack. Generally in this situation IHL would take precedence over this norm 
of IHRL. As discussed above, in this circumstance IHL will provide guidance as to 
the interpretation of ‘the right to life’ during conflict. 395 
 
The protection for journalists under this article is however still relevant and has 
several aspects. First of all, the articles prohibit intentional killing by the state and 
state parties must take adequate measures to prevent arbitrary killing by their own 
state agents.396 The articles also protect against so called ‘disappearances’. In the 
context of art 6 ICCPR the HRC has stated that the state must take effective and 
specific measures against disappearances and ensure that instances of suspicious 
deaths and missing persons are thoroughly investigated. 397 While these articles do 
not prohibit states from executing the death penalty for serious offences, under 
Protocol 6 of the ECHR, which has been signed by all CoE States,398 the death 
penalty is abolished and extradition to a country with the death penalty is not 
                                                            
394 Art. 15(2) ECHR notes specifically that deaths resulting from lawful acts of war are exempted. 
395 The ‘right to life’ as contained in art. 6 of the ICCPR, for example, only provides the general 
provisions that “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”, which does not give details on when a civilian can and 
cannot be deprived of life during conflict. Art. 51 Protocol I on the protection of the civilian 
population on the other hand, provides far more detailed provisions on how the lives of the civilian 
population must be protected and when this protection is lost. See further Doswald-Beck and Vité 
(1994), p.107. 
396 HRC, “General Comment 6 - Article 6”, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1/Add.13 at 6 (1994), para. 3 
(hereafter (HRC, 1994a); Suárez de Guerrero v Colombia, Comm. No. 45/1979 (1982); See for the 
ECHR for example: McCann and others v United Kingdom [1995] 21 EHRR 97.  
397 HRC (1994a), para. 4; for the ECHR see for example: Timurtaş v Turkey [2001] 33 EHRR 121. 
398 It has further been ratified by all CoE States except Russia. 
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permitted, thus providing practical protection from the death penalty for journalists 
under the jurisdiction of CoE States. The ICCPR does not provide the same 
protection, but specifically states that the death penalty may only be imposed “for the 
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime” and after final judgement by a competent court.399  
 
Most importantly, these articles impose upon the state the positive obligation to 
protect life. States must therefore put in place a legal framework which provides 
effective deterrent against any unlawful killing by both state agents and 
individuals.400 As noted above, such a framework does not have to protect against 
killings thsat are the result of legitimate actions during conflict, but does place the 
obligation to protect against illegitimate or arbitrary killing. This is especially 
relevant for journalists, whose deaths (in conflict zones) suffer from a high level of 
impunity, which arguably means that states are not providing a sufficiently effective 
deterrent against killing journalists.  
 
4.4.2 Personal liberty, security and fair trial 
While this right aims to provide safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, 
rather than directly protecting physical safety, being arrested can carry significant 
risks to physical safety through, for example, interrogation methods and detention 
conditions. For this reason both these rights and the right to a fair trial discussed in 
the next paragraph, are relevant in the context of this thesis and will therefore be 
briefly discussed here. 
 
Article 5 ECHR and article 9 of the ICCPR protect journalists from arbitrary arrest 
and or detention, though the right can be derogated from in times of emergency. The 
articles ensure that arrests can only be made with lawful authority and proper judicial 
control, and must satisfy several procedural requirements. The ECtHR has further 
                                                            
399 Art. 6(2) ICCPR; Extradition to a state with capital punishment is also prohibited under this article, 
see for example: Roger Judge v Canada, Comm. No. 829/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 
(2003). 
400 HRC (1994a), para. 3; S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, materials and commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 181-
184; Kiliç v Turkey [2001] 33 EHRR 1357. 
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taken the view that not only must detention be ‘lawful’; the law governing the 
detention must be of a certain quality, thus providing some procedural safeguards.401  
Detainees have the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court, 
which will speedily decide whether or not the detention is lawful. The ECtHR has 
further emphasised that while the court does not have to be a ‘traditional’ court, it 
must be independent from the executive and involved parties and must have the 
power to order release should the detention be found to be unlawful.402 
 
Connected to the right of personal liberty and security is the prohibition of torture 
contained in article 3 ECHR and article 7 ICCPR which state: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. This 
protection is absolute and no derogations can be made. There is significant case law 
on what constitutes “torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.403 It is 
sufficient to note here that this article, due to its absolute nature, provides 
considerable protection against maltreatment of journalists by state actors. States 
further have a positive obligation to take sufficient measures to prevent such 
treatment of persons by private and/or state parties, which includes the obligation to 
investigate any instances of such treatment404 and ensure conditions of detention do 
not result in such treatment.405 Journalists may further find protection in the 
Convention Against Torture, which provides detailed protection and currently has 
155 state parties.406 
 
                                                            
401 Steel, Lush and others v United Kingdom [1998] 28 EHRR 603; Mr. C v Australia, Comm. No. 
900/1999. UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (2002). For more detail see: C Ovey and R White, The 
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 127-129.  
402 Neumeister v Austria [1968] 1 EHRR 91, para. 24; Hussein and Singh v United Kingdom [1996] 22 
EHRR 1, para 65. 
403 For an overview see: Ovey and White (2006), pp. 75-84; Joseph, Shultz and Castan (2004), pp. 
195-211.  
404 Aksoy v Turkey [1996] 23 EHRR 553, para. 47; Sevtap Veznedaroglu v Turkey [2001] 33 EHRR 
1412; HRC, “General Comment 20 – Article 7” U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 14 
(hereafter, HRC 1994b); Joaquin David Herrera Rubio et al. v Colombia, Comm. No. 161/1983, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 192 (1990). 
405 See for example: HRC (1994b), para. 11; Price v United Kingdom [2002] 34 EHRR 1285. 
406 UN, “United Nations Treaty Collection: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, available at: 
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Connected to the right to personal liberty and security, is the derogable right to a fair 
trial contained in article 6 ECHR and article 14 ICCPR.  The ECHR and the ICCPR 
articles state that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. This applies to 
both to civil and criminal trials. The articles further state that everyone charged with, 
or accused of a criminal offence, shall have the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to the law. This right provides important protection for 
journalists, in combination with other human rights, from arbitrary arrests and 
charges which may endanger their freedom, or even lives. The articles contain a 
number of procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring all trial proceedings adhere to a 
minimum standard of fairness for the accused. There is a wealth of case law on these 
articles, and while some of its aspects apply to both civil and criminal suits, those 
referring to criminal trials are the most relevant to journalists operating in war 
zones.407 
 
The tribunal before which a case is brought must be independent, impartial, and 
established by law. Hearings should be public, though there can be overriding 
considerations to close a trial for the public, such as national security.408 Judgements 
should be announced publicly and trials should take place without undue delays/in 
reasonable time. The ICCPR further states that “everyone convicted of a crime shall 
have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal 
according to law”,409 a right which is also contained in Protocol 7 to the ECHR.410 
 
The right to silence and the principle against self-incrimination is contained in article 
14(3)g ICCPR. It is not explicitly contained in article 6 ECHR, but is considered part 
of internationally recognised standards of a fair trial and is recognised in the case law 
for article 6.411 This provides protection for journalists from being compelled to 
incriminate themselves during questioning. The articles further explicitly provide 
                                                            
407 This is not to say the procedural safeguards for civil lawsuits are irrelevant, but journalists’ 
physical safety is predominantly affected by (the threat of) criminal proceedings against them. 
408 Art. 6(1) ECHR and art. 14(1) ICCPR. 
409 Art. 14(5) ICCPR. 
410 Art. 2 Protocol 7 ECHR, though not all states have signed and ratified this Protocol. 
411 Ovey and White (2006), p. 196; JB v Switzerland [2001] Criminal Law Review 748; Saunders v 
United Kingdom [1997] 23 EHRR 313. 
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useful rights during the trial, such as adequate time to prepare a defence, to be 
provided with legal assistance, an interpreter if necessary and to examine witnesses. 
Finally, article 7 ECHR and article 15 ICCPR, which are both non-derogable, protect 
against retro-active criminalisation of actions by stating that: “No one shall be held 
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed.” This include the requirement that legislation must be sufficiently 
clear,412 which, at least in theory, ensures that journalists can be aware before taking 
action whether they would risk prosecution under domestic legislation. 
 
4.4.3 Freedom of Expression 
Article 10 ECHR and article 19 ICCPR concern the derogable right to freedom of 
expression, which is subject to a number of limitations ranging from national security 
to protecting the reputation and rights of others. While freedom of expression is of 
paramount importance for journalists in terms of ensuring they can carry out their 
work subject to minimum interference of public authorities, for the purpose of this 
thesis an important part of the value of these articles lies in the positive obligations it 
creates for states to actively protect journalists from harm. IHRL concerning freedom 
of expression therefore provides journalists with different forms of protection. It 
stops states from unduly interfering with journalistic expression, which has some 
indirect effect on journalist safety as interference with freedom of expression must be 
justified, which, in theory, places limitations on the reasons journalists can be 
arrested and imprisoned and the risks that come with that.413 It further creates a 
positive obligation to protect journalists against interference from private parties, 
though there is little international case law on this aspect of the freedom of 
expression to date.414 
 
The ECtHR has recognised the obligation to protect the effective exercise of freedom 
of expression through positive measures on several occasions, most notably in Özgür 
                                                            
412 Kokkinakis v Greece [1994] 17 EHRR 397, para. 52. 
413 See for example: HRC, “Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Lesotho” 
(1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 106, para 22, where the HRC condemns continuing harassment of, 
and repeated libel suits against, journalists criticising the government. 
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Gündem v. Turkey, where they found Turkey was under obligation to investigate and 
take protective measures when newspaper staff were subject to a campaign of 
intimidation and violence.415 The court stated here: “Genuine, effective exercise of 
this freedom does not depend merely on the state’s duty not to interfere, but may 
require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between 
individuals”.416 Similar notions on the positive obligations under freedom of speech 
have been expressed by the UN General Assembly.417 
 
4.4.4 Right to property 
The right to protection of property, though included in article 17 of the UDHR is not 
included in either the ICCPR or the ECHR as no agreement could be reached on the 
scope and meaning of the article. Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which was drafted shortly 
after the Convention itself came into force, does recognise the right to protection of 
property. The protocol states in article 1 that “Every natural or legal person is entitled 
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law”, though derogations can be 
made. This article is relevant to the protection of journalists as it, in theory, protects 
them from unauthorised confiscation of safety equipment, such as bullet proof vests 
and helmets. It can further provide some protection from attacks on media stations 
and equipment where journalists may be injured or killed. 
 
 
4.5 Customary International Human Rights Law 
 
Some human rights enshrined in the various IHRL treaties have achieved customary 
law status.418 The ICJ has emphasised that under international law states have certain 
                                                            
415 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey [2001] 31 EHRR 49. 
416 Ibid, para. 43. 
417 UN General Assembly, “Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and 
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”, Resolution 53/144 of 9 December 1998. 
418 This is generally accepted, though some authors still argue this is not the case, see for example: 
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obligations towards the international community which are the concern of all states, 
such as the basic rights of the human person.419 While customary law has to be 
derived from state practice, it has been argued that in the field of human rights, the 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly and statement made by other international 
organisations, which demonstrate a clear commitment of the international 
community towards certain values, can indicate the existence of customary law.420  
 
Which exact rights achieve this status of customary law is however still subject of 
dispute. There is no official list of recognised customary human rights, or 
peremptory norms, though violations are generally accepted to include: genocide, 
violence to life, crimes against humanity, slavery, racial discrimination, deviating 
from fundamental principles of fair trial, arbitrary deprivations of liberty and torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment.421 The human rights contained in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998 (hereafter Rome Statute), 
discussed below, are generally considered to have achieved customary law status, 
which is the reason they are included in the Statute.422 Similarly, most of those rights 
contained in Universal Declaration of Human Rights are also considered to have 
acquired customary law status and thus bind armed groups and individuals.423 
International organisations have (limited) legal personality and are bound by 
customary law where they engage in the same activities as states, though the exact 





                                                                                                                                                                        
The effect of treaties and other formal international acts on the customary law of human rights” (1996) 
25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 99. 
419 ICJ, Case of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v Spain), ICJ 
reports 1970, p. 3, paras. 33-34. 
420 De Schutter, (2010), p. 50. 
421 Henckaerts and Wiesener (2013), p. 159; Kälin and Künzli (2010), p. 62; International Law 
Commission, “Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts” (November 2001) Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, p. 206-209, available at: 
http://www.eydner.org/dokumente/darsiwa_comm_e.pdf ; HRC, “General Comment 29: States of 
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4.6 International Criminal law 
 
International Criminal Law (ICL) significantly overlaps with human rights law and 
humanitarian law, as it criminalises a number of actions, such as crimes against 
humanity and genocide, which also pose breaches of IHL and IHRL.425 The focus of 
ICL lies on different actors though. Where both IHL and IHRL are primarily 
concerned with state actions and state responsibility for actions in their territory, ICL 
focusses on holding individuals responsible for gross breaches of human rights and 
humanitarian law for which a state may or may not have concurrent responsibility. 
Consequently in a single (serious) breach of a journalist’s rights, two questions must 
be asked in order to determine which bodies of law have been breached and thus 
which remedies might be available: 1) is the individual who committed the breach 
individually responsible under ICL and 2) can the state be held responsible for that 
individual’s actions?  
 
ICL consists of both treaty law and customary international law and has been 
codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Individuals can 
only be held responsible under ICL if their conduct was criminalised in either 
sources of ICL before the conduct took place, otherwise it would breach the human 
rights principle against retrospective criminality discussed above. The main 
categories of criminalised behaviour are genocide, crimes of aggression, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes,426 of which the latter two are the most relevant for 
the protection of journalists. The term crimes against humanity stems from the 1907 
Hague Convention preamble, which sought to codify customary law of armed 
conflict and were established in positive international law for the first time in the 
prosecution agreement for the Nuremberg trials.427 Crimes against humanity are 
defined by the Rome Statute as: “any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack” and continues to lists crimes such as murder, rape and 
imprisonment and other depravation of liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
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international law.428 These crimes differ from ‘ordinary’ crimes in the sense that they 
systematically target the civilian population.429 War crimes on the other hand are 
simply defined as “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” 
and a number of crimes applicable to international and non-international armed 
conflicts such as wilful killing, torture and rape are set out, which are relevant to the 
protection of journalists in conflict zones.430 Not all breaches of IHL will also 
constitute breaches of ICL, only the gravest breaches invoke criminal liability. 
 
Under ICL the person who commits the crime, either alone or with others can be held 
accountable, but also the individual who “orders, solicits or induces the commission 
of such a crime” and the person who “for the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission”.431 ICL is enforced 
through domestic courts and international courts and tribunals, for example through 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and some of the regional tribunals set up to 
deal with specific conflicts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Enforcement of ICL through such tribunals will be 





The application of IHRL to conflicts provides journalists, at least in theory, with 
valuable protection when reporting on conflict. IHRL has a wider scope then IHL in 
protecting civilians and its application can thus extend the protection journalists are 
                                                            
428 Art. 7, UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 
2010), 17 July 1998 (hereafter Rome Statute). It is not necessary for the ‘attack’ referred to in this 
article to occur during armed conflict. In this context ‘attack’ according to art 7(2) means “a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such attack” and 
this article thus provides protection outside the scope of armed conflict as well as during armed 
conflict. 
429 Kälin and Künzli (2010), p. 62. See also ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) Judgement of 26 February 2007, ICJ reports 2007, p.43. 
430 Art. 8 Rome Statute. 
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entitled to. Rights such as freedom of expression can provide journalists with 
additional protection by creating positive obligations for state actors, but this is not 
their only value in terms of protecting journalists. The underlying message: that one 
cannot prosecute journalists for the content they produce,432 can also provide 
protection as it reinforces the notion that journalists should not be targeted, during 
peace or during conflict. In this sense the acceptance of extraterritorial application of 
human rights is a positive development, as not only does it force actors to apply 
human rights during conflict, it normalises those rights in the sense that it sends the 
message that these rights apply continuously, for as far as possible, at home or away. 
 
While IHRL thus has the potential to provide a valuable additional source of 
protection for journalists operating in conflict zones, the extent of this protection 
remains unclear and is unfortunately likely to be limited. One of the main issues is 
the fact that there are only a small number of international human rights that cannot 
be limited or derogated from in times of public emergency or war and while some 
norms of IHRL are thus generally accepted to apply, these are limited in practice. 
The protection that is available largely overlaps with treaty-based and customary IHL 
thus not making a significant addition the protective body of law. This is however 
not the say that IHRL does not add anything at all to the protection of journalists in 
conflict zones. It can provide more detailed interpretation of norms contained in IHL, 
such as the right to a fair trial and can increase protection through such means. What 
does pose a significant problem, is that IHRL only applies to non-state actors to a 
limited extent. As journalists are increasingly covering conflicts with involvement of 
one or more non-state actors, these actors are increasingly posing a risk to their 
safety and the limited application of IHRL in interaction between non-state actors 
and journalists, thus significantly limits its value.  
 
Another major hurdle in applying human rights law in conflict situations is that the 
human rights treaty law is formulated in very general language. Compared to IHL 
which is formulated as clear duties that combatants have to obey, the general 
formulation of the rights in IHRL require a significant amount of interpretation 
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before they can be applied as a legal framework. The reliance on the exact 
circumstances of the case to establish which rights apply and potentially which 
(conflicting) rights take precedence in a given combat situation, makes it difficult for 
those involved to apply IHRL ‘in the field’, especially for non-state actors with 
limited or no legal training. As noted, journalists are increasingly interacting with 
non-state actors, which is thus problematic. Similarly, even in situations where clear 
human rights obligations for non-state actors can be identified, international law 
largely lacks accountability mechanisms for human rights violations, which renders 
IHRL law ineffective for protecting victims during conflict. Humanitarian law was 
created for situations where victims have no opportunity to assert their rights, while 
human rights law assumes victims will be able to assert their rights and will be able 
to instigate judicial proceeding, which does not sit well with conflict situations.433 
The methods by, and the extent to which, IHRL is enforced in practice will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
  
                                                            
433 Schindler (1981-1982), p. 941. 
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5. Enforcement of legal norms and impunity 
 
The previous chapters have shown that there are a significant number of legal 
provisions that have the potential to provide protection for journalists working in 
conflict territories. On the other hand statistics demonstrate that in spite of these 
provisions, journalists are still being targeted and that these incidences are increasing 
rather than diminishing. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has identified 70 
cases in 2013 in which journalists were killed in direct relation to their work, which 
includes deaths on dangerous missions and deaths in crossfire.434 This statistic does 
not include cases of killings where no motive could be confirmed, which means that 
the actual number of work-related deaths will be considerably higher than this. Of 
those 70 cases where motive could be confirmed, the majority took place in conflict 
territories and 51% of the journalists who were killed were reporting on war.435  
 
These statistics raise questions as to whether the current legal framework provides 
adequate protection for journalists in practice. Robin Geiss, a legal expert for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), considered this issue in a 2010 
interview, concluding that the legal framework concerning the protection of 
journalists in conflict zones provides sufficient protection in theory and that “the 
most serious deficiency is not a lack of rules, but a failure to implement existing 
rules and to systematically investigate, prosecute and punish violations”, something 
which must be improved upon.436 In 2011, the ICRC published a four-year action 
plan for the implementation of humanitarian law, which similarly calls for enhanced 
protection of journalists in conflict zones, but does not suggest there is a need for a 
new treaty to enhance protection for journalists.437 In order to fully evaluate the legal 
                                                            
434 CPJ, “70 Journalists Killed in 2013/Motive Confirmed” (2014), available at: 
http://cpj.org/killed/2013/. Other organisations provide slightly different numbers, such as Reporters 
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437 ICRC, “Four-Year Action Plan for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Draft 
resolution of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (28 November 
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framework protecting journalists, we must therefore take a closer look at how this 
framework is implemented in practice and consider to what extent crimes against 
journalists in conflict zones go unpunished.  
 
International courts and tribunals play an important role in the enforcement of the 
legal framework governing conflict. Their role often goes beyond simply providing 
fora and procedures for post-conflict dispute resolution and settlements. They also 
play an important role in emphasising, defining and explaining the content of the 
relevant legal framework during, or even prior to, a conflict taking place.438 This 
chapter will first consider the variety of courts and international bodies that 
implement and enforce IHL, IHRL and International Criminal Law, before 
examining the issues behind the high levels of impunity for crimes against journalists 
in conflict zones. 
 
 
5.1 Enforcement of IHL 
 
The enforcement of IHL involves a two-pronged approach: enforcement through 
judicial methods and enforcement through non-judicial methods. The judicial 
enforcement of IHL takes place through a number of national and international 
courts and tribunals. Enforcement through non-judicial measures can take many 
forms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions which can work towards 
addressing past violations as well as ensuring that such violations do not occur in the 
future.439 There is however no real systematic international enforcement system of 
IHL, which hampers its effectiveness.440 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-
int-conference-4year-action-plan-11-5-1-3-en.pdf. 
438 C Foster, “The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in Relation to Armed Conflict” in: U 
Dolgopol and J Gardam (eds.), The Challenge of Conflict: International law responds (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 105-144, p. 143. 
439 See for example: UN Security Council, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General” (23 August 2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616. 
440 R Alley, “The Culture of Impunity: What journalists need to know about International 
Humanitarian Law, (2010) 16 Pacific Journalism Review, 78, p. 89. 
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Historically, one of the most common methods for enforcing IHL was reprisal. If one 
side of a conflict violated the laws of war their opponents would respond in kind, 
both as a punishment and as an attempt to force the other party to change their 
conduct.441 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have severely limited this form of 
enforcement, as has customary law. The ICTY indicated on this subject that the 
defining characteristic of modern IHL is “the obligation to uphold key tenets of this 
body of law regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants,”442 which is 
incompatible with the system of reprisals. Having limited the scope of enforcement 
through reprisals, the Geneva Conventions (1949) provide for alternative methods of 
enforcement, such as the designation of a Protecting Power,443 though this option has 
rarely been employed in practice, or through establishing a fact-finding 
commission.444 In practice IHL is enforced through a variety of state and non-state 
actors working both in war and peace to ensure observation of the relevant principles 
of law during conflict.  
 
Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) states that: “The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances”. States are therefore required to ensure that all 
those under their control respect IHL. How they must achieve this is up to individual 
states to a certain extent, though article 80(2) of Protocol I specifically requires 
parties to a conflict to “give orders and instructions to ensure observance of the 
Conventions and this Protocol” as well as supervise their execution. Ensuring respect 
for the provisions of IHL is likely to require both repressive and preventive 
measures, such as military training in the content of the Conventions.445 There are a 
number of provisions contained in the Geneva Conventions which concern the 
                                                            
441 A Cassese, “On the Current Trend towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law” (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law, 2, p. 3. 
442 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al. Judgement (Trial Chamber), 14 January 2000 (para. 511). 
443 Art. 8 Geneva Conventions I-III, art. 9 Geneva Convention IV. 
444 Art. 90 Protocol I; for more information see: Cassese (1998), p.4. 
445 T Pfanner, “Various Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian 
Law and Protecting and Assisting War Victims” (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross, 
279, p. 280. 
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enforcement of IHL, though not all are, or have been, in use since the drafting of the 
Conventions.446 
 
One of the preventive measures required by the Geneva Convention is the 
dissemination of the text of the Conventions to civilians and military personnel, both 
during times of war and peace time. Such dissemination should be as wide as 
possible to ensure that the population of a state is familiar with the content of the 
Conventions.447 Special reference is made in this context to the study of the 
Conventions during military training programmes. To ensure military forces are fully 
aware of their obligations and responsibilities under the Conventions, article 82 
Protocol I requires state parties to ensure that “legal advisers are available, when 
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application 
of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to 
the armed forces on this subject”. 
 
5.1.1 National Courts 
IHL’s primary method of enforcement is through the domestic courts of the state 
where the violation in question has occurred or the state of which the alleged 
offenders are nationals.448 To this end, several provisions in the Geneva Conventions 
(1949) require the adoption of national legislative measures to fulfil the obligations 
contained in the Conventions.449 These national provisions, to a certain extent, make 
it easier to bring breaches of the Conventions before a court. Most importantly, 
article 49 of Geneva Convention I requires states to “enact any legislation necessary 
to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches, of the present Convention”.450 The provision 
                                                            
446 The enquiry procedure, for example, has never been used. For further information see for example: 
Pfanner (2009), pp. 285-286. 
447 Art. 47 Geneva Convention I, art. 48 Geneva Convention II, article 127 Geneva Convention III, art. 
144 Geneva Convention IV; art. 83 Protocol I all have similar wording to this extent. See for Protocol 
II art. 19, which contains a similar provision. 
448 D Akande and S Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic 
Courts” (2011) 21 European Journal of International Law, 815, p.816.  
449 See for example art. 26, art. 44, art. 53 and art. 54. 
450 See also art. 50 Geneva Convention II, art. 129 Geneva Convention III, art. 146 Geneva 
Convention IV, which have the same wording as art. 49 Geneva Convention I . A ‘grave breach’  is 
generally defined as: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and 
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further requires state parties to search for persons who have committed, or have 
ordered to have committed, such grave breaches and bring them before the national 
courts. There does not need to be a connection between the state exercising 
jurisdiction and the perpetrator for the prosecution of grave breaches.451 Finally, the 
article provides that state parties must also take all measures necessary to suppress 
breaches that do not meet the threshold of ‘grave breach’. While these provisions are 
only applicable to international armed conflict, the ICJ has held that similar 
obligations exists for non-international conflicts that fall under the scope of common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.452  
 
It is not always necessary for national courts to have a ‘direct connection’ to the 
breaches of IHL in order to prosecute them. Under the principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, states may bring charges against individuals for committing the grave 
breaches of IHL regardless of a connection with the crime, victim or alleged 
offender.453 The Geneva Conventions (1949) as well as Protocol I establish such 
universal jurisdiction where grave breaches of the Conventions are concerned.454 
Universal Jurisdiction is further not limited to international armed conflicts. The 
ICTY has explicitly confirmed that violations of the laws and customs of war as laid 
down in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions attract customary criminal 
                                                                                                                                                                        
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly”, see: art. 50 Geneva Convention I, art. 51 Geneva Convention II, art. 130 Geneva 
Convention II, art. 147 Geneva Convention IV and artt. 11(4) and 85 Protocol I. 
451 The intentional killing of a journalist during conflict would likely be classed as a ‘grave breach’ 
under the legal framework. 
452 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) Judgement of 27 June1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 220. 
453 For more information on the principle of Universal Jurisdiction and connected issues, see for 
example: KC Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” (1987-1988) 66 Texas Law 
Review, 785; M Cherif Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
perspectives and contemporary practice” (2001-2002) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law, 81. 
454 Geneva Convention (I), Article 49; Geneva Convention (II), Article 50; Geneva Convention (III), 
Article 129; Geneva Convention (IV), Article 146; Additional Protocol I, Article 85(1). While these 
articles do not specifically state jurisdiction is universal in the sense that it can be asserted regardless 
of the place of offense, it has generally been interpreted as such: ICRC, “The Scope and Application 
of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction: ICRC statement to the United Nations, 2013” (18 October 
2013), available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-
universal-jurisdiction-statement-2013-10-18.htm.   
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liability and universal jurisdiction.455 Generally speaking, however, states have been 
reluctant to prosecute violations of IHL though national jurisdiction.456 
 
National Courts may order those who are responsible for breaches of IHL to pay 
compensation to their victims. This is a longstanding principle of IHL and is 
currently contained in several treaties, amongst them article 91 of Protocol I and 
article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property. Reparation does not necessarily take the form of monetary 
compensation and other forms of remedies may be ordered by the courts.457 The 
existence of an individual right to compensation under IHL is debatable, and in many 
cases individuals will have to rely on their own governments to bring a claim.458 This 
is largely due to the nature of IHL which deals primarily with conflicts between 
states, rather than states and individuals. The situation is different under International 
Criminal Law (ICL), which does allow for individual claims, as well as under 
Human Rights Law, which can coincide with IHL, thus effectively providing an 
individual right to claim compensation. Both are discussed below. 
 
5.1.2 International Courts  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the first international tribunal to be 
established by the UN in 1945 and has assisted in improving the observance of IHL 
worldwide. The court does not solely concern itself with IHL, its remit being much 
wider. The ICJ settles disputes between states in accordance with international law 
and can further provide Advisory Opinions on legal questions which have been 
referred to it by authorised United Nations (UN) organs and specialized agencies.459 
The Advisory Opinions are especially important in terms of enforcement of IHL as 
they can establish the legality of actions in advance of or during a conflict, rather 
than retroactively ascertain their permissibility.460 It has published several important 
Advisory Opinions in the field of IHL, such as the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
                                                            
455 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction), 2 October 1995, para 83. See also: ICRC (2013)  
456 Cassese (1998), pp. 5-7; Akande and Shah (2011), p. 816. 
457 Pfanner (2009), p. 287. 
458 Pfanner (2009), pp. 288-289. 
459 ICJ, “The Court”, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1. 
460 Foster (2006), p. 140. 
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Opinion,461 discussed in the previous chapter, which (partly) clarified the relation 
between IHL and IHRL. Advisory Opinions are however primarily a declaration of 
the applicable law, rather than specific directions which parties must follow and the 
scope of their judicial role and jurisdiction are subject to debate.462  
 
There are further a number of international courts and tribunals such as the 
International Tribunal Responsible for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) which all assist in the 
enforcement IHL. These courts and tribunals deal with individual criminal 
responsibility through ICL which encompasses gross violations of IHL. These 
institutions are discussed separately below at paragraph 5.3. 
 
5.1.3 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
One of the main objectives of the ICRC is “to prevent suffering by promoting and 
strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles”.463 Its 
fundamental principles dictate, amongst others, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence in all its activities, which limits the work which the ICRC can 
undertake to enforce the correct application of IHL during conflicts.464 This does not, 
however, prevent them from making a valuable contribution to the observance of 
IHL principles. The work of the ICRC therefore focusses on providing assistance 
during conflict to those in need, rather than enforcing their rights.465 
 
The ICRC is active in the dissemination of the Conventions and their incorporation 
into national law. At the start of an international armed conflict, the ICRC 
                                                            
461 ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996. 
462 Ibid, pp. 140-142. 
463 ICRC, “The ICRC’s Mission Statement” (19 June 2008), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-mission-190608.htm.  
464 ICRC, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Geneva: ICRC, 1996). 
465 Pfanner (2009), p. 299; J Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary 
(Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1979), p. 54. 
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traditionally draws attention to the need to observe the norms of IHL.466 The ICRC 
may further publicly denounce serious violations of IHL and call on the international 
community to end these violations, as they have done during conflicts in Rwanda, 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, amongst others.467 They also provide practical assistance to 
journalists in conflict zones. The ICRC runs a 24-hour hotline dedicated to 
journalists requiring assistance while covering armed conflict and other situations of 
violence. The hotline can be accessed by employers, media and family to report a 
journalists who have been injured, captured, detained or have gone missing.468 The 
ICRC will further seek permission to visit detained journalists, accompanied by a 
doctor if necessary and seek to establish contact between the journalist and their 
family.469 
 
The Geneva Conventions regularly refer to the ICRC throughout their text and 
provide them with a legal basis to supervise the application of IHL.470 During 
conflicts ICRC personnel actively provides humanitarian assistance directly to those 
in need in a conflict zone. Some of these activities are explicitly specified in the 
Geneva Conventions, but the work of the ICRC is not limited to these and they can 
undertake any humanitarian activities “for the protection of wounded and sick, 
medical personnel and chaplains, and for their relief” under article 9 Geneva 
Conventions I-III, provided it has the consent from the parties to the conflict.471 It 
can work with other humanitarian relief organisations to improve their reach and 
resources and can thus provide valuable assistance in ensuring the observance of the 
principles of IHL during conflict. 
 
5.1.4 The United Nations 
The UN plays an important role in the worldwide implementation and enforcement 
of IHL. The Security Council, for example, not only adopts resolutions condemning 
                                                            
466 They have done so, for example at the start of the Gulf War in 1990 and the war in Iraq in 2003, 
see: Pfanner (2009), p. 292. 
467 Panner (2009), p. 296. 
468 S Kagan, H Durham, “The Media and International Humanitarian Law: “Legal protection for 
journalists” (2010) 16, Pacific Journalism Review, 96, p.107. 
469 Ibid. The Red Cross does not, however, campaign for their freedom or demand their release, as this 
would affect their neutrality in the conflict. 
470 See for example art. 81 Protocol I. 
471 See also art. 10 Geneva Convention IV. 
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violations of IHL, but has also organised debates on specific topics connected to the 
application of IHL, which can inform policy creation by UN members.472 More 
importantly, the Security Council has on several occasions ordered investigations 
into the (alleged) violation of IHL during conflicts, ensuring that serious violations of 
IHL do not go unnoticed by the international community.473 Where the Council 
suspects IHL is being violated by parties to a conflict, it can choose to refer the case 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) who can further investigate and bring 
charges where necessary (see below at 5.3).474  The UN Secretary General is tasked 
with providing the research required by the Security Council, though his work is not 
solely dependent in requests from the Security Council as he has the power to 
provide reports on situations of armed conflict, or specific aspects of combatant 
behaviour, on its own initiative.  
 
The UN has established several tribunals which enforce IHL, such as the ICJ, 
discussed above, as well as several temporary international ad hoc tribunals that 
provide a platform for the prosecution of those having committed grave breaches of 
IHL during specific conflicts, such as the ICTY and the ICTR. The role of these 
tribunals in enforcing IHL and IHRL is discussed below at paragraph 5.3. 
 
 
5.2 Enforcement of International Human Rights Law 
 
Human rights treaties have been drafted to confer basic rights to individuals and 
individuals enjoy these rights against any state bound by those treaties.475 IHRL 
treaties can only be effective in protecting individuals if those who breach their rights 
can be held accountable before courts and tribunals. For the enforcement of human 
rights against state actors, it is especially important that individuals have access not 
                                                            
472 F Kalshoven and L Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 221. 
473 This is unfortunately not always the case. See for example the investigation and subsequent 
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons during the Kuwait invasion by Iraq, which did not halt 
the use of these weapons during the conflict. 
474 See for example the referral to the ICC of the situation in Darfur: UN Security Council, Resolution 
1593 (31 March 2005). 
475 R Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 24. 
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only to national courts, but also to international courts when national courts fail to 
provide a remedy for the alleged violation. One of the issues here, however, is that an 
individual case of a state breaching the rights of its own citizens rarely poses a threat 
to other states, thus there is less incentive to ‘police’ non-compliance with IHRL at 
the international level, than there is incentive to ‘police’ IHL.476 Consequently, the 
effective enforcement of international human rights treaties largely depends on the 
willingness of individual states to implement and apply these treaty provisions. 
 
Generally speaking, both at the national and international level, it is likely to be 
insufficient to solely provide ex-post facto remedies for human rights violations, as 
these have limited effectiveness, especially in cases where the victim has lost their 
life. While convictions for human rights violations will certainly have some deterrent 
effect, where possible, preventive measures should be put in place to ensure the 
violations do not occur in the first place. One of the ways to achieve this is to ensure 
that any draft legislation is compatible with human rights treaties and that similar 
procedural checks on compatibility are in place for administrative practice.477 
Another important means to achieving effective enforcement of international human 
right treaties is to ensure remedies to human rights violations actually address the 
underlying issues and are aimed at preventing a re-occurrence of the breach of rights, 
rather than simply compensating a past breach. A wide scope of remedies that can be 
employed in this context and the suitability of any particular remedy will be 
dependent on the exact circumstances of the case.478 
 
5.2.1 Enforcement of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that state parties must “respect and ensure” the 
rights listed in the Covenant to all individuals in their territory. Article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR provides that persons who have had their rights or freedoms violated must 
                                                            
476 OA Hathaway, “Do Human Right Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal, 
1935, p. 1938; O De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, material, commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 729-730. 
477 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2004)5  “On the 
verification of the compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative practice with the 
standards laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights” (12 May 2004). 
478 For a general overview of remedies and their individual effectiveness and drawbacks, see: D 
Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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“have an effective remedy”. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has noted that this 
entails that parties must establish “appropriate judicial and administrative 
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law”.479 What 
exactly an effective remedy entails will depend on the circumstances of the case,480 
and the HRC has noted that such remedies may include: “restitution, rehabilitation 
and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees 
of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to 
justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.”481 Bringing a complaint before 
the relevant national courts may be particularly difficult during conflict and even 
where this can be done, the results may be unsatisfactory. It is therefore important 
that a higher international body monitors the application of the ICCPR by individual 
states and can hear complaints. For the ICCPR, this body is the HRC. 
 
The ICCPR allows complaints to be brought concerning alleged violations of human 
rights by other states, though states must have made a declaration indicating 
acceptance of such complaints.482 To date this procedure has never been used.483 
More relevant, therefore is the individual complaint procedure under the ICCPR, 
which is established in Optional Protocol I. Under Optional Protocol I, states 
recognise the competence of the HRC to hear complaints from individuals of alleged 
breaches of their rights under the ICCPR.  As of April 2014, the Protocol has been 
ratified by 115 states. For any case to be considered by the HRC, certain procedural 
requirements must be met, as set out in Protocol I. The key requirements are that the 
complaint must be brought by the individual whose rights have been violated (article 
1),484 all domestic remedies must be exhausted (article 2 and 5(2)b) and the matter is 
not being investigated under other international procedures (art 5(2)a).485 
                                                            
479 HRC, “General Comment 31:  Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 15. 
480 A McBeth, J Nolan and S Rice, The International Law of Human Rights (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 114. 
481 HRC (2004), para. 16. 
482 See art. 41 ICCPR. 
483 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights Bodies: Complaints 
procedures”, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx.  
484 There are however exceptions to this rule and under certain circumstances complaints can be 
brought on behalf of a direct victim. For details see: S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, materials and commentary (Oxford: 
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If the HRC finds a violation it will ask the relevant state party to take appropriate 
steps to remedy the situation in a manner suitable to the circumstances of the case.486 
Although the HRC’s decisions are technically not binding, in practice their decisions 
are much like binding rulings,487 as has recently been confirmed by the International 
Court of Justice.488 While the HRC does follow up on the implementation of its 
decisions, it is difficult to assemble exact data on the practical effect of its rulings.489 
The general opinion in academic literature and practice is however that the individual 
complaints procedure of the HRC is slow and that more could be done to increase its 
effectiveness in the enforcement of the rights contained in the ICCPR.490 
 
5.2.2 Enforcement of European Convention on Human Rights 
The enforcement of a regional human right treaty can be stronger than the 
enforcement of a large international, multi-region, treaty. There are several reasons 
for this. A common heritage and history of a region can ensure that a regional human 
right treaty is more ‘in tune’ with the cultures it covers, thus improving the chance of 
broad political consensus on the interpretation of those rights.491 Similarly, the 
enforcement of such treaties may be stronger as judgement by neighbouring states 
with a common heritage may be easier to except than judgement by states with 
different cultural and political background.492 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 64-82. Note though that anonymous complaints are not allowed 
(art. 3 Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR). 
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All member states of the Council of Europe (CoE) agree to adhere to the ECHR, 
which gives it a wide geographical field of application. They must further accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which, importantly, 
allows individuals to petition the court directly.493 States may also bring complaints 
against each other before the court, though this is a rare occurrence. Article 13 
ECHR states that: “where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a 
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy before a 
national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to 
obtain redress”.494 The ECtHR has clarified that the remedy required by this article 
must not only be ‘effective’ in practice but also in law: “The ‘effectiveness’ of a 
‘remedy’ within the meaning of article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a 
favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the ‘authority’ referred to in that 
provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and 
the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy 
before it is effective”.495 The ECtHR is a court of last resort496 which will only 
address cases where national courts have failed to address alleged violations. The 
ECtHR leaves certain discretion to states, in terms of how rights are implemented in 
national systems, to allow for the accommodation of societal differences through its 
‘margin of appreciation’.  
 
In terms of remedies for human rights breaches, it can afford ‘just satisfaction’ to the 
victim, where the national system fails to do so.497 The Committee of Minsters of the 
CoE supervises state implementation of the decisions of the ECtHR. States have a 
legal obligation to implement the court’s decisions, though they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation in terms of the exact implementation method.498 While the court has no 
powers to actively enforce ECtHR decisions, the compliance system enforced by the 
Committee of Minsters contained in article 46 ECHR allows for the application of 
                                                            
493 Council of Europe, “Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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political pressure and the compliance rate is relatively high.499 The ultimate sanction 
for non-compliance is suspension or expulsion from the CoE, though this has never 
been used. 
 
It is important to note here that the ECtHR generally does not apply IHL, regardless 
of whether IHL and IHRL may overlap in a given case.500 Article 32 of the ECHR 
states that “The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto”, thus 
limiting the jurisdiction of the court to the application of the ECHR. The Court has 
shown reluctance in referring to norms of IHL and avoids referring to IHL even in 
support of decisions taken based on the ECHR.501 The value of the ECtHR in 
protecting journalist in conflict zones lies thus firmly in the enforcement of IHRL 




5.3 Enforcement of International Criminal Law 
 
ICL has grown in importance over the last decades, as an interpretation and 
enforcement mechanism of IHRL and IHL.502 Both IHRL and IHL traditionally only 
consider the role of the state in relation to violations, ICL on the other hand considers 
the role of individuals in those violations. By enhancing the individual responsibility 
for grave breaches of IHRL and IHL, ICL is trying to tackle the culture of impunity 
that exists in relation to war crimes. Not all violations of these bodies of law will 
amount to ICL violations though. As discussed in the previous chapter, ICL is 
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Abresch, “A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Chechnya” (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law, 741. 
501 Gioia (2011), p. 216. 
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limited to gross humanitarian law and human rights violations, which are 
criminalised in treaty law or customary international law and are generally 
considered to include: genocide, violence to life, crimes against humanity, slavery, 
racial discrimination, deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.503  
 
Until the end of the Cold War, there was little scope for creating international 
tribunals to enforce ICL due to the lack of international cooperation between the East 
and the West. After the end of the Cold War, this changed, resulting in the creation 
of international ad hoc tribunals by the Security Council, such as the ICTY and the 
ICTR, to deal with a number of conflicts taking place in the 1990s. Both tribunals 
focus on individual criminal responsibility, rather than state responsibility.504 While 
the establishment of these tribunals has been an important step forward in the 
enforcement of IHL and IHRL, the tribunals have their limitations. The remedies 
available through the ICTY and the ICTR are limited in the sense that they do not 
provide a procedure for compensation claims by (or on behalf of) victims, instead 
leaving this to national courts, though they can order the return of property and 
proceeds acquired by criminal conduct to be returned to their rightful owners.505 The 
tribunals are also still strongly dependent on state cooperation, with limited 
enforcement mechanisms of their own and inquiries can be costly and time 
consuming. The issues arising with the operation of the tribunals led to an expert 
group, appointed by the Security-General, publishing a report setting out ways to 
improve the efficiency of ad hoc tribunals. This in turn led to changes being made to 
the operation of the ICTY and ICTR, thus improving the efficiency of the 
                                                            
503 Henckaerts and Wiesener (2013), p. 159; Kälin and Künzli (2010), p. 62; International Law 
Commission, “Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts” (November 2001) Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, pp. 206-209, available 
at: http://www.eydner.org/dokumente/darsiwa_comm_e.pdf; HRC, “General Comment 29: States of 
Emergency (article 4)”, UN Doc. CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 11. 
504 For more information on both tribunals see: DA Mundis, “New Mechanisms for the Enforcement 
of International Humanitarian law” (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law, 934, pp. 
949-951. 
505 Art. 24 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 7 
July 2009), 25 May 1993. See also: UN, “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991: Rules of procedure and evidence” (22 May 2013) IT/32/Rev.49, 
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tribunals.506 While they continue to have limitations, they make an important 
contribution to ensuring the enforcement of international law. The ICTY in particular 
has advanced the interpretation and application of key principles of IHL.507 
 
Aside from the rise of ad hoc tribunals, another important development in the 
enforcement of ICL has been the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The ICC is the first permanent, international, treaty-based criminal court, 
established to combat the ongoing impunity of serious international law violations by 
individuals, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.508 The Court 
is based on a treaty, the Rome Statute,509 which has been signed by 139 countries as 
of April 2014, though not all have ratified the Statute.510 Importantly for journalists, 
the Statute of the court explicitly states that intentionally directing an attack against a 
civilian amounts to a war crime, whether this happens during international or non-
international conflict.511 The effectiveness of the ICC is, however, undermined by the 
fact that amongst those who have not yet ratified its Statute are significant military 
power such as the United States and Russia.  
 
Unlike the previous ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC is not 
limited in its jurisdiction to a geographical area or a specific time period. In 
principle, a person falls within the jurisdiction of the court where they have 
committed a crime on the territory of, or are a national of, a state party or a party that 
has officially accepted the court’s jurisdiction.512  The ICC does, however, only have 
                                                            
506 UN General Assembly, “Comprehensive Report on the Results of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and 
Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: Note by the Secretary General” (4 march 2002) UN Doc. A/56/853. 
507 DJ Scheffer, “Perspectives on the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law” (3 February 
1999) The Fifth Hauser Lecture on International Humanitarian Law, available at: 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/persp.htm.  
508 ICC, “About the court”, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx.  
509 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (as amended 29 
November 2010), 17 July 1998 (hereafter, Rome Statute). 
510UN, “United Nations Treaty Collection: 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, 
available at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en.  
511 Art. 8(2)b Rome Statute. 
512 Art. 12. This jurisdiction can be expanded by the Security Council (art 13(b)). 
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prospective jurisdiction from the date it was established and can therefore not 
prosecute crimes having taken place before July 2002.513 
 
Under the Rome Statute, any of the state party can arrest and prosecute persons for 
breaching the provisions of the Statute within their jurisdiction, or within the 
jurisdiction of another state party, thus providing a wide basis for the enforcement of 
the international legal framework through national courts. If states do not wish to try 
a case before their national courts, or are unable to do so, they can refer the case to 
the ICC.514  Individuals cannot bring a case before the ICC and must rely on a state 
party bringing the case before the Court.515 Cases can further be referred to the Court 
by the United Nations Security Council,516 or alternatively the Prosecutor of the 
Court can bring a case in accordance with the provisions of article 15 of the Rome 
Statute.  
The ICC functions on the basis of complementarity, which means the Court will only 
take up investigation and prosecution where a state is “unwilling or unable to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution”.517 This includes situations 
where a state has decided not to prosecute after investigation, unless this decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute (art 
17(b)). Therefore where alleged perpetrators are acquitted, or after investigation no 
charges are brought against them, the ICC will not consider the case, unless the 
underlying investigation or court proceedings were illegitimate. 
While the ICC has a relatively broad territorial and personal jurisdiction, they have, 
however, limited resources, which can slow down its prosecution rate. Furthermore, 
where offences are committed in non-state party, they can only be prosecuted if the 
prosecutor of the ICC chooses to do so, or if he is ordered to do so by the UN 
Security Council.518  
 
                                                            
513 Art. 11 Rome Statute. 
514 For the full jurisdiction of the ICC and admissibility rules see artt. 11-21 Rome Statute. 
515 Art. 14 Rome Statute. 
516 Art. 13(b) Rome Statute. 
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The ICC differs from previous ad hoc tribunals in the sense that the ICC can award 
compensation to victims, rather than relying on national courts to provide remedies. 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC “shall establish principles relating 
to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation” and that the court can directly order convicted persons to make 
reparations. It further provides in article 79 for the establishment of a trust fund for 
the benefit of victims that fines can be transferred into. This saves victims from 
having to file separate proceedings through their national court system, as was 
previously the case under the ad hoc tribunals, in order to obtain compensation. 
 
 
5.4 Impunity in relation to crimes against journalists 
 
As explained above, IHL and IHRL are enforced through a variety of national and 
international courts. Where violations are established a variety of remedies are 
available, the appropriateness of which depend on the circumstances of the case. 
Furthermore, enforcement of both bodies of law does not solely take place ex post 
facto, and a number of organisations as well as national governments have 
implemented measures aimed at preventing violations ever taking place. Yet, as 
noted above, it has been argued that one of the most difficult aspects of protecting 
journalists in conflict zones is not the lack of an appropriate legal framework 
ensuring their safety, but rather the high levels of impunity with regards to attacks on 
media personnel. Impunity can be defined here as: “the failure to bring perpetrators 
of (human rights) violations to justice”.519 To summarise, there is a legal framework 
in place protecting journalists, which can be enforced in a variety of ways, yet the 
statistics clearly show that there is little, and in some instances no enforcement of 
that legal framework in practice. While not all risks can be mitigated for journalists 
working in conflict zones, as the nature of their job puts them in an unsafe 
environment, the failure to enforce the current legal framework exposes them to 
                                                            
519 UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” 
(27 March 2012) International Programme for the Development of Communication, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expres
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higher risks than might necessary have been the case if the framework was 
effectively enforced. 
 
The International News Safety Institute (INSI) has noted that 9 out of 10 journalists 
are killed with impunity.520 As long as this is the case, violence against journalists 
will continue, as there is simply little reason for both state and non-state actors to 
observe the international legal framework where it is ‘inconvenient’ to do so, if they 
do not have to worry about being held accountable for breaching it. It is clear that 
relevant international law and potential enforcement mechanisms exist, yet this has 
not resulted in widespread application of these laws. This raises the question of why 
impunity rates are this high. While there is no single general answer to this question, 
as impunity rates are influenced by the circumstances and location of a conflict, it is 
possible to identify a number of factors which influence these high levels of 
impunity. Social, political and legal factors all play a role in this context and can 
significantly disrupt the effective application of any legal framework. 
 
5.4.1 The Causes of impunity: disruption of national judicial system and authority 
One of the main causes for impunity in conflict territories is that the local justice 
system no longer functions as a consequence of the very conflict which journalists 
are reporting on. In this situation, violence against journalists is not necessarily 
condoned by the local authorities, but they are simply unable to do anything about it. 
This sentiment is well illustrated by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its 
response to an enquiry by UNESCO into the investigation of the killing of journalists 
in Afghanistan. While cooperating with the enquiry, they also noted that in similar 
situations to the deaths of the reporters, thousands of Afghanis soldiers and soldiers 
belonging to troops of partner countries have lost their lives in the fight against ‘the 
invisible enemy’.521 As they noted “there are certain acts that necessarily manage to 
avoid the normal practices of legal systems”.522  
 
                                                            
520 INSI, “Urgent Appeal from the International News Safety Institute” (14 September 2012), 
available at: http://www.newssafety.org/latest/news/insi-news/detail/urgent-appeal-from-the-
international-news-safety-institute-103/.  
521 UNESCO (2012a), p. 22. 
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In a conflict zone the local judicial system is often interrupted, with neither the 
personnel nor the resources available to fully investigate all crimes taking place.523 
Where domestic legal systems collapse, there can be no effective enforcement of IHL 
and the possibility to establish international and hybrid tribunals will be 
compromised.524 This is especially relevant in high-intensity conflicts, which is 
demonstrated by the fact that in 2014, two of the countries that have seen some of the 
worst fighting in that year, Somalia and Iraq, had the highest number of journalists 
killed on the job as well as the highest rates of impunity.525 Significant problems 
further arise outside high-intensity conflicts where the conflict is between state and 
non-state actors and the non-state actors are attacking journalists. In this situation, it 
will often be difficult for the government to apprehend the perpetrators and prosecute 
them, without first destroying the whole armed group.526 The ineffectiveness of the 
local judicial system will also affect the safety of witnesses, who will be unwilling to 
come forward if it endangers their own lives, leading to evidentiary issues where 
investigations do take place.527 Conflict is often accompanied by a rising criminality 
due to diminishing effectiveness of the legal system, which can pose a serious threat 
to journalists.528  
 
In many situations where states still have a functioning judicial system, it may 
simply be no match against other powers operating in the state, as is currently the 
case in Pakistan. In Pakistan too many state and non-state actors, such as the Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate, the Taliban and the military are using violence 
against journalists, while the underfunded and under-protected judiciary cannot hold 
                                                            
523 S Elliot, M Elbathimy and S Srinivasan, “Threats to the Right to Life of Journalists” (2012) CGHR 
Working Paper 4, University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, p. 11. 
524 Alley (2010), p. 88. 
525 CPJ “Getting Away with Murder: CPJ’s 2014 Global Impunity Index spotlights countries where 
journalists are slain and the killers go free” (16 April 2014), available at: 
http://cpj.org/reports/2014/04/impunity-index-getting-away-with-murder.php.   
526 Elliot, Elbathami and Srinivassan (2012), p. 11. 
527 CPJ “Getting Away with Murder: CPJ’s 2013 Global Impunity Index spotlights countries where 
journalists are slain and the killers go free” (2 May 2013), available at: 
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them accountable out of fear for their livelihood and even lives and the government 
is not a strong enough entity to back them up.529 
 
In this situation international courts may offer a solution, especially international 
criminal courts, where individuals can be held accountable for their actions. These 
are however significantly limited by the ways in which they operate. As noted above, 
it must first be established that national remedies have been exhausted, which can be 
more or less onerous depending on the situation and the court in question and there 
tend to be significant delays in bringing cases before international courts. 
Furthermore, significant aspects of the enforcement of IHL and IHRL through 
international courts depend on the willingness of states to cooperate with the 
proceedings, due to the principle of state sovereignty.  
 
5.4.2 The Causes of impunity: unwillingness to apply legal framework 
The other side of the coin is that a functioning judicial system may still be in place, 
but there may be a general unwillingness to (fully) apply the relevant legal 
framework. This is one of the leading causes of impunity and it can occur for a 
variety of reasons, from a desire to protect one’s own military personnel and citizens 
to broader concerns around accountability. 
 
International law functions around the concept of state sovereignty, which can hinder 
the prosecution of crimes taking place across borders. Generally, states are reluctant 
to hold their own military personnel responsible for actions in conflict zones. 
Similarly, states may be reluctant to prosecute enemy fighters out of fear that this 
would bring to light violations committed by their own military.530 Consequently, 
even though instances of violence against the press may be investigated by the ‘home 
state’ of those responsible, these investigations may simply exonerate the 
perpetrators. This was, for example, the case with the death of James Miller, a British 
freelance cameraman, who was killed by Israeli tank fire as he was filming in the 
                                                            
529 E Rubin, “Roots of Impunity: Pakistan’s endangered press and the perilous web of militancy, 
security and politics”, (May 2013) Special Report of the Committee to Protect Journalists, p. 36, 
available at: https://cpj.org/reports/CPJ.Pakistan.Roots.of.Impunity.pdf.  
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Gaza strip.531 While the British coroner’s report ruled it an unlawful killing, the 
soldier in question was cleared by the Israeli authorities.532 As primary jurisdiction 
rested with Israel, as the place where the incident took place, there was little that 
could be done. Similar situations have arisen in the context of the US. The US 
military has been responsible for the death of a number of journalists in Iraq and 
there seems to be a general unwillingness to launch adequate investigations or take 
steps to mitigate the risk of similar incidents occurring in the future.533 While a 
handful of these deaths have been investigated by US authorities, in all cases the 
soldiers in question have been exonerated.534  
 
A more extreme situation arises when government forces themselves are actively and 
purposefully targeting journalists. This can happen for a variety of reasons, but will 
take place to ensure no uncensored information about unlawful actions during 
conflict will be reported to the outside world. It can further happen where journalists 
are considered to have affiliations with foreign governments or NGOs which pose a 
danger to the ruling government in a conflict zone.535 Similar situations arise with 
non-state actors, who will often be roughly aware of (some) of the relevant 
international legal provisions preventing them from actively targeting journalists, but 
feel that international law has nothing to do with them and that they have little reason 
for obeying such laws.536 This leads to one of the main difficulties with a culture of 
impunity: impunity breads impunity, creating a vicious cycle that is hard to break. 
State and non-state actors are reluctant to apply the existing legal framework if it 
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does not suit their needs precisely because they have little reason to expect that they 
will be held accountable for a breach, while they likely receive few concrete benefits 
from observing the framework. It is therefore clear that one of the most obvious, 
though hardly simple, ways to address this particular cause of impunity is to actively 
prosecute all significant breaches of the relevant legal framework.  
 
Again, in this situation the international community might intervene and enforce the 
appropriate application of the legal framework, but here too arise difficulties in terms 
of the willingness to fully apply legal provisions, though for different reasons from 
the ones stated above. Bringing perpetrators to justice is not always the primary 
concern of the international community. International Courts and Tribunals often 
perform a function in the wider context of building a lasting peace in a post-conflict 
situation. While holding those who have committed gross human rights and 
humanitarian law violations responsible is one component of the process, there are 
other concerns to take into account in this context, such as amnesty and 
reconciliation, as well as wider political concerns.537 Consequently, there may be 
overriding concerns in holding an individual or a group of people responsible for a 
single act of violence against a journalist. While providing amnesty to groups who do 
not deserve it creates a dangerous presumption amongst actors that one can get away 
with serious human rights violations, endangering a peace process out of a desire to 
hold every single person accountable for their actions may also not be beneficial.538 
The balance between reconciliation and holding perpetrators responsible can be 
extremely difficult to get right.539 
 
                                                            
537 See for example: MC Bassiouni, “Combatting Impunity for International Crimes” (2000) 71 
University of Colorado Law Review, 409; Cassese (1998) pp. 5-6; N Roth-Arriaza (ed.) Impunity and 
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Furthermore, the international community may be willing to apply the legal 
framework in full and bring perpetrators to justice, but if the relevant state refuses to 
cooperate, international courts and tribunals only have limited measures to force 
compliance.540 International tribunals have no law enforcement comparable to 
national law enforcement and are thus reliant on national authorities for carrying out 
arrests.541 Some, like the ICC, do however have their own investigators, though these 
too will rely on a certain level of cooperation from the state in question. Furthermore, 
the ICJ has held that based on customary law, certain incumbent state officials have 
personal immunity from criminal jurisdiction, which prevents them from being held 
accountable of any breaches of ICL by foreign states while in office.542 Under these 
circumstances, it can be years before perpetrators are brought to justice and in the 
intervening time violence against journalists is likely to continue as there is no 
significant deterrent against it. 
 
5.4.3 The causes of impunity: lack of a clear and concise legal framework 
As discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4, conflicts are no longer predominantly fought 
between states, with the majority of conflicts now involving one or more non-state 
actors.543 These conflicts are generally unlikely to be classed as international 
conflicts under the IHL framework. Significant difficulties are caused by the 
dichotomy of international and non-international conflict which affects the 
application of IHL provisions. The legal framework for non-international armed 
conflicts is significantly less detailed and established than it is for international 
                                                            
540 This is demonstrated for example by the procedural rules of the ICC, which is limited in its ability 
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armed conflict.544 Consequently, most of the provisions protecting journalists in 
statutory IHL are not applicable during non-international armed conflict, as the 
Geneva Conventions are essentially reduced in application to common article 3. 
Journalists operating in non-international armed conflicts are increasingly dependent 
on customary law, which by its very nature is more difficult to establish in detail than 
treaty law. 
 
As previously noted, the nature of the conflicts covered by journalists has changed 
over the last century from predominantly international armed conflict to 
predominantly non-international armed conflict. This increase in non-international 
armed conflicts brings an increase in non-state actors involved in conflicts. These 
non-state actors are not always as well trained and disciplined as their state 
counterparts and may not be fully aware of the rights of journalists.545 Most military 
manuals have sections on media workers and journalists and interaction with them is 
covered during training, which will generally not be the case for non-state actors. 
This is well demonstrated by the experience of a journalist reporting from the Ivory 
coast who, when threatened by a soldier who had obviously no knowledge of the 
Geneva Conventions, tried to explain her rights by referring to the rights of men and 
Christian compassion, which due to cultural differences did not exactly improve the 
situation.546 A poll conducted by the ICRC in 2009 showed that in a sample drawn 
from the population of Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, 
Haiti, the Philippines, Lebanon, Georgia and Colombia, only 43% of those surveyed 
had even heard of the Geneva Conventions.547 Such statistics show a clear obstacle 
for effective implementation of the legal framework. 
 
The more complicated and less well defined the legal framework is, the more likely 
there will be a lack of awareness of the applicable rules. Journalists themselves, 
                                                            
544 See for example: B Saul, “The International Protection of Journalists in non-International 
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however, can assist in raising awareness of the legal framework through their 
reporting. The ICRC, for example, provides training courses for journalists in IHL, 
not just so that they are aware of the protection that they are entitled to, but also so 
that they can recognise abuses of IHL and report them to the wider international 
community.548 This will help to raise awareness of the legal framework. What 
remains problematic though, is that the concept of journalists as neutral players in a 
conflict is simply less well defined than that of, for example, medical personnel. 
Furthermore, the circumstances of non-international conflict where non-state actors 
will often be fighting out of uniform make it more likely for civilians and journalists 
to be targeted during combat as it is more difficult to distinguish between them and 
armed fighters.549 
 
It is not just non-state actors though who are affected by the lack of clarity of the 
legal framework, it also affects some actions by state-actors. Under the current legal 
framework, journalists lose all legal protection if they are ‘directly participating’ in 
the hostilities. When, exactly, journalists breach this threshold has been subject of 
extensive debate. The view that actively spreading propaganda arises to ‘active 
participation’ in hostilities by the media, thus negating their protection under 
international law, has led to the bombing of a number of Television and Radio 
Stations over the past decade, most cases leading to civilian casualties and all 
bombings have been condemned by various international organisations for breaching 
international law.550 The most famous of these was the bombing by NATO of a 
television station during the Kosovo war. In its final report on the bombing, the 
ICTY noted that: “whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a 
debatable issue. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a 
legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the 
                                                            
548 Kagan and Durham (2010), p. 108. 
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war effort, it is not a legitimate target”.551 The confusion around the notion of ‘direct 




5.5 UN work plan on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity 
 
The UN has a specialised agency for the promotion of the “free flow of ideas by 
word an image”:552 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), which has been an active player at the international level 
in enhancing the protection of journalists in conflict zones. In 2006, the UN adopted 
Resolution 1738 which condemned “intentional attacks against journalists, media 
professionals and associated personnel, as such, in situations of armed conflict” and 
called on the Secretary-General to report on the “safety and security of journalists, 
media professionals and associated personnel” in further reports on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict.553 This report on the implementation of Resolution 1738 
has become an annual event. In 2007 UNESCO published the Medellin Declaration, 
which calls on member states to investigate all instances of violence against 
journalists and media personnel and to bring the perpetrators of such acts before the 
courts.554 UNESCO has further, in cooperation with Reporters without Borders 
(RwB), published a practical guide for journalists working in conflict territories 
which is regularly updated and regularly undertakes activities to raise awareness for 
journalists’ safety, such as ‘World Press Freedom Day’ on the 3rd of May each year. 
Recently, the Director-General of UNESCO organised a UN Inter-Agency Meeting 
on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity, which took place September 
2011. Out of this meeting emerged a plan of action for a “comprehensive, coherent 
                                                            
551 ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (13 June 2000), para. 47. The 
bombing in this case was justified on the basis of disrupting an enemy communications network being 
used in the war effort, which made it a legitimate target, but a pure propaganda station would likely 
not be, Ibid paras. 75-76. 
552 UNESCO Constitution (16 November 1945), art. 1. 
553 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1738, S/Res/1738/ (2006), paras. 1 and 12. 
554 UNESCO, Medellin Declaration: Securing the Safety of Journalists and Combatting Impunity 




and action-oriented UN-wide approach to the safety of journalists and the issue of 
impunity”.555 This action plan calls for the strengthening of UN mechanisms as well 
as reinforcing collaboration with other organisations and institutions on the issue of 
journalist safety as well as cooperation with member-states to ensure full 
implementation of the existing international rules and principles and to improve 
relevant national legislation.556 The plan further calls to increase awareness of the 
danger of impunity of crimes against journalists, as well as to foster safety initiatives 
to prevent injury and deaths.557  
 
In 2013, UNESCO followed up on the UN’s plan of action on the safety of 
journalists and the issue of impunity, by publishing a detailed work plan on the issue, 
which seeks to “conceptualize journalist safety as part of fostering unhindered access 
to information and knowledge, which is one of the four key principles underlying 
knowledge societies”.558 The work plan is in line with the UN’s action plan and its 
objective is “to promote a free and safe environment in both conflict and non-conflict 
situations, for journalists, with a view to strengthening peace, democracy and 
development worldwide”.559 The action points for combatting impunity in conflict 
situations are especially relevant for this thesis. For the purposes of the work plan, 
journalists are defined as: “journalists, media workers and social media producers 
who generate a significant amount of public-interest journalism”.560 The action lines 
contained in the UNESCO work plan follow the ones in the 2012 UN plan of action. 
In terms of the legal framework, the focus of both clearly lies on enhancing the 
implementation of the existing international legal norms and principles, rather than 
amending existing rules and creating new and more detailed regulation. The action 
plans do however acknowledge that there might be scope for the development of 
more detailed legislative frameworks to create “a safe environment for journalists to 
perform their work independently and without undue interference” though the 
                                                            
555 UNESCO (2012a), p. 33. 
556 UNESCO, “UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity” (2012) 
International Programme for the Development of Communication, CI-12/CONF.202/6, paras. 5.1 -
5.14 (hereafter UNESCO 2012b). 
557 Ibid, paras. 5.15-5.24. 
558 UNESCO, “UNESCO Work Plan on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity” (3 June 
2013) CI/FEM/FOE/2013/299 (hereafter UNESCO 2013a), para. 6. 
559 Ibid, para. 7. 
560 Ibid. 
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emphasis here lies on national measures by member states, rather than international 
efforts.561  
 
While the UN’s efforts in this area are an important step towards combatting the 
issue of impunity, the steps proposed by the action plans are neither a radical, new 
approach to combatting the issue, nor particularly detailed. The general points 
contained in the plans can provide important protection to journalists working in 
conflict zones, but much will depend on how these plans are taken forward and 
implemented in practice over the next few years. The first implementation strategy 
for the work plan for 2013-2014 has been published and contains the detailed steps 
which will be undertaken over the next two years, to improve the protection for 
journalists. In terms of measures concerning the current legal framework, several 
action points of the implementation strategy directly address issues in this area. 
Member states will be provided with assistance “to fully implement existing 
international norms and principles, particularly within the framework of the 
international human rights law, humanitarian law and criminal law” and international 
and regional conferences will be organised to encourage discussion on the issue of 
journalist safety and impunity.562 Support will further be provided for the 
development of “appropriate national policy, legislative and institutional frameworks 
to increase safety for journalists”,563 clearly indicating that any drafting of a new 
legal framework to protect journalists is expected to take place at the national rather 





International judicial bodies can make an important contribution to the enforcement 
of IHL and IHRL in conflict zones. However, most international courts offer 
                                                            
561 UNESCO (2012b), para 5.6; UNESCO (2013a), para 16. 
562 UNESCO, “Implementation Strategy 2013-2014: UN plan of action on the safety of journalists and 
the issue of impunity” (2013), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/official_documents/Implementa
tion_Strategy_2013-2014.pdf  (hereafter UNESCO 2013b), p. 13. 
563 UNESCO (2013b), p. 14. 
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retrospective assessments of the legality of states’ and individuals’ behaviour after a 
conflict has taken place.564 Their preventive function arises out of ensuring 
compliance with IHL and IHRL in future conflicts through punishing past breaches. 
It is therefore important to ensure that as few breaches of these laws as possible go 
unpunished. High impunity rates result in a greater likelihood of illegal actions 
taking place in future conflicts, as there are simply insufficient deterrents to prevent 
such behaviour.  
 
While the work of journalists in conflict zones is inherently dangerous simply due to 
the circumstances in which they operate, the lack of enforcement of the legal 
protection they are entitled to makes their jobs more dangerous than it needs to be. 
There are limited legal measures that will protect journalists from injury and death 
due to situations that are inherent to getting close to conflict situations, such as 
crossfire. The issue is, however, that even during conflict, a major cause of the 
premature/untimely death of journalists is murder, which is in direct contravention of 
several legal instruments and should not endure the high levels of impunity it is 
currently subject to.  
 
Improving the enforcement of the current legal framework is an obvious place to 
start enhancing the protection of journalists operating in conflict zones, but this does 
not mean it is the only way to achieve this. Impunity has many causes, and some 
relate to potential issues with the current legal framework, which should be more 
closely examined. As identified above, it can be argued that the current legal 
framework is complicated and does not provide clear legal rules for all situations that 
journalists can find themselves in. It is clear that journalists’ safety can be greatly 
improved by ensuring that any breaches of the legal framework that protects them are 
prosecuted by national and international courts and tribunals. However, whether this 
would be sufficient to protect journalists from violence in future conflicts, or whether 
more must be done, such as the creation of a new, more detailed, comprehensive 
legal framework will be discussed in the next chapters. 
 
                                                            
564 Foster (2006), p. 108. 
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6. Protecting different types of journalists. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis have provided an overview of those legal frameworks 
providing protection to journalist in conflict territories: International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL), Human Rights Law (HRL) and International Criminal Law (ICL). They 
have further considered how and to what extent the legal framework is enforced in 
practice. The combined legal framework provides, at least in theory, a significant 
number of provisions seeking to protect civilians, and therefore journalists, in 
conflict zones. It has also become clear, however, that there are significant 
differences in the awarded protection based on the type of journalist, the type of 
conflict and, as we shall see below, even the nationality of the journalist. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, it is often argued that the current legal protection 
is adequate, but that the enforcement of it is lacking and that this is the predominant 
reason why journalists reporting on conflicts face such significant risks to their 
physical safety. While this is undoubtedly part of the problem, this chapter will 
examine whether the legal framework really is up to the task of protecting journalists 
in conflict zones and whether there are any gaps in the protection that cause 
difficulties in practice. 
 
Journalists operating in conflict zones can be classed into three different categories 
under the international legal framework: accredited war correspondents, 
(independent) journalists and local journalists. Arguably, there is a fourth category of 
journalist: military correspondents, which is a term used for journalists in active 
military service reporting on a war.565 Legally, these journalists are classed as 
combatants and their status does not differ from other military personnel. They make 
up only a small, distinct portion of those journalists reporting on conflict and, unlike 
their civilian counterparts, have a clear status as combatant under the legal 
framework. They will therefore not be included in the discussion below. 
 
                                                            
565 See for example: J Kiss, “Meet the Army’s own Media Corps: The Combat Camera Team is the 
army’s own embedded corps, reporting from Afghanistan” (20 August 2010) The Guardian. 
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The differences in terminology have been touched upon in the introduction of this 
thesis and will be discussed in further detail below. The previous discussion of the 
legal framework has focused on the ‘general class’ of journalists, while occasionally 
noting protection only available to specific types of journalist. Below, the range of 
legal protection available to journalists will be applied to the three different 
categories of journalists. This will highlight not only the differences in protection 
received under international law, but also highlight some of the difficulties that are 
inherent to the protection on offer. As we shall see below, journalists are classed as 
either prisoners of war or general civilians when captured. Yet the protection that 
comes with being classed in one of these two categories may not always be as 
suitable to journalists as it is to the general class they are grouped with. There are 
further some relatively common dangers for journalists that are not addressed by the 
current legal framework, such as accusations of spying and collaboration.  
 
 
6.1 Accredited war correspondents 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, accredited war correspondents are those journalists who 
accompany the armed forces during conflict and have received authorisation to do so 
from the armed forces they accompany. The Dictionnaire de Droit International 
Public defines them as:  
Specialised journalists who, with the authorisation and under the 
protection of the armed forces of a belligerent, are present on the 
theatre of operations with a view to providing information on 
events related to the ongoing hostilities.566  
The term ‘war correspondent’ in popular culture is often used as a term for all 
journalists reporting from conflict zones. As noted in the introduction, this thesis 
uses the term strictly in its legal sense and it therefore only covers those journalists 
accredited to the military. 
 
                                                            
566 J Salmon (ed.), Dictionnaire de Droit International Public (Brussels: Bruylant, 2001), p. 275 
(translated  
from French). 
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To summarise the discussion in chapter 3: during international armed conflict, war 
correspondents retain their classification as civilians under IHL, but are entitled to 
prisoner of war status upon capture.567 They enjoy this protection together with other 
civilians who accompany the armed forces, such as military aircraft crews and supply 
contractors. The group entitled to protection under this article is open, as article 
4A(4) Geneva Conventions 1949 only provides an indicative list, rather than 
specifying a closed group of persons, who are awarded this type of protection.568 
Consequently, all authorised media staff accompanying and accredited to the armed 
forces, not just journalists, but also, for example, camera crews and other media 
support staff, are entitled to prisoner of war status under this article. Those 
accompanying the armed forces should carry an identity card testifying to their status 
for their own safety, though this is not a requirement for receiving protection under 
article 4A(4). When there is doubt upon capture concerning their status, they should 
be presumed to be entitled to prisoner of war protection, until proven otherwise.569 
 
As discussed, the rationale behind this is that by accompanying the military, these 
journalists are likely to have access to significantly more (sensitive) information 
about the armed forces they accompany than ordinary civilians not connected to the 
military. Prisoners of war cannot be compelled to answer during questioning and 
cannot be accused of being spies, their capture must further be notified to the 
relevant authorities and their families, which means they cannot be held without 
contact to the outside world.570 If the same protection is not extended to those who 
accompany them and have access to similarly valuable information this can lead to 
significant difficulties for those in possession of such knowledge, which could 
endanger their lives. The dangers of missing this protection will be discussed in more 
detail below at paragraph 6.2. While there are thus advantages to their status, the 
main danger for war correspondents is that their proximity to the armed forces will 
endanger them. While war correspondents retain their classification as civilians and 
                                                            
567 See art. 4A(4) Geneva Convention III (1949).  
568 ICRC, Report on the Work of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims (Geneva, 1947), p. 113. 
569 Art. 5 Geneva Convention III (1949). 
570 Artt. 70-71 Geneva Convention III (1949), this is mostly additional protection in the sense that 
journalists cannot “disappear” after being captured and authorities will be able to monitor the 
circumstances of their detention.  
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can therefore not be targeted directly during the hostilities, they generally wear 
clothes resembling military uniforms and travel with a military unit, rendering them 
indistinguishable from combatants. Should they be killed in this situation, their 
killing is therefore unlikely to violate the laws of war.571 While this is a risk faced to 
a far lesser degree by independent journalists, embedded journalists, who during 
international armed conflict will generally be classed as accredited war 
correspondents, as will be discussed below, suffered significantly fewer casualties 
than their independent counterparts, suggesting that being accredited to a military 
unit is safer than covering conflict independently.572 
 
Aside from article 4A(4) and IHL in general, war correspondents will find protection 
under IHRL for so far as these rights are applicable in conflict zones and are not 
superseded by relevant lex specialis. This can provide additional protection to a 
certain extent, but as many of the human rights not reflected in IHL can be limited in 
their application or derogated from in times of conflict, IHRL is likely to be of 
limited use to accredited war correspondents. 
 
6.1.1 Prisoner of War status 
While there are clear benefits to being classed as a prisoner of war upon capture, 
there are also significant drawbacks, at least where journalists are concerned.573 The 
problem is that classification as a prisoner of war under the legal framework is not an 
easy ‘fit’ for the function journalists perform in conflict zones. Prisoner of war status 
was largely created to remove enemy soldiers from the battlefield and ensure they no 
longer pose a threat to one’s own armed forces without having to kill them all.574 The 
                                                            
571 C Piloud “Article 79 – Measures of Protection for Journalists” in: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski, B 
Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para 3269. In this case 
they do not lose their right to protection, but they do lose their effective protection under that right. 
572 During the war in Iraq seven embedded reporters died, as opposed to 132 non-embedded reporters: 
CPJ, “Iraq - Journalists in Danger: A statistical profile of media deaths and abductions in Iraq 2003-
2009” (July 2008), available at: http://www.cpj.org/reports/2008/07/journalists-killed-in-iraq.php.  
573 See for example: B Saul, “The International Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflict and other 
Violent Situations” (2008) 14 Australian Journal of Human Rights, 99, p. 104, though he argues that 
there are also no real benefits for journalists to being classed as prisoner of war, which ignores the 
benefits of not having to answer during questioning and protection from being accused of being a spy. 
574 Montesquieu noted in his work De l’Esprit des Lois that “the only right that war gives over a 
captive is secure his safe-keeping and to prevent him from doing harm”. CL Montesquieu, De l’Esprit 
des Lois, liv. XV, ch. II (1748). 
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obvious problem here is that this simply does not apply to journalists. Journalists are 
non-combatants and thus do not pose the same threat as combatants do. As noted in 
chapter 2, article 4A(4) stems from a time when the behaviour of war correspondents 
was much closer to that of combatants than today.575 While it may be necessary to 
detain journalists temporary during military operations for security reasons,576 this is 
unlikely to be the case for the entire duration of the conflict, yet this is precisely what 
happens to prisoners of war. It makes sense to deny enemy fighters the option to 
return to their own state during a conflict, as this makes it possible for them to be 
redeployed against one’s own armed forces, but this is not a risk that applies to 
journalists. There have even been cases where the media has denied that captured 
journalists should be classed as prisoners of war, in the hope that they could secure 
the release of their personnel, rather than have them detained for the duration of the 
conflict.577 This demonstrates that at least some of the additional ‘protection’ offered 
to prisoners of war is less than ideal for journalists. 
 
Detaining journalists for the duration of the conflict does not seem to confer a real 
benefit to journalists or belligerent parties. In theory, it actually harms the 
international community. Journalists play an essential part in providing audiences 
around the world with information about conflicts they cannot witness for 
themselves. Freedom of expression is not just the right to impart information, it is 
also the right to receive information. As stated by United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), it is a “collective right, which 
empowers populations through facilitating dialogue, participation and democracy, 
and thereby makes autonomous and sustainable development possible”.578 Journalists 
                                                            
575 For example, most countries which have embedded reporters travel with their military expressly 
state that war correspondents cannot carry arms, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
576 J Pictet, The Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 : Commentary - Vol.2, Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea (Geneva: International Committee for the Red Cross, 1960), p. 49. 
577 This happened for example in Iraq, where after the arrest of 4 CBS media workers, the CBS Vice 
president stated: “We are doing all we can to make clear to Iraq that they are not prisoners of war, that 
they are not spies. I am concerned Saddam Hussein understand that these four men are journalists and 
that they are non-combatants and that he make the decision to release them”. See: H Kurtz, “CBS 
News Crew Held In Baghdad; Fate of Bob Simon, Others Now Up to Saddam” (16 February 1991) 
Washington Post.  
578 UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” 
International Programme for the Development of Communication (27 March 2012), available at: 
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in conflict zones therefore serve the public interest. In the words of the ICTY: “war 
correspondents play a vital role in bringing to the attention of the international 
community the horrors and reality of conflict.”579 Removing a journalists from a 
conflict means removing a source of information from an audience which is likely 
already reliant on a small number of (independent) sources. While this may 
physically keep the journalist out of harm’s way, providing the circumstances of his 
capture fully comply with the international legal framework, this is not beneficial to 
the wider international community.  
 
6.1.2 Non- international conflicts 
The situation for war correspondents is radically different during non-international 
armed conflict. During this type of conflict the Geneva Conventions are reduced in 
application to common article 3, which makes no mention of war correspondents or 
indeed prisoners of war in general, and merely requires humane treatment of those 
not or no longer taking part in the hostilities. As there is no additional protection in 
this situation for war correspondents over and above that offered to independent 
journalists who are treated in both situations as ‘ordinary’ civilians, there is thus little 
difference between war correspondents and (independent) journalists in this 
situation. As noted previously, this article is generally taken to bind both state and 
non-state actors thus protecting journalists from maltreatment by all parties to the 
conflict.580 The article additionally requires that “parties to the conflict should further 
endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention”. This urges parties to consider applying, on a 
voluntary basis, a wider set of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to the 
conflict. Where the provisions concerning war correspondents and prisoners of war 
are brought into force, this can make a difference to the status of war correspondents.  
 
Customary law will assist those embedded journalists who during international 
conflicts would have been classed as war correspondents, as discussed below, in non-
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expres
sion/Safety_Report_by%20DG_2012.pdf), p. 29. 
579 ICTY, Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjan and Momir Talic decision on interlocutory appeal (11 
December 2002) IT-99-26, para 36. 
580 Though, as noted, this is not without controversy, see the discussion under para. 3.1.3 of this thesis. 
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international armed conflicts as well, as the customary rule that “Civilian journalists 
engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and 
protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities,” applies during 
both international and non-international conflicts. In practice, however, journalists 
accompanying state military units may put themselves at greater risks during non-
international armed conflict than (independent) journalists. Faced upon capture with 
non-state actors who are likely to have less knowledge of the international legal 
framework, the very fact that these war correspondents are travelling with the armed 
forces will make it far more difficult  to convince their capturers that they are in fact 
‘independent observers’  and are not combatants, but ‘ordinary’ civilians.581 
 
6.1.3 War correspondents in modern conflicts: ‘embeds’ 
The term ‘embedded press’ was first used during the Bosnia campaign in 1995 to 
describe a style of reporting that referred to reporters being assigned to a specific 
unit, deploying and living with that unit for significant periods of time.582 It was used 
on a limited scale during that conflict, but became a fully developed system for 
covering media-military relationships during the war in Iraq. While embedding 
journalists with military units was not a radical new approach to covering conflict, a 
similar system was used during WWII and Vietnam, it was more formalised and 
employed on a much wider scale then during previous conflicts.583 Journalists 
embedded with different military branches and more than 600 reporters participated 
in the embedding programme.584 The program proved popular with both the military 
and the press,585 though the latter raised concerns about impartiality, loss of 
objectivity and the narrowness of the information available to embedded reporters, 
                                                            
581 Marcus Wilford, vice president for News International Digital, who oversaw the network’s 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq discusses the problem of remaining independent in the context of 
the extreme difficulties with convincing a source that an embedded reporter is not in league with the 
military. Similar issues will likely arise in the context of convincing a non-state actor of the same 
thing. M Wilford, “The Big Story: Our embattled media” (Fall 2009) World Affairs, available at: 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/big-story-our-embattled-media.  
582 C Paul and JJ Kim, Reports on the Battlefield: The embedded press system in historical context 
(Santa Monica: Rand, 2004), p 48. 
583 Ibid, p. 51. 
584 BR McLane, “Reporting from the Sandstorm: An appraisal of embedding” (Spring 2004) 
Parameters, 77, p. 81. 




making it difficult to report a broader picture of the conflict.586 Embedding is now 
generally considered to be the likely model for media-military relations during future 
conflicts, as it provides the military with a certain control over information which is 
difficult to achieve due to modern technology.587 It has, however, been pointed out 
that the embedding programme has not really been tested with sustained negative 
news stories, as coverage has always been largely positive and negative stories 
concerning the war effort from embedded reporters have received little public 
attention.588 Only once the embedded programme has been put through this test will 
we know how future-proof it really is. 
 
The current system of embedding raises some question as to how these journalists 
must be classed under the legal framework. The strongest arguments are to class 
embedded journalists, who operate during international armed conflict and have 
received official accreditation from the armed forces, as war correspondents, as they 
meet all criteria of article 4A(4) of the Geneva Conventions 1949.589 They operate in 
a way closely related to accredited war correspondents in WWII, who the drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions had in mind when drafting the Conventions of 1949. Some 
doubts have been raised, however, as to whether this is the correct classification. 
There has been suggestion that the French class embedded reporters as (independent) 
journalists even during international armed conflict, rather than as accredited war 
correspondents, leaving them without prisoner of war status upon capture.590 Their 
motivation for this is unclear and whether they really class embedded reporters this 
way has proven difficult to verify. Legally speaking, during international armed 
conflict, it seems sensible to class them as war correspondents given the way they 
                                                            
586 See for example: M Hirst and R Patching, Journalism Ethics: Arguments and cases (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 122-123; S Aday, S Livinston and M Hebert, “Embedding the 
Truth: A cross-cultural analysis of objectivity and television coverage of the Iraq war” (2005) 10 The 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 3; R Keeble, Ethics for Journalists (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 235-238. 
587 Mclane (2004), pp. 86-87; Paul and Kim (2004), p. 2, quoting a Pentagon spokeswoman; see also 
D Moore “Twenty-first Century Embedded Journalism: Lawful targets?” (2009) 31The Army Lawyer, 
1. 
588 McClane (2004), p.84. Ayres describes for example strong reactions by the military to a negative 
news story he wrote while embedded in Iraq: C Ayres, War Reporting for Cowards (London: John 
Murray Publishers, 2005), pp. 279-280. 
589 See for example: Saul (2008), p.108. 
590 A Balguy-Gallois, “The Protection of Journalists and News Media in Armed Conflicts” (2004) 86 
International Review of the Red Cross, 37, p. 42. 
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operate in conflict zones. This is further supported by practice. The British 
government, for example, has made clear that embedded reporters are entitled to 
prisoner of war status upon capture, as per the Geneva Conventions (1949).591 This is 
also the dominant position in the academic literature and is supported by the 
ICRC.592 Yet the issue remains that it can be difficult to ascertain the exact 
circumstances of the capture of a journalists travelling with a military unit, which in 
practice leads to difficulties with their classification.593 That some confusion 
concerning the status of embedded reporters persists is well demonstrated by the fact 
that Reporters without Borders, in response to the UN action plan on the Safety of 
Journalists and the Issue of Impunity,594 has requested clarification of the legal status 
of embedded reporters to clearly establish whether they should be treated as 
prisoners of war upon capture, or as ordinary civilians.595 As discussed under 6.1.2, 
during non-international armed conflict the provisions in the Geneva Conventions 
(1949) concerning war reporters generally do not apply and embedded reporters 
operating in these conflicts will be classed as independent journalists. 
 
 
6.2 Independent journalists 
 
Journalists not accredited to a military unit are referred to as independent journalists, 
or ‘unilaterals’, a term coined during the war in Iraq to differentiate between them 
                                                            
591 UK Ministry of Defence, MoD Working Arrangements with the Media in Times of Emergency, 
Tension, Conflict or War (31 January 2013) Joint Service Publication 580, version 8, para. 37. 
592 R Geiss, “How does International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists in Armed Conflict 
Situations?” (27 July 2010) ICRC Interview, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalists-interview-270710.htm. 
See further for example: Balguy-Gallois, p. 42; H-P Gasser, “The Journalist’s Right to Information in 
Time of War and on Dangerous Missions” (2003) 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
367, p. 384; I Düsterhöft, “The Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How can they be better 
safeguarded?” (2013) 29 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 4, p. 12. 
593 See for example the capture of a French journalists in Colombia: E Pachico, “Is Kidnapped French 
Journalist a POW” (6 May 2012) InSightCrime, available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/is-kidnapped-french-journalist-a-pow.  
594 UNESCO, “UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity” (2012) 
International Programme for the Development of Communication, CI-12/CONF.202/6. 
595 Reporters without Borders, “RSF Welcomes UN’s Commitment to Tackle the Issues of Journalists’ 
Safety and Impunity” (28 February 2013), available at: http://en.rsf.org/rsf-welcomes-un-s-
commitment-to-28-02-2013,44150.html.  
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and the embedded reporters.596 While from an IHL point of view this class of 
journalists could be referred to as ‘civilian journalists’ this tends to lead to confusion 
in popular culture where that term is occasionally used to refer to ‘citizen 
journalists’, discussed at 6.3.2 below. Therefore the term ‘independent journalist’ is 
preferred in this context.597  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, independent journalists find protection under article 79 of 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This article does not provide any additional 
protection; it simply confirms that journalists are civilians and they therefore should 
be granted all the protection civilians are entitled to under the Geneva Conventions 
(1949). As with the term ‘war correspondent’ there is no official definition of a 
journalist under the Geneva Conventions, though the UN draft convention on which 
article 79 is based, defines journalists as: “any correspondent, reporter, photographer, 
and their technical film, radio and television assistants who are ordinarily engaged in 
these activities as their principal occupation”.598 As with war correspondents, 
supporting media personnel are thus covered by article 79.  
 
6.2.1 Nationality 
The protection of civilians under IHL is dependent on the nationality of the civilian. 
Consequently, nationality influences the protection journalists are entitled to in 
conflict zones. Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV relative to the protection of 
civilian persons in times of war, sets out which groups of civilians the Convention 
applies to. In principle the Convention applies to two groups of civilians: “persons of 
enemy nationality living in the territory of a belligerent state”, which are referred to 
as ‘protected persons’ in Geneva Convention IV599  and “the inhabitants of occupied 
                                                            
596 Shafer (2003).  
597 K Davies and E Crawford, “Legal Avenues for Ending Impunity for the Death of Journalists in 
Conflict Zones: Current and proposed international agreements” (2013) 7 International Journal of 
Communication, 2157, p. 2161. Furthermore, accredited war correspondents are still civilians, thus 
even legally there can be confusion surrounding the term “civilian journalist”. 
598 Art. 2a Draft United Nations Convention on the Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous 
Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict, 1 August 1975, UN Document A/10147, Annex 1. 
599 “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict 
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals (art. 4 Geneva Convention IV). “in the hands of a 
Party” is meant in an “extremely general sense” according to the Commentary on the Convention and 
will cover merely being in the territory of a party: OM Uhler et al., The Geneva Conventions of 12 
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territories”.600 Nationals in their own state are thus excluded. The provisions are 
detailed and rather complicated, with different criteria applying to different parts of 
the Convention.601 Generally in conflict areas the Convention applies to “all persons 
of foreign nationality and to persons without any nationality,” with the following 
exceptions: “nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a 
belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State” as long as the state of which 
they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the state in whose hands 
they are.602 This qualification may however not provide quite as much protection as 
envisioned by those drafting the Geneva Conventions. Even where states maintain 
diplomatic representation this does not always mean they will be able to provide 
sufficient assistance to nationals who are, for whatever reason, in trouble with the 
local authorities. As noted in the previous chapter, states will often have to take into 
account a wide range of (international) interests before interfering in the affairs of a 
foreign country. They may therefore choose not to employ the full range of the 
protection they could offer in a contentious case, in order to preserve diplomatic 
relations.  
 
Establishing nationality is however not as straightforward as it may seem. 
Nationality is not only a matter of establishing of which state a person is a national. 
The requirement has been interpreted to extend, in certain circumstances to 
allegiance. The ICTY established in Tadic that ‘substantial relations’ between a 
person and enemy state, can be relevant and that factors such as ethnicity, allegiance, 
and other close bonds with the enemy state must therefore be taken into account.603 
Effectively, therefore, while a person may not meet the ‘standard’ requirement for 
                                                                                                                                                                        
August 1949: Commentary - Vol. 1V, Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Times of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), p. 44. 
600 Uhler et al. (1958), p. 45. 
601 Notably, the provisions in part II apply according to art. 13 regardless of nationality and are thus 
applicable to local journalists. 
602 Art. 4 Geneva Convention IV. Nationals from states not party to the convention are also excepted, 
though this is no longer relevant since the universal ratification of the Conventions, and naturally 
those protected under Conventions I-III (i.e. combatants) are not protected either. See for more 
detailed discussion Uhler et al. (1958), pp. 45-51. 
603 See Prosecutor v. Delalię et al. (20 February 2001), Case IT-96-21-A, Judgement of the Appeals 
Chamber, para 52-84 for an extensive discussion. See also ICTY,	  The	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Dusko	  Tadić	  ,	  
Decision	  on	  the	  Defence	  Motion	  for	  Interlocutory	  Appeal	  on	  Jurisdiction,	  IT-­‐94-­‐1-­‐A,	  2	  October	  
1995,	  para	  166. 
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nationality to qualify as a ‘protected person’ under article 4 Geneva Convention IV, 
for the purposes of this Convention they may still have ‘assimilated’ a nationality 
which brings them under the scope of the Convention. 
 
What does this mean in practice for journalists? During armed conflict journalists 
who are nationals from co- or non-belligerent states are essentially subject to 
peacetime legislation: domestic law, potentially supplemented by human rights law 
and the protection of diplomatic relations between their home state and the state they 
are operating in, though the latter may provide only limited assistance.604 In this 
situation IHL has only limited application. Similarly, during conflict journalists in 
their own states remain subject primarily to domestic legislation, IHL provisions 
concerning the local civilian population and applicable human rights law. Nationals 
from belligerent states, or those allied with them however, are subject to domestic 
law, additional protection of IHL for ‘protected persons’ and human rights law and 
therefore find additional safeguards under the international legal framework.605 There 
are significant advantages and drawbacks to the protection journalists receive under 
the international legal framework, which will be discussed below. 
 
6.2.2 Protection 
One of the biggest advantages for journalists is that they cannot be the direct target of 
hostilities.606 They further receive the protection entitled to civilians when captured, 
which is different from the treatment received by prisoners of war. This has both 
advantages and disadvantages. As discussed above, the exact extent of protection 
differs depending on nationality, though a number of general provisions concerning 
civilians apply irrespective of nationality and thus to all journalists.607 These 
                                                            
604 Where diplomatic relations have broken down completely, these journalists fall into the same 
category as nationals from belligerent states and they essentially become a protected person under 
Geneva Convention IV. For more information see: H-P Gasser, “The Protection of Journalists 
engaged in Dangerous Missions” (1983) 23 International Review of the Red Cross, 3, pp. 15-16. 
605 During occupation the situation is only different for nationals of a neutral state. During occupation 
they are protected regardless of existing diplomatic relations, see art. 4. 
606 Their proximity to military objectives, such as army units or targets, can however mean that while 
they cannot be directly targeted they may become lawful “collateral damage”. 
607 There is some discussion whether this protection applies equally to a state’s own nationals, though 
the Commentary on Protocol I argues it does: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and B Zimmerman (eds.), 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 3017-3021. 
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provisions cover some of the most practical protection, which especially in 
combination with the provisions of IHRL means that all civilian journalists 
(theoretically) receive largely the same basic protection in conflict territories, though 
detailed protection will still vary depending on nationality; those journalists who are 
classed as ‘protected persons’ under Convention IV, meaning those who are 
nationals from belligerent states, or states who no-longer maintain diplomatic 
relations, receive additional protection. For example, article 31 of Convention IV 
prohibits the use of physical or moral coercion against ‘protected persons’, especially 
to give up information, which can be valuable protection for journalists.608 The 
Convention further states that where protected persons are detained for security 
reasons they can have this decision reviewed “as soon as possible” by an appropriate 
court or administrative board and there is thus limited scope to detain journalists who 
fall under this category long term.609 There are numerous other provisions offering 
additional protection to those classed as protected persons under the legal 
framework, but these are less relevant for the current discussion. 
 
All journalists receive basic protection in the sense that, regardless of their situation 
murder, torture, corporal punishment and mutilation are all prohibited, as are 
outrages upon personal dignity, the taking of hostages, collective punishments and 
threat to do any of the aforementioned.610 When arrested or detained for actions 
relating to the conflict they must be informed of the reason for their detention, and 
basic provisions concerning fair trial, which largely mirror those of IHRL, must be 
observed.611 Unlike war correspondents, journalists who are detained for actions 
relating to the conflict cannot simply be held until the end of the conflict. Article 
75(3) of Protocol I dictates that they “shall be released with the minimum delay 
possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention 
or internment have ceased to exist”, unless they are detained for penal offences. 
                                                            
608 See for more detail: LC Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Juris 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 262-264. Women are further specifically protected from “any attack on their 
honour”, such as rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault (art. 27). 
609 Art. 43 Geneva Convention IV. Where a court does decide internment is necessary this decision 
must be reviewed at least twice a year. This provision does of course not cover journalists detained for 
penal offences, which are decided under national law. 
610 Art. 75 Protocol I. 
611 Ibid. 
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While this means journalists must at least be charged with a crime in order to be 
detained for longer periods of time during a conflict, this may in practice only 
provide limited protection. As noted, journalists, as civilians, remain subject to local 
laws which often offer ample opportunity to charge journalists with ‘crimes’ for 
performing tasks which are generally part of their normal journalistic activities. 
 
This can seriously endanger journalists on occasion. An example of this can be found 
in a recent case in Egypt, where 16 Egyptian journalists and four international 
journalists were arrested and charged for collaborating with a terrorist organisation, 
after reporting on the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation banned by the current 
Egyptian government.612 One of the arrested journalists, an Australian national, has 
been charged with broadcasting false news in the service of the banned 
organisation,613 which in itself is a problematic legal provision as it raises questions 
as to who gets to decide which information is ‘true’. Must information be disproven 
by hard facts to establish it is false, or, as seems to be the case in Egypt, is anything 
counter to ‘political truth’ false? Such a legal provision offers scope for significant 
abuse. The journalists’ contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group opposing the 
current Egyptian government, is an essential component of their work in Egypt to 
provide a clear overview of the situation, whether they are neutral or support either 
side of the conflict.614 All journalists involved have now unfortunately received 
lengthy sentences, a clear violation of freedom of speech.615 An appeal is likely to 
follow. 
 
As noted, the most important protection under IHL for all civilian journalists during 
conflict lies in the fact that they cannot be the object of attack.616 Journalists’ own 
actions may, however, affect this protection. Where journalists directly participate in 
hostilities they lose all protection. What exactly this entails is largely open to debate 
                                                            
612 BBC, “Egypt Urged to Release Al-Jazeera Reporters” (29 January 2014) BBC News. 
613 Australian Associated Press, “Egypt extends Detention of Australian al-Jazeera Journalist Peter 
Greste” (24 January 2014) The Guardian. 
614 IHL is not applicable here as it does not concern an international armed conflict and it is arguable 
whether the standard for non-international armed conflict was met at this point in the unrest. 
Furthermore, IL does not concern itself with the content journalists produce, as discussed in chapter 3. 
615 P Kingsley, “Al-Jazeera Journalists Jailed for Seven Years in Egypt” (23 June 2014) The 
Guardian. 
616 Art. 51(2) Protocol I (1977). 
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and will be discussed in the next chapter. The other possibility is that journalists do 
not directly participate in the hostilities, but through their own actions place 
themselves so close to military targets that protection from harm is no longer 
possible. This happens for example where they use military vehicles for transport, a 
common practice due to general lack of transport options in conflict zones. In this 
situation their legal status (and right to protection) as civilians is not affected, but by 
placing themselves close to a military objective they lose all practical protection 
under IHL.617  
 
Journalists are civilians both during international and non-international conflicts. The 
protection under statutory IHL is more limited as only common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies and if the conflict is of sufficient intensity, Protocol II. 
A significant portion of the provisions concerning protection when detained or 
arrested which are not part of the statutory framework of non-international conflicts, 
are however also covered by IHRL, which applies irrespective of the type of conflict. 
Furthermore, as noted in chapter 3, article 34 of the customary law database states 
that “Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict 
must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in 
hostilities.” This rule applies regardless of the type of conflict and journalists are thus 
during both international and non-international armed conflicts treated as civilians.618 
 
6.2.3 Spies and collaboration 
As noted, war correspondents cannot be accused of espionage when they are 
captured while accompanying the armed forces. This does not apply to those war 
correspondents that are no longer with the military unit they have previously been 
accompanying. When war correspondents leave, they lose the additional protection 
awarded to them on the basis of article 4A(4) and become in effect independent 
journalists, who are not protected from accusations of spying under the legal 
framework. While this may seem like a minor inconvenience, accusations against 
journalists for spying are actually relatively common, due to the nature of their work. 
                                                            
617 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), para. 4.3.7; see also: Gasser (2003), p. 374. 
618 J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 661-670. 
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Journalists in conflict zones will often (attempt to) talk to both sides of the conflict, 
in order to provide balanced and independent journalism to their audiences. This may 
in turn evoke suspicion of either side, who may suspect journalists are passing 
information along to the other side of the conflict, or otherwise collaborating with the 
enemy. Especially journalists who are nationals of one of the parties to the conflict 
are likely to risk attracting such suspicion. 
 
The Hague regulations of 1907 define a spy as a person who “acting clandestinely or 
on false pretences (..) obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of 
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile 
party”.619 Civilians who are arrested for espionage fall outside the protective scope of 
IHL and will be dealt with under domestic law, though safeguards concerning 
circumstances of detention and fair trial will remain applicable. Espionage is 
however in most jurisdictions a serious criminal offence, especially during conflict 
and will often lead to life imprisonment if not the death penalty. Journalists are not 
helped in this matter by the fact that there is a strong history of journalists working as 
spies.620 Examples can be found throughout different conflicts, such as the Vietnam 
War and the Cold War, when both American and Russian journalists spied for their 
respective governments.621 There are also more recent examples outside the scope of 
conflict. Several sport journalists from the Netherlands, for example, reporting on the 
2008 Olympics in China, were revealed to have been on the payroll of the AIVD, the 
Dutch intelligence agency.622 While this was strongly condemned by the Dutch 
Society for Journalists, who notes that this endangers independence and, more 
worryingly, affects the credibility of all journalists,623 it demonstrates that journalists 
working as spies is hardly restricted to the past. The US partly banned the use of 
                                                            
619 Art. 29 Hague Regulations 1907. 
620 See for example: BM Seeger, “Spies and Journalists: Taking a look at their intersections” (Fall 
2009) Nieman Reports, available at: http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101913/Spies-and-
Journalists-Taking-a-Look-at-Their-Intersections.aspx.  
621 One of the most famous was Austin Goodrich, and international journalist later discovered to be 
working for the CIA:  B Weber, “Austin Goodrich Spy Who Posed as Journalist, Dies at 87” (10 July 
2013) The New York Times. See also: N Daniloff, Of Spies and Spokesman: My life as a Cold War 
correspondent (Colombia: Missouri University Press, 2008). 
622 NRC “Journalisten Spioneerden voor de AIVD tijdens Olympische Spelen in China” [Journalists 
Spied for the AIVD during China Olympics] (15 June 2012) NRC, available at: 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/06/15/journalisten-spioneerden-voor-aivd-tijdens-spelen-in-china/.  
623 “NVJ Geschrokken van Spionage” [NVJ Shocked by Espionage] (15 June 2012) De Telegraaf, 
available at: http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/article20080623.ece.  
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journalists as intelligence agents in 1997 under the Intelligence Authorization Act, 
though this provision can be overruled by the director of the CIA, which still happens 
on occasion.624 
 
The lack of protection from accusations of espionage can both hamper journalists’ 
activities and endanger journalists’ lives. There have been several occasions over the 
past few years of (groundless) accusations of spying concerning journalists who were 
simply performing standard journalistic practice. Some of these led to the arrest and 
detention of foreign correspondents.625 The combination of a history of journalists 
working for intelligence agencies and the fact that journalistic work shares 
significant characteristics with espionage, means that accusations and arrest on this 
ground are likely to continue and are not easily addressed by the legal framework. 
Those who are incorrectly accused of being spies through simply carrying out normal 
journalistic procedures, will be dependent on fair trial provisions and rigorous 
judicial proceedings to protect them from serious sentences. 
 
6.2.4 Access to conflict zones 
Journalists travelling independently through conflict zones are fully subject to local 
law, which means they are also affected by visa regulations. This can be a serious 
issue in terms of access to conflict territories, as sometimes restrictions will mean the 
only way to gather information is to flaunt restrictions and therefore to break local 
laws. As noted IHL is not concerned with the right to freedom of expression and 
ensuring journalists can carry out their duties in conflict zones; it protects their 
physical safety from the effects of combat, but nothing more. Provisions assisting 
journalists in actually carrying out their professional duties are covered solely by 
IHRL at the international level. 
                                                            
624 K Houghton “Subverting Journalism: Reporters and the CIA” (February 1997), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47c567c020.html. The CPJ has asked for the practice to be banned 
completely, see: CPJ, “In US Senate Testimony, CPJ calls for US Ban on Recruiting Journalists as 
Spies” (2 May 2002), available at: http://cpj.org/2002/05/in-us-senate-testimony-cpj-calls-for-us-ban-
on-rec.php.   
625 B Dietz, “Doubling Down on Playing the Spying Card” (23 November 2009) CPJ Blog, available 
at: http://cpj.org/blog/2009/11/doubling-down-on-playing-the-spy-card.php; CPJ, “CPJ demands 
Release of British Journalist and Colleagues held in Afghanistan” (1 October 2001), available at: 
http://cpj.org/2001/10/cpj-demands-release-of-british-journalist-and-coll.php; BBC, “Iran Spy 
Charges for Germans over Ashtiani Stoning Case” (16 November 2010) BBC News. 
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This thesis is concerned with the physical safety of journalists, rather than freedom 
of speech issues and is therefore not concerned with the legality of the act of denying 
access to territories to journalists. Such actions fall more in the range of censorship 
measures and access to information provisions. However there are situations where 
such restrictions impact on the physical safety of journalists, which this thesis is 
concerned with. The simple act of crossing a border can be labelled as terroristic 
activity,626 which will often carry significant sentences and potentially even the death 
penalty. In 2011 two Swedish freelance journalists were arrested for, amongst other 
charges such as terrorism, illegally entering Ethiopia. These journalists entered the 
territory by embedding with the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a separatist 
movement in conflict with the government of Ethiopia.627 As the events took place 
during a non-international conflict, the provisions concerning accredited war 
correspondents were not applicable and the journalists were only protected by 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and IHRL. They were convicted and 
both received jail sentences of 11 years, which led to strong protest from the 
international community on the basis that their sentences were a serious breach of 
human rights law.628 The circumstances of their detention in a notorious jail were 
cause for concern, as it affected their health and endangered their physical safety. It 
is important to note though that the lengthy jail sentence was more the effect of 
terrorism charges, as they were accused of aiding the rebels they were travelling 
with, than the fact that they had illegally entered the territory. Should they ‘only’ 
have been convicted of entering the territory illegally the response of the 
international community would likely have been different. 
 
Similar issues arise during international armed conflicts where media-management 
policies, such as the press pool system, discussed in chapter 2, are implemented. 
                                                            
626 This was for example the case in Libya where the Libyan government denied access to its country 
to journalists and declared that all foreign journalists who cross the border without permission will be 
regarded as “terrorist collaborators”. See:  CNN Wire Staff, “State Department warns Foreign 
Reporters in Libya” (24 February 2011) CNN. 
627 D Smith, “Ethiopia Jails Swedish Journalists on Terrorism Charges” (27 December 2011) The 
Guardian.  
628A Mashoo, “Ethiopia Jails Swedish Journalists for Aiding Rebels” (27 December 2011) Reuters, 
available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/ethiopiaNews/idAFL6E7NR0A720111227.  The journalists 
were eventually pardoned in 2012 and have since returned to Sweden. 
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Journalists travelling through the conflict territory outside of the preferred media 
management system, which will often be considered restrictive, can be at risk from 
both sides of the conflict. The authorities of the state they are working in can arrest 
and detain them for breaking local laws, but other parties to the conflict may equally 
try to remove them from the conflict. This happened for example during the first 
Gulf war, when journalists went outside the restrictive press pools to gain better 
access to information and entered Iraq independently. In the early stages of the 
conflict more than 20 of them were detained, often for reason of being a ‘security 
threat’, without further motivation, or with no charges at al. Some were threatened 
with detention by the American military forces, in some cases resulting in rough 
treatment.629 Similarly, during the war in Iraq, the US made it clear they were not 
responsible for the safety of non-embedded reporters and attempts to inform the US 
military of locations where journalists were based, were met with disinterest, leading 
to the shelling of one of the hotels where a significant number of journalists were 
based.630 Some US military officials have seemingly gone so far as to indicate that if 
media were not with the embedded program when in the field of operations, they 
could rightly be regarded as hostile, which is a clear violation of IHL.631 Especially 
where journalists are legally in the country they could argue they have a right to 
freedom of movement under IHRL, but again, this process is likely to be too slow to 
be of much practical use in such a situation and would involve balancing human 
rights with security concerns.632   
 
                                                            
629 P Knightly, The First Casualty (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 491; Keeble 
(2008), p. 233 and 237. 
630 D Kuttab, “The Media and Iraq: A bloodbath for and gross dehumanization of Iraqis” (2007) 89 
International Review of the Red Cross, 879, p. 883; see also for instance s of harassment of journalists 
in Iraq: A Cooper, “Journalists in Iraq: From ‘embeds’ to targets” (13 December 2014) CPJ, available 
at: http://cpj.org/2004/12/journalists-in-iraq-from-embeds-to-targets.php. 
631 Wilford (2009). This is of course a direct violation of art. 50 of the Geneva Convention, which 
specifically states that when in doubt concerning the status of people (ie combatant or civilian) they 
should be considered to be civilians and can therefore not be targeted. While the US has not ratified 
Protocol I this provision can be regarded to be part of customary law and is therefore applicable. See 
also Knightly, who points out that in the first campaign of the war in Iraq the majority of reporters 
were killed by the American military, all of them were unilaterals and the military showed little to no 
concern about this: P Knightly “History or Bunkum” (2003) 14 British Journalism Review, 7, p. 7. 
632 Both the ECHR (art. 2) and the ICCPR (art. 12)  recognise the right to freedom of movement for 
those lawfully in a territory, though this right may be limited in the interests of national security or 
public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public etc. Several of these exceptions are likely to apply 
in a conflict zone. 
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6.2.5 Respect 
Customary law states that journalists “must be respected” both in international and 
non-international conflicts, which is not a requirement that is explored in detail in the 
customary law database. It is reasonable to assume that this goes beyond the basic 
physical protection offered by IHL to all civilians, but refers more to specific rights 
connected to the work journalists undertake. It condemns measures specifically taken 
to dissuade and/or hamper journalists from carrying out their professional 
activities.633 While this is very important in terms of the freedom journalists will 
have to carry out their work in conflict territory, in practice it is doubtful how much 
this requirement will actually assist and protect them. Customary law itself is, by its 
very nature, harder to enforce than treaty law and the term ‘respect’ is rather vague. 
Much of what will fall under ‘respect’ for journalists will be covered by IHRL, most 
notably through provisions concerning freedom of speech. In practice, these may be 
easier to enforce before a court or tribunal than a rather vague customary law norm. 
 
What the requirement for ‘respect’ for journalists as an accepted international norm 
does indicate is the value attached to the function they perform for society in general. 
It also provides an indication that the possibility of reaching wide-spread 
international consensus on increasing protection for journalists during conflict, may 
not be as unattainable as it is generally perceived to be. One of the arguments against 
increasing protection for journalists through a new dedicated international treaty, is 
that such a treaty is unlikely to be ratified by a significant number of states and that 
reaching consensus on the wording of such provisions is unlikely to succeed. While 
this is certainly a strong argument against targeting efforts at creating new treaty 
provisions as that effort may be put to better use elsewhere, this does seem to ignore 
the fact that there is already sufficient international support for ‘respect’ for 
journalists to have become part of customary international law. Such support can 
form a valuable basis for discussions on enhancing the legal protection for the media 
at an international level. 
 
                                                            
633 See for example: UN General Assembly, Res. 53/164 calling to refrain from harassment and 
intimidation of journalists in the Kosovo conflict and UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 
1995/56, which deplored the attacks, acts of reprisal, abductions and other acts of violence against 
representatives of the international media in Somalia. 
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6.3 Local Journalists 
 
Local journalists, those who work in the country of their nationality, are far more at 
risk than international journalists, both in and outside of a conflict territory. Of all 
journalists killed in Iraq since 2003, 85% have been local journalists.634 Whereas 
death during crossfire and combat do not generally discriminate between local and 
international journalists, this is not the case for murder, which in some conflicts is 
the leading cause of death for journalists.635 Given the broad definition of ‘journalist’ 
accepted in international law, it stands to reason that local media support personnel, 
such as cameramen and sound technicians are included under the term ‘local 
journalist’. There is further no legislation that provides any additional protection to 
journalists over and above those of ordinary civilians in conflict zones. Therefore the 
definition of a journalist is relatively irrelevant in this context and the subsequent 
discussion will cover all media workers as well as their support staff, such as drivers 
and interpreters. 
 
Local journalists do not receive the same protection from the international legal 
framework as their international counterparts. Due to the concept of state 
sovereignty, there are significant limits to the extent the international legal 
framework can interfere in the relationship between a state and its citizens.636 Their 
main protection under IHL derives from Geneva Convention IV, relative to the 
protection of civilian persons in times of war, and Additional Protocol I, though the 
                                                            
634 CPJ, “Journalists killed in Iraq since 1992/motive confirmed” (2014), available at: 
http://cpj.org/killed/mideast/iraq/.  
635 During the conflict in Iraq for example the leading cause of the premature/untimely death of 
journalists was murder, not “crossfire or other acts of war”, see: CPJ “Iraq - Journalists in Danger: A 
statistical profile of media deaths and abductions in Iraq 2003-2009” (2008), available at: 
http://cpj.org/reports/2008/07/journalists-killed-in-iraq.php.  
636 The concept and exact extent of state sovereignty is a hotly debated topic. For a general overview 
of some of the issues in this area see for example: R Cryer, “International Criminal Law vs State 
Sovereignty: Another round?” (2006) European Journal of International Law, 979; International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect” (2001) Report of 
the international Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, available at: 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.   
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latter has not been ratified by military powers such as the United States and Iran.637 
They also face another difficulty, which is not strictly an issue with the legal 
framework as much as with its enforcement. International journalists often work for 
the larger, richer, media organisations. They further have the backing of a 
government which will likely try to intervene should they be captured or taken 
hostage. This is not the case for local media staff, especially not for citizen 
journalists, discussed below at 6.3.2, or local media support staff such as drivers and 
interpreters. This is painfully demonstrated by the fact that when international 
journalists are kidnapped or taken hostage during conflict, their release can 
sometimes be secured through paying a ransom, but their local media support staff 
rarely survive.638 
 
The need to protect local reporters is of increasing importance due to increased 
reliance on local media to provide reports on conflicts.639 This is partly due to the 
rising casualty rate of journalists reporting on conflicts, which has resulted in a 
reluctance to send reporters to conflict zones. Not only is there a realistic fear for the 
safety of staff, but also because of those safety concerns, the cost of insuring and 
protecting reporters, and thus reporting from conflict zones, have risen 
dramatically.640 Financially, it makes more sense to buy material from local media, 
especially given the economic downturn which has hit an already struggling media 
market hard. Increasing reliance on local reporters entails increasing reliance on 
those reporters who are least protected under the international legal framework, 
which is a worrying trend. 
 
6.3.1 Protection 
                                                            
637 A list of the current state parties to Protocol I can be accessed at: 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_tre
atySelected=470. 
638 See for example: K Sengupta, “The End of Bang-Bang? The risk of reporting from the frontline” 
(18 January 2010) The Independent. 
639 See for example: P Beaumont, “Reporting Libya: Freelance coverage, full-time dangers” (13 
November 2011) The Guardian. Wilford (2009) notes that such reliance on regional and local 
reporters should come with measures to ensure they are adequately protected by the media employing 
them. 
640 Wilford (2009) notes that the cost for the larger US networks covering the war in Iraq, was around 
$5 to $10 million per annum, which was far above what was estimated to be needed at the start of the 
conflict. 
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In terms of IHL, it is clear that any journalist will be classed as civilian under the 
legal framework and therefore the general provisions concerning the local civilian 
population provide protection to local journalists. Further protection, at least from the 
most serious crimes, can be found under the Rome Statute of the ICC. Where a state 
has ratified international human rights treaties, these will provide some protection as 
well, though as discussed in chapter 4, these rights can be limited in their application 
during conflict. The Geneva Conventions (1949) are primarily aimed at protecting 
civilians in the power of an adverse party or occupying power, though there are 
provisions that apply to all civilians regardless of the circumstances. Two situations 
must therefore be distinguished in terms of the protection of local journalists under 
the legal framework: local journalists operating in territory occupied by a foreign 
power and local journalists covering a conflict in their own state under the control of 
their own government.  
 
Where territory is occupied by a foreign state, Geneva Convention IV will apply as 
well as the Hague Conventions 1907, which together form the law of occupation. 
This section of IHL does not provide any specific protection to journalists, but it does 
contain significant protection for the local population. In this situation both local and 
foreign journalists are protected from a variety of harms: they cannot be interned 
except for imperative security reasons, and if they are interned the conditions should 
at minimum be equal to those of prisoners of war. Murder, torture and discrimination 
are all prohibited and generally speaking, as far as security permits, people should be 
allowed to lead normal lives.641 While, in theory, local journalists are therefore 
allowed to continue their work as normal, they are likely to be subjected to 
significant restrictions. However, those restrictions that threaten their physical safety 
and lives are generally prohibited under IHL and IHRL in this situation. It is further 
important to note here that local criminal law will remain applicable, which, 
especially in areas that have criminal laws which threaten the safety of journalists, 
can be problematic.642 Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV does, however, allow 
interference with local criminal law and courts where it constitutes “an obstacle to 
the application of the present Convention”, providing a way for occupied forces to 
                                                            
641 Geneva Convention IV, art. 47-78; artt. 27-34. 
642 Art. 64 Geneva Convention IV. 
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remove those laws which run counter to humanitarian law. Occupying powers can 
further under article 64 implement laws “which are essential to enable the Occupying 
Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly 
government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power (..)”. 
While such laws can affect local journalists, they cannot run counter to the protection 
offered to them as civilians under the Geneva Conventions (1949).643 During non-
international conflicts their protection is reduced, as it is for all journalists, to 
common article 3, potentially Protocol II and IHRL, which will provide basic 
protection against the worst dangers to life and physical safety, but not necessary the 
additional safeguards set out above. 
 
Local journalists operating in their own nation involved in a conflict, find less 
protection under the international legal framework than most other groups of 
journalists. As noted above, this is largely due to reluctance at international level to 
interfere in the relationship between a state and its own citizens. This does not 
however mean that there is no protection offered at the international level. In terms 
of IHL, local journalists will find the same protection that is offered to the general 
civilian population, which, as discussed above, will protect them from some of the 
worst crimes. This protection can predominantly be found in article 75 of Protocol I 
and protects against murder, torture, corporal punishment and mutilation, as well as 
outages upon personal dignity, the taking of hostages, collective punishments and 
threat to do any of the aforementioned.644  Article 85(3)a of Protocol I lists wilful 
direct attacks against civilians which cause death or serious injury to body or health 
as a grave breach of Protocol I, which will generally also be classed as a war 
crime.645 
 
                                                            
643 For further information see RT Yingling and RW Ginnane, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949” 
(1952) 46 American Journal of International Law, 393, pp. 411-424. 
644 There is some discussion on whether nationals are included, but generally they are considered to be 
included under this article, see: Sandoz, Swinarski and  Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), paras. 3017-3017, 
and 3082. 
645 For an overview of the relationship between ‘grave breach’ and ‘war crime’ and the legal 
consequences of this classification see: M Öberg, “The Absorption of Grave Breaches into War Crime 
Law” (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross, 163. 
	   155	  
While protection found in local criminal law will remain applicable, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, it is possible that due to the conflict such legal provisions are 
no longer effectively enforced. Where this happens the international legal framework 
can provide, in theory, a ‘backup’, though it is likely to be hampered by similar 
enforcement issues. During non-international conflict protection will be even more 
limited and IHRL will likely provide more concrete protection, assuming the state in 
question has ratified one of the relevant human rights treaties. 
 
Regardless of whether local journalists are working in occupied territory or not, they 
face the same difficulties in terms of laws concerning espionage as their international 
counterparts. Local journalists, who for work purposes have contact with a 
belligerent party, may be accused of being spies by their own authorities, which is a 
serious risk. 
 
6.3.2 Citizen journalism 
Technological progress has seen a sharp rise in so called ‘citizen journalism’. As is 
the case with journalists, there is no officially recognised definition of ‘citizen 
journalists’, though the term is generally taken to indicate non-professional media-
active citizens who engage in journalistic activities.646 Such activities can include 
political and current affairs blogging and photo and video sharing. Citizen journalism 
is not necessary confined to the online sphere, though it is most prolific there, as 
material can, for example, be incorporated in traditional journalism, such as news 
broadcasts.647 As a form of journalism, it has gained importance over the last decade, 
with especially smartphones ensuring that wherever incidents occur, some of the 
witnesses are likely to carry a camera in their pocket.  
 
While citizen journalism concerning a conflict is by no means limited to the local 
population, for the purpose of this thesis, it is sensible to discuss this topic in the 
context of local journalism. The majority of citizen journalists at risk in a conflict 
zones are likely to be part of the local population, who are close to the action and can 
                                                            
646 L Goode, “Social News, Citizen Journalism and Democracy” (2009) 11 New Media & Society, 
1287, p.1288. 
647 Ibid, pp. 1288-1289.Self-publishing on current affairs in hard copy is another example of “offline” 
citizen journalism. 
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provide eyewitness accounts of the conflict. Those citizen journalists writing from a 
country that is not involved in the fighting will face fewer risks. Citizen journalist 
reporting on a conflict will generally receive the same legal protection as local 
journalists, at least in terms of the international legal framework, as they belong to 
the same ‘class’ of persons: the local civilian population. Because of this, they are 
faced with a similar lack of protection from certain issues. Where the domestic legal 
regime fails to provide them with adequate protection, their main recourse is through 
human rights tribunals, or, if crimes against them rise to the level of war crimes, they 
can rely on a case being brought before the ICC by a state party, or the Prosecutor of 
the ICC if their country has ratified the Rome Statute, or recognises the court’s 
jurisdiction,648 as discussed in more detail in section 5.3 of this thesis. There is 
further a chance that they receive even less protection than local professional 
journalists under domestic law, as some specific local legislation concerning the 
work of journalists, such as source protection, may not extend to citizen 
journalists.649 Such protection is however likely to be of little value as provisions are 
often limited in their application for security reasons during conflicts.  
 
Citizen journalism provides a way for those who are dissatisfied with the views and 
facts presented by traditional media outlets to be heard. It makes it possible for 
ordinary citizens to gather support for a cause and to gauge how likely protests are to 
succeed.650 The events in Egypt during the Arab spring clearly demonstrate the 
increasing power of citizen journalism. While political activism online to express 
dissent with the current regime was not a new phenomenon in Egypt before the 
uprisings during the Arab spring, it became much more pronounced during the 
revolution and, combined with the ability of protesters to organise themselves 
through online platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, led the Egyptian government 
                                                            
648 If their country is neither party to the Statute nor recognizes the court’s jurisdiction the United 
Nations Security Council could potentially still bring a case before the ICC, though this would likely 
happen only in the most extreme circumstances, see the discussion under 5.3 of this thesis. 
649 M Cooper, et al., “Standing up to Threats to Digital Freedom: Can we keep the Internet free? – 
policy note” (November 2012) Index on Censorship, available at: 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Index-IGF-Policy-Note.pdf, pp. 8-9. 
650 C Freeland, “The Middle East and the Groupon Effect” (18 February 2011) Reuters, available at: 
http://blogs.reuters.com/chrystia-freeland/2011/02/18/the-middle-east-and-the-groupon-effect/.  
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to completely shut down the Internet in January 2011 for nearly a week.651 Yet 
citizen journalism continued on a large scale, as inventive ways of bypassing the 
restrictions, for example through the use of old fashioned dial-up connections, made 
it possible to still get content online.652  
 
With the increasing power of this section of the media, there is also growing risk for 
those engaging in citizen journalism. The Arab Spring demonstrated the increasing 
influence of citizen journalism and its global reach. It was not just the local 
population who accessed the information online, but it was also picked up and 
further disseminated to an international audience by mainstream international 
media.653 It can therefore be a highly valuable source of information for both the 
local and the international community. There is a limit to the amount of paid 
journalists any given territory can support, based on how ‘newsworthy’ the local 
situation is. When previously quiet areas, with a small number of professional 
journalists, erupt into violence, citizen journalists can move into the role of journalist 
to ensure enough information and news is reported about the conflict to meet the 
demand.654 This makes citizen journalists as much a target for those who wish to 
suppress information about a conflict as their professional counterparts. Freedom 
House noted in their report on Freedom on the Net 2013 that in 28 of the 60 countries 
examined users had been arrested or imprisoned for posting online content.655 In 
Syria, one of the countries experiencing significant levels of conflict at the moment 
has seen 48 citizen journalists killed in direct relation to their media activity.656 
                                                            
651 While Internet controls were in place in Egypt before the revolution, these were less restrictive than 
for example those in Tunisia and political discourse online was fairly widespread. See: S Khamis and 
K Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egypt Revolution: How civic engagement and citizen journalism 
tilted the balance” (2011) Arab Media and Society (online), pp. 12-13; see also S Khamis, “The 
Transformative Egyptian Media Landscape: Changes, challenges and comparative perspectives” 
(2011) 5 International Journal of Communications, 1159, pp. 1159-1166. 
652 BBC, “Old Technology finds Role in Egyptian Protests” (31 January 2011) BBC News. 
653 Ibid, pp. 20-22.  
654 Davies and Crawford (2013), p. 2167. There will in such a situation generally be a delay between 
the eruption of conflict and the arrival of international media. 
655 Often for rather worrying reasons such as “misuse of democratic freedom to attack state interests” 
as happened in Vietnam. For more detail see: S Kelly, et al. (eds.), “Freedom on the Net 2013: A 
global assessment of Internet and digital media” (2014) Freedom House, pp. 10-12, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013%20Summary%20of%20Fi
ndings_1.pdf.  




What makes it even more dangerous for citizen journalists, is that they do not have 
the support of a professional media organisation behind them which most 
professional journalists do have. Citizen journalists therefore generally lack the 
support of an organisation who can campaign for their freedom should they be 
detained or arrested and can provide legal assistance when necessary. Similarly, they 
will likely lack valuable safety training that many of the larger media groups offer to 
their staff.657 Yet any attempts to improve their safety at an international level will 
run into the same issues as attempts to protect local journalists do. The suggestion of 
creating an international treaty providing a special status for journalists under 
international law already meets with significant resistance on all fronts. Including 
‘ordinary’ civilians engaging in media activities in such a treaty is even less likely to 
find support as it entails an even stronger encroachment on state sovereignty, as will 





It is clear from the above that there is significant protection for journalists under the 
international legal framework. The exact extent of this protection depends, however, 
on the way journalists operate in conflict zones, as well as on their nationality as 
interpreted under Geneva Convention IV, at least where protection under IHL is 
concerned. Their foremost protection, regardless of their status, lies in the fact that 
they cannot be the direct target of hostilities, though this provision has limited 
practical use for war correspondents. Protection from physical harm is reasonably 
similar for all types of journalists as long as they are operating in the field. This 
significantly changes, however, when they are arrested or detained, be it for security 
reasons or penal offences, when they receive widely varying levels of protection. 
While it is clear that the consequences of arrest and detention can significantly 
                                                                                                                                                                        
journalists.html?annee=2013. The index differentiates between “Netizens” citizens active online in for 
example media activism and citizen journalists. 
657 See for example International News Safety Institute, “Training” (2013), available at: 
http://www.newssafety.org/safety/training/; BBC Academy, “Journalism: Safety” (2014), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/journalism/safety.  
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endanger a journalist’s physical safety, it is in this area that the legal framework 
becomes complicated and less than uniform. While infringement of basic standards is 
by no means solely caused by a lack of knowledge of the relevant legal framework, it 
is a strong contributing factor. The more complicated the legal framework, the harder 
it will be to disseminate and thus combat non-enforcement.  
 
The legal framework as it stands is not ideal. While it does provide significant 
protection to journalists in conflict zones, there are also areas that the legal 
framework fails to address, or where the protection offered is not as suitable to the 
situation of journalists as it should ideally be. This seems to be primarily caused by 
attempts to fit journalists in the existing categories under the international 
framework. I am by no means arguing that journalists should not be classed as 
civilians under the international legal framework. They are civilians and should be 
classed as such. This does however not address the issue that they do not behave like 
‘ordinary’ civilians in conflict zones, which creates some deficiencies in the legal 
framework. Journalists are more likely to run towards danger than away from it, as 
‘ordinary’ civilians tend to prefer. They are further constantly recording material and 
gathering information about the conflict and in doing so will often have contact with 
both sides to the fighting, which again is unusual for ‘ordinary’ civilians. This leaves 
them open to accusations of spying. The classification of war correspondents as 
prisoners of war upon capture carries some difficulties as well. The potential to 
intern war correspondents until the end of the conflict is neither advantageous, nor 
necessarily based on the justification for detaining prisoners of war.  
 
There is another significant factor in evaluating the effectiveness of the legal 
protection for journalists under the international framework. When the protection 
discussed in this chapter is not available to them at all, journalists become legitimate 
targets under the international legal framework. This occurs when journalists are 
deemed to be directly participating in the hostilities, a difficult to define situation, 
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7. Direct participation in hostilities 
 
 
Journalists are entitled to significant protection under the international framework 
due to their classification as civilians under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
While the protection offered to them may not always be ideally suited to their 
situation and does not cover all issues that place journalists at risk in conflict zones, 
it does, at least in theory, significantly improve their safety. The legal protection 
available to them may however be compromised where journalists are deemed to be 
‘directly participating’ in the hostilities. In this situation journalists will be deemed to 
be making a direct contribution to the fighting and will therefore become legitimate 
targets under international law. Obviously, the consequences of such an assessment 
are far reaching, yet there is no clear definition of ‘direct participation’ in hostilities. 
Journalists’ ‘ordinary’ professional activities are covered by the international 
framework and cannot be considered to constitute hostile acts which compromise 
their civilian status resulting in the loss of protection under IHL.658 Yet there is also 
consensus that under certain circumstances the media can be considered to be 
directly participating in the hostilities. However, intense debate remains concerning 
where the line between these two cases must be drawn. When exactly the media can 
be deemed to be directly contributing to the war effort, rather than just covering the 
hostilities and presenting information on one or multiple parties to the conflict is not 
an easy question to answer. 
 
The loss of the protection granted to civilians in conflict zones when directly 
participating in the hostilities may seem to only affect the application of IHL and, 
indirectly, International Criminal Law (ICL) as protection against those actions 
criminalised under ICL is in various cases dependent on the civilian status of the 
victim. However, the protection of journalists under IHRL is likely to be affected as 
well. Due to the potential simultaneous applicability of IHL and IHRL, discussed in 
chapter 4, it is likely that, at least in some situations in conflict zones, IHL will 
                                                            
658 H-P Gasser, “The Journalist’s Right to Information in Time of War and on Dangerous Missions” 
(2003) 5 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 366, p. 373. 
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override the protection offered by IHRL. For example, by directly participating in the 
hostilities journalists can become legitimate targets under IHL, which in the context 
of a conflict is likely to override the protection the right to life offers under IHRL. 
The consequences of being found to be directly participating in hostilities are 
therefore far reaching and can lead to loss of life. 
 
Some direct participation by journalists is relatively straightforward to assess. For 
example, where journalists travelling with a military unit have taken up arms and are 
actively exchanging fire with a belligerent party, they are likely to be deemed to be 
directly participating in the hostilities. When the direct participation flows from the 
content journalists produce, rather than combat actions, the situation is far more 
difficult to assess. Over the last few years there have been multiple instances when 
television and radio stations have been attacked because the broadcasting 
(equipment) was deemed to be contributing to the war effort. Several of these attacks 
have led to a number of journalists losing their lives. To understand how and when 
the media can be considered to be directly participating in a conflict, we must first 
consider the legal concept of ‘direct participation’ before considering how this can be 
applied to the media. 
 
 
7.1 The concept of direct participation in hostilities 
 
The Geneva Conventions offer significant protection to civilians in conflict zones, 
but provide that this protection is dependent on civilians refraining from participating 
directly in the hostilities.659 The Convention and Additional Protocols do not 
however specifically state how ‘direct participation’ in hostilities is to be defined and 
a clear, uniform definition has not yet emerged from state practice.660 The concept 
has been hotly debated at the international level, which has led the ICRC to publish 
                                                            
659 See for example common art. 3 to the Geneva Conventions (1949), art. 51 Protocol I (1977) and 
art. 13 Protocol II (1977).  
660 J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: 
Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 23. 
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an official non-binding interpretive guidance on the term in 2009.661 The Guidance 
notes that where, previously, the distinction between combatants and the civilian 
population was a relatively straightforward one, over recent decades this has changed 
and lines have started to blur. This is to a significant part due to the shift from 
predominantly international armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts,662 
but other reasons may be identified. There have been three marked trends which blur 
the lines between civilians and combatants: there has been a shift from conducting 
hostilities on battlefields, to conducting them in civilian population centres, thus 
intermingling armed actors with civilians; previously traditional military functions 
are being outsourced to a range of civilian personnel; and there has been a general 
failure of persons participating in hostilities to adequately distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population.663 Consequently, the concept of ‘direct participation’ in 
hostilities has grown in importance, as it distinguishes civilians from armed actors in 
situations where it is increasingly difficult to establish who can be targeted during 
hostilities. Yet this is not a straightforward assessment to make and there is no 
official agreement on when exactly civilians can be deemed to be taking direct part 
in the hostilities.664 
 
7.1.1 Direct participation by civilians 
Article 51 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention sets out the general protection 
awarded to the civilian population during conflict, which aims to protect them from 
the dangers arising from military operations. This article confirms a longstanding 
                                                            
661 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Law (Geneva: ICRC Publication, 2009). This guidance has been criticised for various 
reasons, with especially part IX concerning “restraints on the use of force in direct attack” proving 
contentious. See for example: PW Hays, “Part IX of the ICRC Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Study: No mandate, no expertise, and legally incorrect” (2009-2010) 42 New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics, 769; MN Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis” in: MN Schmidt, Essays on the Law and War 
at the Fault Line (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2012), 513-546. 
662 NP Gleditchs et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset (2002) 39 Journal of Peace 
Research, 615; JA Williamson, “Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflicts: A look at direct 
participation in hostilities” (2010) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 457, p. 463. 
663 ICRC, (2009), p. 5. 
664 The US for example takes a different approach than the majority of nations who follow the 
“Protocol I” approach, by using the functionality test, which allows for the inclusion of a wider range 
of acts in ‘direct participation’. See for more information: DW Moore, “Twenty-First Century 
Embedded Journalists: Lawful targets?” (2009) The Army Lawyer (online), pp. 19-2; E Christensen, 
“The Dilemma of Direct Participation in Hostilities” (2010) 19 Journal of Transnational Law and 
Policy, 281, pp. 290-298. 
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rule of customary IHL and thus binds all States, not just those who have ratified 
Protocol I.665 The article also states, however, at 51(3) that: “Civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities”. The reasoning behind this is that it is reasonable for a belligerent party 
to defend themselves from hostile acts during conflict, whether they are undertaken 
by civilians or combatants. The Commentary on Protocol I defines hostile acts as 
those acts which “by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the armed forces”.666 There must further be a 
“sufficient causal relationship between the act of participation and its immediate 
consequences”.667 Such situations must be distinguished from ‘participation in the 
war effort’ which is often required from the civilian population during war.668 
Participation can be required in many different ways, for example through 
manufacturing uniforms, or preparing food for the armed forces. These activities do 
not entail loss of civilian protection.669 Even manufacturing weapons does not 
constitute ‘direct participation’ as it is more an indirect act, though the factory in 
which such manufacturing takes place is likely to be a military objective, as 
discussed below, and civilians working in such a place accept the risks of a potential 
attack.670 
 
The Guidance of the ICRC clarifies the difference between direct participation and 
indirect participation through, for example, providing general support for the war 
effort. They set out three cumulative requirements which must be met for an action to 
qualify as ‘direct participation’ in the hostilities: the act “must be likely to  adversely 
affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or, 
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack” (threshold of harm);  a “direct causal link between the act and 
                                                            
665 Y Sandoz, C Swinarsk and B Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1987), para. 1923. 
666 Ibid, para. 1942. 
667 Ibid, para. 4787.  
668 Ibid, para. 1945. 
669 C Fabre, “Guns, Food and Liability to Attack in War” (2009) 120 Ethics, 36; Y Dinstein, The 
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 27-28.  
670 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 23. 
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the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation 
of which that act constitutes an integral part” (direct causation) must be present; and 
“the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of 
harm in support of a  party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).”671 The guidelines further specifically note that whether an act rises to the 
level of ‘direct participation’ can only be assessed on a case by case basis and that in 
case of doubt the civilians in question should retain their protection from direct 
attacks.672  
 
During non-international armed conflicts a similar condition for civilian protection 
applies. The basic protection set out in common article 3 to the Conventions starts 
with setting out the protection for persons taking ‘no active part’ in the hostilities 
thus signalling that protection for civilians during non-international armed conflicts 
is similarly reliant on them not taking an active part in the hostilities.673 This is 
supported by customary IHL.674  
 
7.1.2 Duration of loss of protection 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that civilians are protected unless “and 
for such time” as they take a direct part in hostilities.675 This limitation of direct 
participation has resulted in what has been named the ‘revolving door’ debate in 
academic literature, where the validity of the potential of continuously loosing and 
regaining civilian protection between attacks is debated.676  While the issue of 
regaining protection between direct participation is not universally accepted, it is 
generally accepted that civilians can indeed cease to take part in hostilities and return 
to their ‘ordinary’ civilian protection under the legal framework. This raises the 
                                                            
671 ICRC (2009), pp. 47-64. 
672 Ibid, p. 64. This is similar to the position of the ICTY, which holds the view that assessments must 
be made on case-by-case basis: ICTY, Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar (2008), Case No. IT-01-42-A, para. 
178, as well as the UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, see: UK Ministry of Defence, The 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), para. 5.3.3. 
673 For conflicts that reach the required threshold of intensity for the application of Protocol II, see 
also art. 13, which States, like Protocol I, that: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”. 
674 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 21. 
675 Art. 51(3) Protocol I. 
676 See for example MN Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private 
Contractors or Civilian Employees” (2004-2005) Chicago Journal of International Law, 511, pp.535-
536. 
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question when participation is generally understood as commencing and ending. 
While this is an important assessment in terms of targeting, there is still much 
discussion on the exact temporal scope of direct participation.677 A balance must be 
struck between humanitarian concerns regarding the protection of civilians and the 
need for military forces to be able to prevent attacks by stopping them in the 
preparatory phase.678 
 
Preparatory measures are generally considered to have the potential to be included in 
the temporal scope of ‘direct participation’ and will therefore lead to loss of civilian 
protection.679 In light of the requirements for direct participation there must however 
be a sufficiently close link between the preparation and the execution of the attack 
itself and “preparatory measures aiming to establish the general capacity to carry out 
unspecified hostile acts” cannot be considered part of direct participation in the 
hostilities.680 Including preparation to undertake hostile acts within the scope of 
direct participation brings the concept into line with the requirements for the military 
under article 43 of Protocol I. This article concerns the requirement for combatants to 
distinguish themselves from civilians and specifically states this requirement applies 
not just during attacks, but also when preparing for those attacks.681 The return from 
a hostile act should be equated to military withdrawal and will therefore generally 
also form part of the ‘direct participation’.682 The return from participation ends 
when there is a ‘physical separation’ from the act, for example by storing equipment 
and resuming activities distinct from those related to the hostile act.683 
 
Questions on duration are different for civilians who do not carry out ‘incidental’ 
hostile acts, but are members of an organised armed group and have a ‘continuous 
                                                            
677 The ICRC struggled with the exact temporal delineation of ‘direct participation’ and discussion on 
the matter persists in academic literature. See for example: B Boothby, “‘And for such Time as’: The 
time dimension to direct participation in hostilities” (2009-2010) 42 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 741. 
678 Williamson (2010), p. 468. 
679 ICRC (2009), p. 65; Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), para. 1945. 
680 ICRC (2009), pp. 65-66; see however Israeli Supreme Court, Public Committee Against Torture in 
Israel v Government Of Israel HCJ 769/02 (11 December 2005), paras. 35-37 using a fairly wide 
category of included supporting actions which can amount to ‘direct participation’. 
681 For more information see: Boothby (2009-2010), p. 746. 
682 ICRC (2009), p. 67. 
683 Ibid. 
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combat function’. Such civilians lose protection from attack for the duration of the 
assumption of their continuous combat function and temporal delineation of loss of 
protection is thus relatively straightforward in this context.684 
 
7.1.3 Civilian objects  
Civilian objects are, like the civilian population, generally protected from attacks or 
reprisals.685 As discussed in chapter 3, they are negatively defined: civilian objects 
are those objects which are not military objectives. Military objectives are then 
defined as: “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage”.686 The inclusion of “purpose or use” in the definition is to 
indicate that it is possible to make use of ordinarily civilian objects in such a way 
that they become military objectives. The standard example is that of a hotel which is 
turned into military headquarters during the hostilities, which can turn it into a 
legitimate military objective.687 What exactly constitutes an ‘effective contribution to 
military action’ is not without controversy. There is strong debate on whether so-
called ‘war sustaining’ objects that indirectly, but effectively, support and sustain 
war fighting capabilities are included. The US position is that they are,688 though this 
is strongly contested by others.689 This is due to the fact that the US and a few other 
countries which do not follow the ‘Protocol I approach’ apply instead a ‘functionality 
test’, which does not look at actual harm resulting from an action or object, but 
considers the importance and the level of functions carried out and how these 
                                                            
684 Ibid, pp. 72-73. For a more detailed discussion of armed groups and ‘direct participation’, see: K 
Watkin, “Opportunity Lost: Organized armed groups and the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ interpretive guidance” (2009-2010) 42 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics, 769. 
685 It should be noted, however, that where an attack on the civilian population constitutes a war crime 
under art. 85 Protocol I, there is no such provision for civilian objects unless an object is granted 
special protection under the legal framework, such as historic monuments. 
686 Art. 52 Protocol I (1977). 
687 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), para. 2022. 
688 US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of 
Armed Conflict (July 2007), Doc. NWP 1-14M, available at: 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-0defea93325c/1-
14M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP).  
689 For more detail see: MN Schmidt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
constitutive elements” (2010) 42 International Law and Politics, 697, pp. 717-718. 
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contribute to the military effort.690 The requirement that in the context of the 
circumstances at the time of the attack the total or partial destruction must offer a 
definite military advantage, is to ensure that attacks on such objects, which 
depending on their location have the potential to endanger the civilian population, 
will not take place where they will provide merely indeterminate or potential 
advantages.691 When there is doubt whether an object constitutes a civilian or a 
military objective, the presumption must be that of a civilian object and such objects 
can therefore not be attacked.692 It is of course possible for objects to serve both the 
civilian population and the military. Such objects are referred to as ‘dual use’ objects, 
which are generally not protected from attacks. In these circumstances additional 
precautions must be taken when planning the attack, to minimalize loss of life of 
civilians, and the military advantage of such an attack must be weighed against the 
potential loss of life amongst the civilian population. 
 
The concept that only military objectives may be targeted can be traced back to some 
of the earliest codifications of humanitarian law.693 While Protocol I has not been 
signed by some military powers, the provisions of article 52 are firmly based on 
customary law and will therefore apply regardless of the parties to the conflict. The 
rationale for this provision is the concept that conflicts are won by overcoming the 
military forces of the enemy.694 Arguably, however, this is no longer the case. 
Sometimes acquiring a non-military advantage can be more effective in winning a 
conflict than a military advantage.695 Some argue therefore that in modern conflicts 
civilian support for the war, or indeed even anything that prolongs the war, can 
constitute a military objective.696 Such broadening scope of ‘military objective’ can 
                                                            
690 Moore (2010), p. 21. 
691 Ibid, para. 2024. 
692 Art. 52(3) Protocol I (1977). 
693 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight (1868), St Petersburg; and more specifically in the Hague Conventions 1907. 
694 M Sassòli, “Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of “Military Objectives” for the 
Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, in: D Wippman and M Evangelista (eds.), 
New Wars, New Laws? Applying the laws of war in 21st century conflicts (Ardlsey: Transnational 
Publishers, 2005), 181-210. 
695 JM Meyer, “Tearing down the Façade: A critical look at the current law on targeting the will of the 
enemy and air force doctrine” (2001) 51 Air Force Law Review, 143. 
696 See for example: WJ Fenrick, “Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against Yugoslavia” (2001) European Journal of International Law, 489, p. 491, 
discussing the influential theory of the “five strategic rings”: political leadership, economic systems, 
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seriously increase the risks for the civilian population during conflicts. Practice and 
theory seem to have started to diverge at this point, as both the legal framework and 
courts maintain that objects that affect the morale of the civilian population but do 
not have a military purpose do not constitute military objectives, yet during modern 
conflicts such objects are increasingly targeted,697 as will be discussed in the context 
of the media, below. 
 
The principle that only military objectives can be targeted is considered to constitute 
customary law applicable during non-international conflict. The express protection of 
civilian objects during such conflicts is however less detailed due to the general 
nature of customary law, and during non-international conflicts which reach the 
threshold for the application of Protocol II, there is only express protection for a very 
limited number of civilian objects, such as medical units and objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population.698 
 
7.1.4 Consequences of direct participation 
As discussed, the main consequence of civilians participating directly in the 
hostilities is that they lose their immunity from attack for the duration of their 
participation. They regain this protection as soon as their participation ends and until 
such time as they commence participation again. The ICRC Guidance notes that 
while it is permissible to use lethal force against civilians participating in the 
hostilities, the degree of force should not exceed what is necessary to accomplish the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
supporting infrastructure, population and military forces, set out in: JW Crawford, “The Law of 
Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Power and Electric Systems” (1997) 21 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 101 ; JA Burger, “International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo 
Crisis: Lessons learned or to be learned” (2000) 82 International Review of the Red Cross, 129, p. 
132. For a wider discussion on the increasing scope of “military objective” see: Sassoli (2005), pp. 
190-203. 
697 Sassòli (2005), pp. 193-196: Especially the US military is seemingly broadening the scope of 
“military objective” by considering objects that “indirectly but effectively support and sustain the 
enemy’s war-fighting capability” legitimate targets, which allows for the inclusion of a much wider 
range of objects. For more detail on the US position see further: L Turner and LG Norton, “Civilians 
at the Tip of the Spear: Department of Defence Total Force Team” (2001) Air Force Law Review, 1, 
pp.11-12. The Israeli army similarly seems to view propaganda media as legitimate targets, see: 
Reporters without Borders, “Israel/Gaza, Operation “Cast Lead”: News control as a military 
objective” (February 2009), available at: http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Rapport_Gaza_janvier_2009_GB-
2-2.pdf, p. 6. 
698 Artt. 11 and 14, Protocol II (1977). 
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military purpose in the situation.699 The inclusion of this statement led to significant 
discussion in the preparatory stages of the guidance, though as the ICRC explains in 
the final report “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to 
refrain from giving him an opportunity to surrender where there is manifestly no 
necessity for the use of lethal force.”700 It should also be noted that while civilians 
regain protection from attacks as soon as their participation ends, they can still be 
held responsible for acts committed while participating in the hostilities by the 
judicial system. Combatants cannot be held responsible for acts which do not violate 
the laws and customs of war, such as killing enemy soldiers and damaging or 
destroying military objectives during armed conflict, which is generally referred to as 
combatant immunity.701 As civilians who are directly participating in the conflict are 
not awarded the same immunity and will therefore fall into a somewhat ill-defined 
group of unlawful combatants,702 they can be held responsible for their actions 
during their participation in the hostilities by domestic courts. 
 
Civilians who are captured after resuming their civilian protection will thus generally 
be subject to penal prosecution under the domestic law of the detaining state 
concerning their actions during the hostilities, and may further be charged with 
perfidy703 under article 37(1)c depending on the circumstances.704 The exception to 
this rule is where civilians are contracted by the armed forces and there is a related 
                                                            
699 ICRC (2009), p. 77. 
700 Ibid, p. 82. 
701 Combatant immunity constitutes a generally accepted principle of international law, see for 
example the Lieber Code (1863) which states in art. 57 that “So soon as a man is armed by a 
sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, 
or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses.” 
702 Värk (2005), p. 193; see for more information and the historical development of the concept 
‘unlawful combatant’: RR Baxter, “So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, guerrillas, and 
saboteurs” (1951) 28 British Yearbook of International Law, 323. For further discussion on their 
status and protection under IHL see: K Dörmann, “The Legal Situation of Unlawful/Unprivileged 
Combatants” (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross, 45. 
703 Art. 37(1) states that “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is 
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy”. It can therefore be argued that 
under certain circumstances civilians attacking the armed forces are feigning non-combat status, while 
in fact taking part in the hostilities. 
704 The exception is where civilians have taken part in the hostilities during a levée en masse, which is 
when civilians collectively spontaneously take up arms to defend themselves against an invading 
force, this is however rare and unlikely to be relevant in the context of this thesis. It is therefore 
sufficient to note that civilians participating in levée en masse are protected as prisoners of war should 
they be captured. For more information see: I Detter, The Laws of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 140.  
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agreement with the relevant authorities on jurisdiction.705 Civilians participating in 
the hostilities can be prosecuted regardless of whether their actions violate IHL when 
their actions violate domestic law.706 They do still receive protection from the 
Geneva Conventions, though this protection is relatively limited. Article 5 of Geneva 
Convention IV states that those who are in enemy territory and suspected of activities 
hostile to the state, do not receive the rights and privileges they would normally be 
entitled to under the Geneva Convention where granting such rights and privileges 
would be prejudicial to the security of the state.707 These derogations have limited 
practical effect though and at a minimum they should still receive humane treatment 
and a fair trial.708 Furthermore, the fundamental guarantees of article 75,709 which 
also constitute customary law, are applicable to all unlawful combatants regardless of 
their status or nationality as long as they find themselves in the power of a party to 
the conflict, which is a requirement that due to its broad interpretation is easily 
met.710 While they thus receive some protection from the Conventions, the bigger 
concern for most unlawful combatants will be the lack of protection of combatant 
immunity, which means they can be held accountable for their actions by national 
courts. The majority of actions undertaken by unlawful combatants will violate laws 
that carry significant sentences when found guilty of such violations.  
 
As noted above, the situation is slightly different in non-international armed 
conflicts, though not fundamentally so, where only the basic guarantees of common 
article 3 are applicable. Common article 3 is solely concerned with those taking ‘no 
                                                            
705 See generally: D Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). In Iraq, for example, civilian government personnel and government 
contractors were granted immunity from prosecution during the occupation, the resulting 
jurisdictional vacuum was filled by the US establishing domestic criminal jurisdiction for civilians 
employed abroad by the US military, see: Schmitt (2004-2005), pp.516-517. 
706 There is however some doubt whether they can be prosecuted for merely participating in the 
hostilities where such participation does not violate any domestic or international laws, see: ICRC, 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities - report” (31 May 2005), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205.htm.  
707 Such activities not include political or religious convictions; conviction must be translated into 
action before they fall within the scope of this article. See OM Uhler et al., The Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949: Commentary - Vol. 1V, Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Times of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), p. 56. 
708 Värk (2005), p. 197. 
709 This article ensures humane treatment and protects against (amongst others): murder, torture, 
corporal punishment and mutilation, as well as outages upon personal dignity, the taking of hostages, 
collective punishments and threat to do any of the aforementioned.  
710 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), para. 2912. 
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active part in the hostilities’ and all combatants will receive, at least theoretically, the 
same treatment under domestic law or can be prosecuted for war crimes where their 
actions meet the required components.  This is different from international conflicts 
where combatant immunity and prisoner of war status applies.711 During non-
international conflict all those arrested for taking part in the hostilities will thus have 
the same status before the law.712 
 
As noted, civilian objects or property lose their protection from direct attacks if they 
are used by the military or otherwise become a military objective. This does not, 
however, provide a justification to attack such objects under all circumstances. 
Article 51(5)b of Protocol I codifies the customary law principle of proportionality of 
force, by prohibiting attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”. What exactly constitutes ‘excessive’ casualties or damage is open to 
debate and must be judged on a case-by-case basis. If alternative measures to 
destruction are available which would accomplish the same effect, those should be 
considered.713 Article 57 of Protocol I further requires parties to take precautions to 
protect civilians as much as possible during hostilities, by requiring, amongst other 
things, advance warning where possible.714 These provisions do not generally limit 
the damage that can be caused to objects whose destruction can have a significant 
                                                            
711 For example, lawful combatants can kill other combatants during hostilities without being charged 
with murder under most circumstances. This is, however, not necessarily the case for civilians who 
can be charged under domestic law for such actions. 
712 There is some discussion on whether combatant immunity applies during non-international armed 
conflict, though it is generally considered not to apply. See for example: R Värk, “The Status and 
Protection of Unlawful Combatants (2005) 10 Juridica International, 191, p. 193; WA Solf, “Status 
of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts under Domestic Law and Transnational 
Practice” (1983) 33 American University Law Review, 53, pp. 58-61; M Sassoli, “Query: Is there a 
status of unlawful combatant?” (2006) 80 International Studies, US Naval War College, 57, p. 63. 
This situation changes of course when during a non-international conflict additional provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions are brought into force by mutual agreement of the belligerent parties, as parties 
to a conflict are encouraged to do under art. 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions (1949). 
713 For example jamming radio signals, rather than destroying a radio station being used by the enemy: 
B Saul, “The International Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflict and other Violent Situations” 
(2008) 14 Australian Journal of Human Rights, 99, p. 114. 
714 For more detail see: A Balguy-Gallois, “The Protection of Journalists and News Media in Armed 
Conflicts” (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross, 37, pp. 60-67. 
	   173	  
effect on the local population.715 They do however seek to minimise the loss of 
civilian lives during such attacks. 
 
 
7.2 Direct participation in hostilities by journalists 
 
In modern conflicts, individual journalists and media equipment are increasingly 
becoming direct targets during the hostilities. As they are generally protected from 
attack due to their civilian status, we must now turn to the question whether such 
attacks can be justified on the basis that both individual journalists and media 
equipment can constitute a legitimate military target, under certain circumstances, 
due to their direct participation in the hostilities. For example, during both the 
Kosovo air campaign and the war in Iraq a number of television and radio stations 
were targeted. While some of these attacks were justified on the basis that the 
equipment in question had dual use, as it not only broadcast media content but also 
functioned as a military communications network, this has not always been the case 
and some official government and NATO statements seem to consider the media to 
be inherently a legitimate target during the hostilities.716 NATO, for example, has 
stated in the context of the Kosovo air campaign that: “Strikes against TV 
transmitters and broadcast facilities are part of our campaign to dismantle the FRY 
propaganda machinery which is a vital part of President Milosevic’s control 
mechanism”, while the then Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in the same context 
that the media “is the apparatus that keeps him [Milosević] in power and we are 
entirely justified as NATO allies in damaging and taking on those targets”.717 
Similarly, some authors argue that since winning a modern conflict is as much 
                                                            
715 This is especially true for objects with a dual use. 
716 Sassòli (2005), p. 193; K Payne, “The Media as an Instrument of War” (Spring 2005) Parameters, 
81, p. 90; US Department of Defence, “Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review in the US 
Mission to Kosovo” (14 October 1999), available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=2220. 
717 ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (13 June 2000), para. 74, which cites 
statements by the then Prime Mister Tony Blair and the NATO which clearly identify the media as a 
military target based on their propaganda function. Conversely, close to the bombing of a television 
during the war in Kosovo a spokesman from the NATO stated “There is no policy to strike television 
and radio transmitters as such. Allied air missions are planned to avoid civilian casualties, including of 
course journalists”, cited in: N Joffe, “At War with the Nato” (23 October 2001) The Guardian. 
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dependent on military victory as it is on public support by both the domestic and 
international community, the media has now indeed become a weapon of war.718 Yet 
the legal framework clearly states that journalists are civilians719 and not a military 
target and must therefore be directly participating in the hostilities to become one. 
 
From the discussion above we can differentiate between two scenarios. On the one 
hand, when media equipment, such as radio and television transmitters, is used for 
military purposes it will lose its protection as a civilian object due to its direct 
contribution to the hostilities. On the other hand, we can distinguish a situation where 
the equipment itself is only used for civilian purposes, but the message that is being 
broadcast over it makes such a significant contribution to the conflict that it reaches 
the level of direct participation in the hostilities. The latter scenario assumes that the 
media can have such an effect on its audience and actively contributes to the 
hostilities through this influence. The exact extent of media influence on audiences is 
a hotly debated topic, as will be discussed below and goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What will follow is therefore a short discussion highlighting evidence 
suggesting that media can, at least potentially, perform acts which “by their nature 
and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the 
armed forces”,720 and will therefore meet the requirements of direct participation in 
the hostilities.  
 
7.2.1 Do journalists have the power to directly participate in the hostilities? 
Evaluating when media content becomes so influential that journalists provide a 
direct contribution to the hostilities is no easy task. The extent to which media 
influences audiences has been the subject of a number of studies, yet there is no clear 
answer to the question to what extent audiences are concretely affected by the media 
                                                            
718 Payne (2005), pp.81-84, noting that when civilian media broadcasts are directly interfering with the 
accomplishment of a military mission there is nothing in the legal framework prohibiting the use of 
minimum force to shut them down; Reporters without Borders (February 2009), p. 4, quoting the head 
of the Israeli government press office, who noted when discussing banning journalists form conflict 
zones: “It has happened and it will happen again, particularly when we know the extent to which the 
media can constitute weapons of war”. See further: M Kalb and C Saivetz, “The Israeli – Hezbollah 
War of 2006: The media as a weapon in asymmetrical conflict” (2007) 12 The Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 43. 
719 By extension their equipment, when solely used by them, is therefore also civilian in nature. 
720 Ibid, para. 1942. 
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content they consume.721 Some authors have for example argued that the effects of 
media violence on viewers have been conclusively demonstrated, while others argue 
against this, pointing to weaknesses in the relevant research.722  
 
A political science theory called the ‘CNN effect’, also known as the ‘CNN factor’, 
suggests that the media has the power to affect audiences and public opinion, which 
in turn will influence the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy.723 This is based 
on the assumption that the advent of 24 hour news broadcasting and live audiovisual 
coverage of conflicts has significantly increased media impact on public opinion 
formation concerning national and international events, which in turn can influence 
military and political elites.724 To put it in the words of former United Nations 
Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “CNN is the sixteenth member of the security 
council”.725 This theory has commanded widespread support, though especially in 
more recent years it has also been widely criticised for overstating the power the 
media actually commands.726 In terms of military engagement in conflicts, the media 
is but one small component of a decision to engage, amongst many other relevant 
factors.727 The theory has therefore mostly been discredited in situations where there 
is a high level of consensus on policy or strategy. Here the media will have little 
                                                            
721 See for example: J Curran, A Smith and P Wingate (eds.), Impacts and Influences: Media power in 
the twentieth century (New York: Routledge, 2013); Eilders (2005), pp. 645-64; E Gilboa, Media and 
Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinion (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2002). 
722 See for example: CA Anderson et al., “The Influence of Media Violence on Youth” (2003) 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 81; J Freedman, Media Violence and its Effect on 
Aggression: Assessing the scientific evidence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002); J Savage, 
“Does Viewing Violent Media Really Cause Criminal Violence? A methodological review” (2004) 
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 99. 
723 S Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect: An examination of media effects according to type of 
intervention” (June 1997) Harvard Research Paper R 18 Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics 
and Public Policy, p.1, available at: http://www.genocide-
watch.org/images/1997ClarifyingtheCNNEffect-Livingston.pdf. 
724 P Robinson, The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 2. 
725 L Minear, C Scott and TG Weiss, The News, Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action (Boulder: 
Lyne Reinner Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 4. 
726 See for example: N Gowing, “Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic 
Crises: Does it pressure or distort foreign policy decision making?” (Spring 1994) Harvard Working 
Paper 94-1, Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy, p. 9, available at: 
http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/1994_01_gowing.pdf; W Strobel, “The CNN 
Effect” (1996) American Journalism Review, 32. 
727 SL Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Macmillan, 2000), p. 5. 
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power or influence to change the minds of the military and political elite.728 As 
former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan explains: “When governments 
have a clear policy, they have anticipated a situation and they know what they want 
to do and where they want to go, then television has little impact.”729 However, 
where there is significant discord on policy or strategy, in other words, policy 
uncertainty, the situation may be different.730 In this situation, the media can be used 
by policy makers to promote one policy or strategy over another and thus to generate 
support for a specific course of action. Using the media in such a way indicates that 
the media has, at least potentially, the power to influence audiences and affect the 
conduct of hostilities. It can therefore be argued that journalists are capable of 
‘participation in the hostilities’ under certain circumstances through the content they 
produce, but whether it has a significant enough influence to meet the legal 
requirements for a ‘direct’ contribution, is open to debate. 
 
It is possible to identify a number of instances where media coverage has seemingly 
contributed to the decision to undertake humanitarian intervention, which can be 
considered an argument in favour of the assumption that the media can, at least in 
theory, affect behaviour during conflict. This happened for example after the end of 
the Gulf War in 1991 when television coverage of Kurdish refugees fleeing the civil 
war in Iraq led to strong political pressure on the West to intervene, which led to the 
establishment of ‘humanitarian enclaves’ in the North of Iraq.731 Similarly, the 
extensive coverage of Kosovo refugees fleeing the ethnic cleansing led to strong 
political support for intervention, resulting in the air campaign by the NATO.732 
Conversely, the conflicts in Rwanda and Sudan received low levels of media 
                                                            
728 D Fitzsimmons, “On Message: News media influence on military strategy in Iraq and Somalia” 
(2007) 9(4) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies (online); Robinson (2002), p. 30. 




730 P Robinson, “The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring media power during humanitarian 
crisis” (2000) 37 Journal of Peace Research, 613. 
731 R Keeble, Ethics for Journalists (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 247 -248; M Shaw, Civil 
Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing distance violence (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 156-
174. 
732 Ibid, p. 249. 
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attention in the US and no military intervention.733 Yet, as noted, while media 
coverage can contribute to a public call for intervention, they will generally be a 
contributing factor amongst a wide number of other political factors and will rarely 
solely be responsible for sparking intervention.734  
 
7.2.2 Indirect v direct participation by journalists 
As the commentary on Protocol I states: “many activities of the nation contribute to 
the conduct of hostilities, directly or indirectly; even the morale of the population 
plays a role in this context”.735 But media can have a significant impact not just on 
morale, but also potentially, as discussed above, on political decisions and possibly, 
indirectly, even on military strategy.736 The Vietnam War for example, has been 
widely perceived to have been lost due to the loss of public support for that war. 
Where the media produces nothing but propaganda during a conflict, it is hard to 
argue that this does not have the potential of, at the very least, prolonging the 
conflict. However, as we have seen above, not all contributions to the hostilities 
constitute ‘direct participation’ and therefore loss of protection under the 
international framework. ‘Indirect participation’, which constitutes general support 
for the war effort, must be differentiated from ‘direct participation’. Whether the 
media is merely providing an indirect contribution rather than a direct contribution 
will depend on the circumstances of the case,737 but some general observations can 
be made. 
 
The ICRC Guidance on ‘direct participation’ states specifically that the production of 
propaganda does not constitute direct participation.738 Producing media content that 
rises above the level of ‘general’ propaganda, to propaganda that directly incites to 
violence, can however potentially rise to the level of ‘direct participation’. Yet it can 
be very difficult to draw a clear line between the two types and much will depend on 
                                                            
733 Fitzsimmons (2007), p.3. 
734 See for example: Gowing (1994); Keeble (2008), pp. 248-249. 
735 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman (eds.) (1987), para. 1945. 
736 Fitzsimmons (2007). 
737 ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (13 June 2000), para. 47, available 
at: http://www.icty.org/sid/10052. 
738 ICRC (2009), p. 50. 
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the circumstances of the case, which creates uncertainty for those making targeting 
decisions in the field. It is interesting to note here that article 20(1) of the ICCPR 
specifically states that “Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law”, which 
should however be given a narrow interpretation which brings it significantly into 
line with the ICRC Guidance and this provision is not currently actively enforced by 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC).739 Given the far-reaching consequences of 
media content breaching the level of permissible ‘general’ propaganda, more detailed 
guidance on the principle in terms of media participation would be welcome. 
 
There are two cases concerning media content that have been discussed at length in 
academic literature and by the international community providing guidance in terms 
of what content is permissible to produce and what is not: Radio Television Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLMC) during the Rwanda genocide and Radio Television Serbia 
(RTS) during the air campaign in Kosovo. The production of the former’s content 
was deemed to reach the level of ‘direct participation’ in hostilities by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the latter was not. During the 
conflict in Rwanda RTLMC’s some content reached the level of direct and public 
incitement of genocide, while other content met the lower, though still unlawful 
threshold of instigation to genocide by the Appeal Chamber.740 It called on its 
listeners to go out and kill Tutsis, providing essentially instructions for genocide. 
Three key media executives of RTLMC were convicted for their role on the genocide 
by the ICTR.741 While on appeal the court thus confirmed that the media content in 
this case had breached the level of ‘general propaganda’ and had breached the limits 
of lawful content, it also noted that under ICL persons cannot be held responsible for 
hate speech which does not directly incite genocide or other violence among 
members of an armed group.742  
 
                                                            
739 For an extensive discussion of the permissibility of war propaganda under international law, see: 
MG Kearney, The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
740 ICTR, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 
(appeal judgment), 28 November 2007, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, paras. 678-679. 
741 The notion that ‘extreme’ propaganda can reach the level of ‘direct participation’ is further 
supported by the academic literature. See the overview of the issue in: Balguy-Gallois (2004), p. 49. 
742 ICTR, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor 
(appeal judgment), 28 November 2007, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, para. 693. 
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Conversely, the content broadcast by RTS during the conflict in Kosovo had failed to 
meet the level of direct incitement to commit crimes (against humanity) according to 
the ICTY. As noted by the court: “At worst, the Yugoslav government was using the 
broadcasting networks to issue propaganda supportive of its war effort” rather than 
for the incitement of crimes.743 The ICTY summarised its decisions as follows: “If 
the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is 
merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a 
legitimate target.”744 The report does not, however, clearly indicate the difference 
between legitimate propaganda and criminal war propaganda,745 only discussing the 
extremes of the spectrum and noting that this extreme had not been met in the current 
case.   
 
It may be difficult to draw the line in less extreme cases during conflict. When 
determining whether journalists are directly participating in the hostilities through 
the content they produce and therefore loose all protection offered to civilians under 
the Geneva Conventions is no easy matter. As noted in the ICRC Guidelines there 
are three essential components to ‘direct participation’: the act “must be likely to 
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity”; there must be a “direct 
causal link between the act and the harm likely to result”; and “the act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a 
party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.”746 If we apply those criteria to 
the production of media content it becomes clear that propaganda, which does not 
directly incite criminal violence will indeed fail to meet both these requirements as 
there is an insufficient causal link between general propaganda and harm to meet 
these requirements. 747 Even if a media station lost their protection as a civilian object 
because the propaganda they are broadcasting is considered to make an “effective 
                                                            
743 ICTY (2000), para 76; see also Joffe (2001). 
744 ICTY (2000), para. 47. The bombing in this case was justified on the basis of disrupting an enemy 
communications network being used in the war effort, which made it a legitimate target, but a pure 
propaganda station would likely not be: Ibid, paras. 75-76. See also: Reporters without Borders 
(2009), p. 7. 
745 Gasser (2003), p. 281. 
746 ICRC (2009), pp. 47-58. 
747 Ibid; S Kagan and H Durham, “The Media and International Humanitarian Law: Legal protection 
for journalists” (2010) 16 Pacific Journalism Review, 96, p. 103.  For a full discussion on propaganda 
see: ICTY (2000), para 76. 
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contribution to military action” the fact remains that the disruption of propaganda is 
unlikely to offer the required “definite military advantage” to justify an attack, as 
discussed under 3.1.2. The advantage of destroying media equipment is often limited 
as broadcasting can resume from elsewhere, as was for example the case in Kosovo, 
where broadcasting resumed within hours of the attack and equally with the bombing 
of Asqa TV in Gaza City were there was already broadcasting from an alternative 
studio when the air raid started.748 Furthermore, the influence of propaganda on the 
population can be overstated, as people are often well aware that their media content 
is strictly controlled by the state and cannot always be taken at face value.749 
 
It is, however, hard to deny that the media play an influential role on the formation of 
public support or opposition to a conflict and it is this support which has become 
increasingly influential. As noted above, winning a modern conflict is now as 
dependent on military victory as it is on public support by both the domestic and 
international community.750 In the words of Colonel David Kilcullen: “It’s now 
fundamentally an information fight”, noting that when insurgents ambush an 
American Convoy “they’re not doing that because they want to reduce the number of 
Humvees we have in Iraq by one. They’re doing it because they want spectacular 
media footage of a burning Humvee.”751 Much emphasis is now placed on how the 
media represent certain events in conflicts and both state and non-state parties are 
fully aware of the importance of this.752  
 
Military information operations, which are designed to influence or disrupt the 
decisions made by the enemy party and to, amongst other things, reduce the 
adversary’s will to fight,753 have long played a part in the conduct of warfare. 
                                                            
748 ICTY (2002), para 78; Reporters without Borders (2009), p. 6. 
749 Joffe (2001). 
750 Payne, (Spring 2005), pp.81-84; Reporters without Borders (February 2009). 
751 Cited in G Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can social scientists redefine the war on terror?” (18 
December 2006) The New Yorker. 
752 This is perhaps best demonstrated by the demand of the Taliban, that their assassination attempt on 
Malala Yousafzai should receive unbiased media coverage, rather than the purely negative coverage it 
was receiving, see: J Hudson, “Taliban Demands Unbiased Coverage of its attempted Murder of a 14-
Year-Old Girl” (17 October 2012), The Atlantic Wire, available at: 
http://www.thewire.com/global/2012/10/taliban-demands-unbiased-coverage-its-attempted-murder-
14-year-old-girl/58017/.  
753 Moore (2009), p. 24. Gasser (2003), pp. 384-385. 
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Increasing emphasis is however being placed on the value of information operations 
for achieving victory.754 They now form an essential component in the conduct of 
hostilities and the media play an important role in this. The more emphasis is placed 
on ‘information warfare’, not only for tactical support of military operations, but 
more directly for achieving victory in the increasingly important battle for public 
opinion, the more journalists are at risk of losing their civilian protection during 
conflict. By taking part in this important battlefield, it could indeed end up being 
considered to be ‘directly participating’ in the hostilities. This is especially true for 
those countries using a wider definition of ‘direct participation’, such as the US.755 
The line between ordinary journalistic activities and those which actively participate 
in the war effort is becoming increasingly blurred, as military influence on media 
content is not always easily identified.756 The question of where indirect participation 
ends and direct participation begins is therefore more important than ever for the 
safety of journalists, yet more difficult to answer than ever before. To decide on a 
case by case basis which content is and is not permissible, makes it difficult to apply 
the concept of ‘direct participation’ in a systematic and coherent way, leading to 
confusion for those making targeting decisions, but also for journalists themselves, 
who may not be able to adequately assess when they have lost all protection under 
the legal framework. Journalists would therefore benefit from authoritative guidance 
on the notion of ‘direct participation’ by journalists. 
 
7.2.3 Dual use of media equipment 
Media equipment, when solely being used by the media, will generally not constitute 
a military objective, except for extreme cases where the content being broadcast 
amounts to ‘direct participation’, as discussed above, though establishing when this 
is the case remains problematic. This is however not the only way media equipment 
can become a target in the hostilities. Media equipment can become a target during 
the hostilities through use by parties other than the media during conflict, such as the 
military. This is a relatively common occurrence and several examples can be found 
                                                            
754 C Eilders, “The Media under Fire: Fact and fiction in conditions of war” (2005) 37 International 
Review of the Red Cross, 635, p. 643. 
755 Ibid, p. 25. This is especially true for embedded reporters who operate under the direct influence of 
the military in terms of limitations and even censorship, see: Moore (2009), pp. 26- 27. 
756 Gasser (2003), p. 385. 
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in recent conflicts where media equipment was indirectly targeted due to the dual use 
of equipment or premises they found themselves in. This has for example been the 
case with the RTS bombing during the Kosovo air campaign, where the media 
transmitters were deemed to be used for military communication, and the bombing of 
the Ministry of Information in Bagdad in 2003, which also housed offices of the 
international media.757 
 
Dual use of media equipment, use for both military and civilian purposes, is 
relatively easy to establish as it is mostly based on facts, though these can be hard to 
come by depending on the trustworthiness of the available in formation during 
conflict. This does not mean, however, that there are no value judgments to be made 
in this context. Importantly, as discussed above, any attack on such objects must 
meet the required standard of proportionality at all times and advance warning must 
be given where possible.758 This entails that with any attacks on such targets, the 
military advantage must be weighed against the potential for civilian casualties, 
which are likely to be higher for dual use objects due to their civilian nature. The 
ICTY considered this requirement in the context of the RTS bombing, noting that: it 
is much easier to “formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than it 
is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is often 
between unlike quantities and values.”759 The final report did not reach a clear 
conclusion on the proportionality of the attack, noting that the available evidence is 
conflicting, but that there are indications that the NATO did provide advance 
warning to mitigate civilian casualties, even though the warning was not received by 
all.760 Generally speaking though, precautions to limit civilian casualties should be 
taken. This can be done for example by giving such advance warning to allow 
civilians to evacuate equipment or areas that are about to be destroyed by military 
                                                            
757 M Sassòli, AA Bouvier and A Quintin, How does Law Protect in War: Cases, documents and 
teaching materials on contemporary practice in International Humanitarian Law, Vol II (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2011), p. 592. 
758 Both of these principles are based on customary law and applicable during non-international 
conflict, see: Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin (2011), p. 594. 
759 ICTY (2000), para. 48. 
760 Ibid, para 77. It found however no evidence of significant wrongdoing that would warrant further 
investigation into the matter of proportionality. 
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force.761 The final report of the ICTY on the RTS bombing considered that the 
bombing, which resulted in several civilian deaths, was justified on the basis of the 
dual use of the equipment.762 Here it was determined that the equipment functioned 
not only as a television station but also that the transmitters were integrated into the 
military communications network, which could be disrupted by its destruction.763  
 
 
7.3 Armed security teams and carrying weapons 
 
The dangerous nature of the work journalists undertake in conflict zones raises 
questions on how best to protect them from these dangers. In the past this discussion 
has to a significant extent considered the question whether journalists can, and 
should, carry weapons for purposes of self-defence, or whether this would 
compromise their protection under the legal framework. In recent times, a similar 
question has arisen in terms of the use of private, armed, security teams for the 
protection of journalists, a practice which is becoming increasingly common in 
modern conflict. 
 
Whether journalists are legally permitted to carry a weapon will depend on the 
domestic legal system they are operating in. As noted, journalists are civilians and 
therefore subject to domestic law. The legal consequence of carrying weapons for 
their protection under IHL is a separate question and one that is not directly 
addressed by the Geneva Conventions. It is generally assumed that the mere fact of 
carrying a weapon for self-defence purposes is not enough to amount to ‘direct 
participation’ and will therefore not make journalists legitimate military targets, but 
when journalists use their weapons to commit acts of violence or to participate in the 
hostilities, this changes. 764  The results of such actions are, however, not well 
defined. Depending on the circumstances, journalists taking up weapons can 
                                                            
761 R Alley, “The Culture of Impunity: What journalists need to know about humanitarian law” (2010) 
16 Pacific Journalism Review, 78, pp. 84-86. 
762 The report, however, also confirmed it would not have been justified solely based on the argument 
that it was a propaganda tool. There was further discussion on the question of whether adequate 
warning should have been given before the bombing. 
763 ICTY (2000), paras. 72-74. 
764 Gasser (2003), p. 377. 
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constitute legitimate self-defence, for example, when defending themselves against a 
criminal act, or against an act which amounts to a war crime.765 Yet such an action 
can equally constitute direct participation in the hostilities when, for example, 
returning fire with military forces while under attack by combatants, in which case a 
claim to self-defence is not available.766 The assessment of the legal permissibility of 
returning fire and the consequences under the various legal frameworks must 
therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Restrictions may further be imposed 
by those providing logistical support. For example, neither the US Armed Forces, nor 
the British Ministry of Defence permit members of the media accredited to them to 
carry personal weapons.767 
 
Journalists are also increasingly making use of armed bodyguards when travelling 
through conflict zones.768 Simply being accompanied by armed guards does not 
make journalists a legitimate military target under IHL,769 but where such company 
actively fires on assailants, this blurs the line between reporters and combatants.770 In 
2003, for example, a CNN crew came under fire in Northern Iraq and their security 
escort responded with automatic weapons fire. This raised concerns amongst 
journalists as this goes against established practice of unarmed reporters and 
potentially gives of the wrong signal. 
 
With both the carrying of weapons and the use of armed guards the concerns lie not 
just with the legal loss of protection. Especially during non-international armed 
conflict, the distinction between fighters and civilians will not always be obvious. By 
directly or indirectly using weapons for protection, journalists are likely to at least 
create the perception that they are indeed part of the conflict, rather than impartial 
observers, which can endanger their lives. Journalists who are captured with armed 
                                                            
765 ICRC (2009), p. 64, stating that both individual self-defence and defence of others against violence 
prohibited under IHL does not constitute direct participation in the hostilities. 
766 Saul (2008), pp. 102-103. For a general discussion on civilians in conflict zones and self-defence v 
direct participations, see: Schmitt (2004-2005), pp. 538-539. 
767 Turner and Norton (2001), p. 23; UK Ministry of Defence, MoD Working Arrangements with the 
Media in Times of Emergency, Tension, Conflict or War (31 January 2013) Joint Service Publication 
580, version 8, para. 31. 
768 M Wilford, “The Big Story: Our embattled media” (Fall 2009) World Affairs, available at: 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/big-story-our-embattled-media.  
769 Gasser (2003), p. 377. 
770 Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin (2011), p. 590.  
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rebels or other participants in the conflict are often accused of supporting such 
groups, or even directly participating in the hostilities themselves.771 Such 
accusations may be much harder to fight if journalists are captured with weapons. 
While carrying weapons for protection, or being surrounded by those who do, may 
therefore not technically result in loss of civilian protection under the legal 
framework, it may still result in significant risks when captured and will increase. 




7.4 Consequences for the media 
 
As noted, some content can be so extreme that journalists become a direct participant 
in the hostilities and thus lose their protection from attack. But what are the 
consequences of such direct participation? 
 
When the journalists or media stations lose their protection from attack, this raises 
questions as to the duration of such loss. There is a general consensus that civilians 
regain their protection when they stop participating in the hostilities. The exact 
moment of finishing the act of ‘direct participation’ is up for debate, but regaining 
protection once it is done is not. Yet can journalists stop participating in the 
hostilities once they have started? The tone of the content they produce can change, 
but this is likely to be a gradual process, making it very difficult to determine when 
participation ends. If journalists can participate in the hostilities by publishing 
content that is so incendiary that it constitutes ‘direct participation’, can this really be 
seen as an individual act from which one can ‘return’ and resume civilian character? 
Researching, editing and other activities that are part of journalistic life are almost 
continuous, which makes the assessment of the duration for which they lose 
protection from attacks highly problematic. The consequences of this could be severe 
as it would leave journalists without civilian protection for much of the conflict. 
                                                            
771 See for example the case discussed in the previous chapter at para 6.2.4 of the two Swedish 
journalists arrested in Ethiopia who were accused of having received weapons training from the rebels 
they were travelling with.  
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Similar considerations can be made in terms of television and radio stations: is a 
single report crossing the line from propaganda to incitement to crimes enough to 
justify it becoming a military target and if content returns to ‘general’ propaganda 
afterwards? This is even more problematic given the difficulties of distinguishing 
permissible propaganda from propaganda which incites violence. Furthermore, when 
exactly is protection regained? With the next report? After several reports on the 
‘right’ side of the line? And can such protection be regained at all, as the influence of 
media content will likely continue long beyond the duration of a single report? There 
are no clear answers to these questions. 
 
It is clear there must be a provision concerning the loss of civilian protection for 
equipment and persons who make a direct contribution to the hostilities, to make it 
possible to target those who are directly contributing the fighting. The problem is 
that as it stands, it offers a rather convenient ‘get out’ clause for those targeting the 
media for reasons other than ‘direct participation’, which weakens the legal 
framework. The bombing of the Serbian State Television, for example, seemed more 
motivated by it being a symbol of the enemy regime, than by its actual functioning as 
military equipment.772 The wider we interpret the requirement of ‘direct 
participation’, the easier it will become to use this as a loophole in the legal 
framework protecting journalists in conflict zones. It seems likely that with the 
increasing permeation of media in society, the importance of winning the war for 
public opinion through the media is likely to increase, which in turn will only worsen 





Journalists receive significant protection under the international legal framework, yet 
this protection is negated where they are deemed to be directly participating in the 
hostilities. The consequences of such participation are therefore severe and can lead 
to loss of life, yet there is little clarity, or international consensus, on the exact scope 
                                                            
772 See for example: Fenrick (2001), pp. 496-497; Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin (2011), p. 592. 
773 Payne (2005), p. 92. 
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of ‘direct participation’. The specific situation of direct participation by the media is 
unfortunately no clearer.  
 
There currently seems to be a worrying trend of an increasing willingness to widen 
the scope of direct participation by the media to include the broadcasting of 
propaganda. This is disconcerting, as it is the start of a slippery slope where 
protection for the media can go downhill fast. Considering the dissemination of 
propaganda to constitute direct participation in the hostilities is further problematic 
as content constituting propaganda is not easily delineated. Is all biased reporting 
propaganda? If this is so, the next logical step would likely be that only those media 
that are neutral and report objectively and independently in a conflict cannot be 
targeted. But if this is the case, how do we define neutral and objective? Do we 
require it in single news reports, or should coverage overall be balanced and 
objective? Is it even possible to achieve such coverage in a conflict, where it may not 
be possible to gather all information necessary for such reports? Imposing such 
requirements on the media is at the very least dubious in terms of the right to 
freedom of expression, and wholly unpractical. It would further widen the scope of 
‘direct participation’ for the civilian population in general, if general support for the 
war effort were to constitute direct participation in the hostilities. Moreover, 
requiring the media to be neutral to receive protection under the international legal 
framework would run counter to the main principles of IHL, where it is a clear 
standard that those who do not actively engage in the hostilities cannot be targeted, 
not just those who hold a neutral position in the conflict.  
 
Overall, it must be emphasised that it is highly undesirable for states to consider 
media equipment a legitimate target during conflict. As discussed in chapters 3, 4 
and 5, there are significant efforts at the international level by a number of states and 
a variety of actors to improve protection for journalists in conflict zones. If these 
same states condone or even undertake bombing of media equipment during conflict, 
this sends a highly confusing message to those who are not fully aware of the legal 
framework and even to those who are. The message that journalists are independent 
observers and should under no circumstances be targeted for doing their job does not 
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sit well with the increasing targeting of media equipment during conflicts. While it 
may be necessary to stop the media from broadcasting in extreme cases such as the 
direct incitement to commit genocide in Rwanda, attacks should only be carried out 
in the most extreme cases. When attacks are carried out, they must be clearly 
motivated by evidence of dual use of media equipment, or clear evidence of ‘direct 
participation’ by journalists or broadcasters, that rises well above the level of 
propaganda. Propaganda has always been used during conflicts, by all sides, and to 
widen the scope of ‘direct participation’ to the broadcasting of propaganda exposes a 
previously restrictive legal category to the possibility of significant abuse.  
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The previous chapters have shown that while the legal framework provides 
significant protection for journalists working in conflict zones, there are situations 
journalists face which are not fully addressed by this legal framework. The legal 
framework as it currently stands is complicated and unclear on a number of points, 
which, especially when dealing with actors with limited legal expertise, can endanger 
journalist safety. The rising death toll amongst journalists is a serious concern for the 
international community and there have been numerous initiatives over the past few 
years aimed at enhancing the safety of journalists in conflict zones. The majority of 
these efforts are targeted at improving enforcement of the current legal framework. 
While impunity, “the failure to bring perpetrators of (human rights) violations to 
justice”,774  is one of the main issues endangering journalists, it is important not to 
lose sight of the improvements that could be made within the current legal 
framework, which could have a positive effect on journalist safety. As noted in 
chapter 5, one of the underlying causes for impunity is a lack of a clear and concise 
legal framework, as this affects how well the legal framework is known amongst 
different actors in conflict zones and therefore its application. While it may seem 
counter-intuitive to focus efforts on enhancing a legal framework which is often not 
observed in practice, clarifying and simplifying the legal framework could have a 
positive impact on its application. 
 
The main argument put forward in the academic literature against attempting to 
amend or supplement the current legal framework, concerns the general challenges 
associated with drafting international treaties.775 Achieving meaningful consensus on 
                                                            
774 UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” 
(27 March 2012) International Programme for the Development of Communication, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expres
sion/Safety_Report_by%20DG_2012.pdf), p. 29. 
775 This is perhaps best summarised by Davies and Crawford who note that: “the process of 
negotiating global agreement on international treaties is incrementally slow and can be hindered by 
distracting calls for actions that would better suit some minorities but are unlikely to gain broad 
support needed to ratify a legal instrument”. See: K Davies and E Crawford, “Legal Avenues for 
	  190	  
any issue by international treaty is a long and drawn out process. Yet it is not 
impossible and the potential positive effects of amending the international legal 
framework for the protection of journalists in conflict zones should not be discarded 
solely based on the perceived difficulties of such a project. As noted in chapter 6, it 
is encouraging that there is already a sufficient level of state practice and 
international support for ‘respect’ for journalists in conflict areas to have this become 
part of customary international law. This suggests that enhancing the protection 
currently available to journalists through the creation of a new legal instrument might 
not be as unattainable as is often suggested. 
 
While the current legal framework does offer significant protection, several issues 
remain which may affect its application and therefore the protection it offers to 
journalists in the field. A dedicated convention could address these concerns and 
clarify the current legal framework. The implementation of such a convention is not 
a new suggestion. Prior to the drafting of article 79 of Protocol I, there was 
significant consensus on the need for special protection for journalist under 
international law through a dedicated convention.776 This plan was abandoned in 
favour of including article 79, which states that journalists are civilians and should be 
treated as such, in Protocol I, as will be discussed below at 8.2. It may however be 
time to revisit the need for such a dedicated convention in light of the increasing 
death toll amongst journalists operating in conflict zones.  
 
There have been other attempts to create an international convention for the 
protection of journalists in conflict zones. Most notably, the previously 
mentioned  Press Emblem Campaign (PEC), a Geneva based NGO, published a 
Draft proposal for an International Convention to strengthen the protection of 
journalists in armed conflicts and other situations including civil unrest and targeted 
killings in 2007.777 The convention, largely based on IHRL rather than IHL, has not 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Ending Impunity for the Death of Journalists in Conflict Zones: Current and proposed international 
agreements” (2013) 7 International Journal of Communication, 2157, p. 2157. 
776 H-P Gasser, “Article 79 – Measures of Protection for Journalists”, in: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and 
B Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 3252. 
777 The draft convention is available at: http://www.pressemblem.ch/4983.html.  
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been taken up by an international body, but has received the support of a number of 
journalist unions and organisations, though some journalist organisations have 
rejected it.778 The proposal contained far reaching provisions, such as “Any State, 
whether party or not to an armed conflict, has the obligation to assist journalists in 
the line of duty giving them free access to information and all relevant documents 
and to facilitate their movements” (article 3) as well as compensation for victims of 
violence against journalists (article 9) and the creation of a protective emblem to 
identify journalists in conflict zones (article 7), especially the latter has proven highly 
controversial,779 as will be discussed below at 8.2.5. Generally speaking, it is a 
highly ambitious proposal, which, should it be taken forward,  is unlikely to achieve 
significant ratification at the international level due to its far reaching provisions but 
lessons can be learned from the work of the PEC. As discussed below at 8.2, a 
convention along the lines I consider would mirror IHL, rather than IHRL, to provide 
a more limited base line of protection for journalists, which should thus prove less 
controversial and have a better chance of being taken forward at the international 
level. 
 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the current issues which are not, or are 
inadequately addressed by the legal framework discussed in the previous chapters. It 
then considers the scope for addressing these issues through a dedicated convention 




8.1 Challenging the current legal framework 
 
The discussion in the previous chapters has flagged up several issues for journalists 
working in conflict zones, which are not adequately addressed by the legal 
framework. These issues can be summarised as follows:  
                                                            
778 For the full list see: PEC, “List of Journalists’ Syndicates and Organisations Supporting the PEC 
Campaign” (2014), available at: http://www.pressemblem.ch/4902.html.  
779 See generally: Davies and Crawford (2013), pp. 2167-2171. 
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• The lack of consistent rules and laws for the protection of journalists in 
international and non-international conflicts (see 8.1.1);  
• The different protection for different types of journalists such as war 
correspondents and ‘unilaterals’ (see 8.1.2); 
• The lack of a comfortable fit for journalists with the legal status of ‘ordinary’ 
civilians and for war correspondents with the legal status of prisoner of war 
when arrested or detained during conflict (see 8.1.3);  
• The lack of a clear legal concept of direct participation in the hostilities by 
journalists (see 8.1.4). 
It is possible to identify a number of (varied) reasons for these deficiencies in the 
current legal framework. Some originate from the historic development of IHL as 
well as the emphasis on the concept of State sovereignty within international law, 
while others have developed or have become more pronounced due to the changes 
that have taken place over the last few decades in the nature of warfare, 
communications technologies and journalistic practice. While all these points 
threaten the safety of journalists working in conflict zones, some also raise more 
general concerns, such as the needless complication of the legal framework, which is 
likely to affect the protection of journalists in practice and contribute to high levels 
of impunity. The limitations of the current legal framework could be addressed by 
the creation of a single, dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in 
conflict zones. Before I consider the scope for such a convention, I provide a short 
summary of those challenges that such a convention should aim to address. 
 
8.1.1 Lack of consistent laws between international and non-international 
conflicts 
As discussed throughout this thesis, international and non-international conflicts are 
subject to different legal frameworks, with the latter largely lacking detailed legal 
provisions. Consequently, there are significant differences between the protection 
journalists are entitled to in these different types of conflicts even though they are 
classed as civilians in both conflicts.  
 
War correspondents are subject to the most significant change in treatment 
depending on the type of conflict they cover. In international armed conflict they 
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receive specialised protection due to their proximity to the armed forces. When 
captured, war correspondents receive the status of prisoners of war and cannot be 
compelled to answer during questioning, nor can they be accused of being spies. 
While there are also downsides to this classification, as will be discussed in more 
detail at 8.1.3 below, it does provide additional protection over and above that 
received by journalists not accredited to the armed forces. This protection is, 
however, not available to war correspondents in non-international armed conflicts. 
During non-international armed conflict they will, at least in terms of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), only be protected by the basic provisions of common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949). While this article guarantees humane 
treatment, it provides little specific protection. This lack of detailed protection can 
have a significant impact on journalistic practice. Over the past decade, embedding 
with military units has become a relatively popular method of covering conflict. Yet 
this becomes effectively impossible in non-international armed conflicts due to the 
lack of protection upon capture. Embedded journalists are likely to have access to 
significant sensitive information about the armed forces they accompany, which 
makes them an attractive source of information, leaving them vulnerable without the 
benefit of additional protection. A further problem arises when journalists wish to 
‘embed’ with a non-state party to the conflict. This is essentially impossible due to 
the lack of protection covering conflict in this way. When captured by government 
forces they could be considered part of the group of non-state actors they are 
travelling with and be subject to full prosecution under domestic law, which is likely 
to include charges such as treason and terrorism, all carrying significant sentences.780 
 
The protection for independent journalists is less subject to change between covering 
international and non-international conflicts. This is because they are classed and 
treated as civilians in both types of conflict without any additional protection over 
and above that offered to other civilians. While war correspondents are equally 
classed as civilians, they do receive additional protection as set out above during 
international conflict. Independent journalists receive no such additional protection 
during international conflict, and they therefore mostly suffer in non-international 
                                                            
780 This is essentially what happened to the two Swedish journalists who were arrested for covering 
the conflict in Ethiopia from the rebel side, see the discussion in para 6.2.4. 
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conflict from the same absence of detailed protection that all civilians suffer from in 
non-international armed conflict.  
 
As previously discussed, the regulation of non-international armed conflicts suffers 
from a lack of coherent rules. These conflicts are therefore generally governed by 
provisions of customary law based on rules applicable in international armed 
conflict, supplemented by IHRL and ICL. Yet gaps remain, largely due to the 
problems that arise from applying norms to non-state actors that are designed to 
apply to states.781 Especially those journalists who would fall into the category of 
‘protected person’ under Geneva Convention IV (1949) receive far less detailed 
protection during non-international armed conflict. There is, for example, no treaty 
provision applicable during non-international conflict equivalent to article 31, which 
protects journalists and other civilians who qualify as protected persons from 
physical or moral coercion to give up information.782 Article 79, the only provision in 
the Geneva Conventions to directly address journalists, by confirming they are 
civilians and should be protected as such, is also not reflected in treaty based law 
concerning non-international armed conflict. The article is however reflected in 
customary law,783 which ensures that independent journalists do receive relatively 
similar protection in both types of conflict. 
 
The lack of consistent protection in the two different types of conflict is undesirable 
for the following two reasons. First, one of the main concerns is that non-
international conflicts are now the norm rather than the exception and the threat, for 
journalists, posed by non-state actors is increasing.784 Yet these conflicts are covered 
by a significantly less detailed legal framework than international armed conflicts. 
Second, some common journalistic practice, such as embedding, is not covered by 
                                                            
781 S Sivakumaran, “Re-Envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict” (2011) 22 
European Journal of International Law, 219. For a more detailed discussion on this see chapters 3 and 
4 of this thesis. 
782 Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture 
are however prohibited under common art. 3. 
783 J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 661-670. 
784 UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” 
(27 March 2012) International Programme for the Development of Communication, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expres
sion/Safety_Report_by%20DG_2012.pdf, p. 33. 
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the legal framework for non-international armed conflict. This limits war 
correspondents from covering non-international conflict in this way, or at least 
causes them to face significant risks when doing so. While they can still risk 
embedding with state actors in such conflicts, as this would at least largely eliminate 
the risk of being charged under domestic law for criminal offences, embedding with 
non-state actors is likely to be too dangerous.  This could in theory lead to 
unbalanced reporting due to reduced access to one of the sides of the conflict, which 
could affect the appearance of independence of the journalists in question. 
 
8.1.2 Different protection for different types of journalists 
Related to the problems caused by receiving varying levels of protection during 
different types of conflicts, is that the protection awarded by the international legal 
framework is not uniform for all journalists. Depending on the type of journalist, as 
well as nationality as interpreted under Geneva Convention IV, there are significant 
differences in treatment under the legal framework. These differences are most 
pronounced upon capture, when war correspondents are treated as prisoners of war 
whereas ‘independent’ journalists are treated as civilians. But nationality also 
impacts significantly on the available protection. The protection is strongest for those 
journalists that qualify through their nationality as a ‘protected person’ under Geneva 
Convention IV785 and the protection is weakest under international law for those 
journalists who are nationals of the state they operate in. Here the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) only provide the basic protection for the local civilian population 
and otherwise assume the domestic legal system is capable of providing the required 
protection, supplemented by any relevant IHRL. 
 
The lack of consistent protection for different types of journalists and different 
nationalities poses several challenges. The specific difficulties with the various 
classifications under the legal framework will be discussed in the next paragraph, but 
the overall concept of differing protection is undesirable from an enforcement point 
of view. Violence against journalists, as well as unlawful detention suffers from a 
                                                            
785 Basically, those who find themselves in a State that is party to the conflict and are nationals from a 
belligerent State, or are from a state which no longer maintains normal diplomatic representation in 
the state in whose hands they are, as well as the inhabitants of occupied territories. For a more detailed 
discussion see: para. 6.2.1 of this thesis. 
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high level of impunity, as discussed in chapter 5. One of the underlying causes for 
impunity is a lack of awareness of the relevant legal framework. The more 
complicated this framework is, the harder it is likely to be to spread awareness of the 
relevant legal provisions. While the basic lines can be relatively easily 
communicated, it is for example rarely permissible to directly target a journalist, yet 
even for this rule there are exceptions, and upon capture the situation becomes 
significantly more complicated. As noted, modern conflicts increasingly involve one 
or more non-state actors. These actors are likely to have little expertise in matters of 
international law and may feel in general that international legal obligations do not 
apply to them. The more varied and complicated the legal provisions are, the more 
difficult it will be to communicate these provisions and spread awareness of them. 
Actors will therefore likely be less aware of a complicated legal framework, as well 
as their obligation to apply such a framework, which can seriously hamper the 
effectiveness of the legal provisions in question. 
 
8.1.3 Status of journalists under the legal framework 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 6, war correspondents are entitled to the status of 
prisoner of war, which provides additional protection over and above that of civilian 
detainees. Aside from the specific additional protection offered by the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) set out above, it lessens the significant risk of prosecution under 
domestic law. Yet it also has a significant drawback. Prisoner of war status is 
specifically aimed at removing actors from a conflict for the duration of that conflict, 
which can be highly undesirable for journalists, who will essentially be stopped from 
reporting on a conflict and prevented from returning home until the conflict is over. 
The underlying rationale for prisoner of war status does not sit well with the function 
journalists perform during conflict. While it makes sense to stop enemy fighters from 
re-joining their ranks, enabling them to attack again, this simply does not apply to 
journalists who do not partake in the fighting. It may be necessary to detain 
journalists during military operations for security reasons, but this is likely only 
necessary for a limited period of time and not for the duration of the conflict. 
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The classification of independent journalists as ‘ordinary’ civilians is also an 
uncomfortable fit. As discussed in more detail in chapter 6, the protection journalists 
are entitled to will differ depending on nationality, but will, at the very least, cover 
protection from murder, torture, corporal punishment and mutilation, outages upon 
personal dignity, the taking of hostages, collective punishments and threat to do any 
of the aforementioned.786 Yet this leaves journalists vulnerable to accusations under 
domestic law concerning, for example, treason or espionage. The problem here is 
that journalists do not behave like ordinary civilians in conflict zones. Their 
behaviour whilst ‘doing their job’ can easily, in any number of ways, attract attention 
and suspicion by all sides of the conflict. For instance, when they collect significant 
amounts of information, likely from both sides of the conflict, or when they seek 
access to areas which ordinary civilians are unlikely to wish to enter, for example 
battlegrounds. This type of behaviour is likely to result in charges under domestic 
law of varying degrees of seriousness. Yet IHL provides no protection against this, 
while the protection under IHRL is likely to be limited due to derogations, as well as 
the fact that IHRL can be difficult to enforce before domestic courts. As noted by 
Hackett, co-director of NewsWatch Canada: “In war time, media are not mere 
observers but simultaneously a source of intelligence, a combatant, a weapon, a 
target, and a battlefield”.787 The protection granted to civilians therefore only partly 
covers the risk journalists are exposed to in conflict zones and this lack of 
comprehensive protection can significantly endanger their lives. 
 
Overall, journalists simply not easily conform to any of the available categories 
under IHL. While war correspondents may travel with combatants, they are not 
taking part in the hostilities, as recognised by the current legal framework, and they 
simply do not pose the same risks to a belligerent as combatants. Consequently, to be 
treated as one upon capture poses difficulties for them. Similarly, the behaviour of 
independent journalists does not equate to the behaviour of ‘ordinary’ civilians in 
conflict zones, exposing them to dangers the legal framework does not sufficiently 
take into account.  
                                                            
786 Art. 75 Protocol I. 
787 RA Hackett, “Journalism versus Peace? Notes on a problematic relationship” (2007) 2 Global 
Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition, 47, p. 48. 
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8.1.4 Lack of a clear concept of direct participation in hostilities by journalists 
The current legal framework, when enforced, provides significant protection to 
journalists. This protection can however be lost completely when journalists are 
deemed to be ‘directly participating’ in the hostilities. This happens if journalists are 
deemed to be making a direct contribution to the fighting, which in turn will make 
them legitimate targets under international law. While the consequences of direct 
participation are obviously severe, there is no clear internationally accepted 
definition of ‘direct participation’. 
 
While some discussion remains concerning the use of weapons and armed security 
teams for self-defence purposes, the permissibility of which will have to be judged 
on a case by case basis, most of the discussion concentrates on direct participation by 
journalists through the content they produce. It is generally accepted that the media 
do indeed have the power to directly contribute to the hostilities under certain 
circumstances, but significant discussion remains on the type of content and message 
that must be produced to qualify as direct participation. A significant majority of 
legal documents and courts maintain that the production and broadcasting of 
‘general’ propaganda, which does not incite the commission of crimes and violence 
in a conflict, does not constitute direct participation in the hostilities by journalists, 
nor does it make those media stations broadcasting such content legitimate military 
targets, as discussed in the previous chapter. The assessment of the line between 
permissible and impermissible propaganda is however very difficult to draw and can 
only be done on a case by case assessment, which does not improve legal certainty in 
this area. In practice, there seem to be increasing instances where the position is 
taken that the consistent spread of any form of propaganda, especially where it 
concerns misinformation rather than biased information, is considered to make a 
direct contribution to the hostilities, which turns journalists and media stations into 
legitimate targets.788 Over the past few years television and radio stations have thus 
increasingly become targets in the fighting, the permissibility of which, under the 
legal framework, has often been, at best, questionable. 
                                                            
788 See the cases discussed in chapter 7. 
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The main issue with this increasing willingness to extend the scope of the concept of 
direct participation in hostilities by journalists is that this opens the legal framework 
to significant abuse. It increases the opportunities to attack both media stations and 
journalists which publish or broadcast an ‘inconvenient’ message to the belligerent 
parties. It further sends a highly confusing message to those involved in a conflict. 
On the one hand, the international community strongly denounces any type of 
violence against journalists who are simply performing their job in conflict zones and 
in other dangerous situations, while, on the other hand, many of those same countries 
are targeting media equipment during conflicts. At the very least this impacts 
negatively on the clarity of the message that journalists are mere observers and 
should not be subject to violence, which in turn has the potential to significantly 
increase impunity levels. 
 
 
8.2 A dedicated convention for the protection of journalists 
 
The suggestion that journalists would benefit from a dedicated international 
instrument to ensure their protection in conflict zones has long been the subject of 
academic debate. Article 79 of Protocol I, which states that journalists are civilians 
and shall be protected as such, was based on the Draft United Nations Convention on 
the Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed 
Conflict of 1975.789 This convention was drafted by the UN in response to the 
disappearance of seventeen foreign correspondents in Cambodia in 1970.790 While 
the majority of the government experts consulted at the time were in favour of 
providing special protection for journalists by international treaty, the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights suggested that the protection should be included in 
international humanitarian law, rather than a special convention.791  The arguments 
for this were that it would be quicker and more effective and would have the added 
                                                            
789 UNESCO, New Communication Order 4: Protection of journalists (Paris: UNESCO, 1985). 
790 Ibid, p. 2.  
791 H-P Gasser, “Article 79 – Measures of Protection for Journalists”, in: Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and 
B Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 3252.  
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advantage of ensuring journalists were made fully aware of IHL. 792 However, the 
resulting article 79 does not provide any additional protection to journalists over and 
above that of ordinary civilians as it merely confirms journalists are civilians and 
should be protected as such and consequently does not provide any of the benefits of 
the detailed provisions concerning, for example, medical staff in the Conventions of 
1949. 
 
Including protection for journalists in the main body of law governing armed 
conflict, the Geneva Conventions (1949), certainly has its benefits, but there are also 
drawbacks. Due to the nature of the Geneva Conventions the protection offered to 
journalists is of a generic nature that does not always match their specific 
circumstances. As noted, while journalists are civilians, they do often not behave as 
‘ordinary’ civilians in conflict territories. The Geneva Conventions are further not 
concerned with ensuring that journalists are able to carry out their professional 
activities, nor do they consider some of the specific risks that are inherent to the 
journalistic profession. They do not, for example, mention the right to freedom of 
speech, or a right to access conflict territories for professional purposes.  
 
8.2.1 Special status for journalists 
The creation of a dedicated international convention for the protection of journalists 
would create a special status for journalists under the international legal framework 
which sets them apart from ‘ordinary’ civilians and much of the discussion 
surrounding the creation of a new convention has focussed on this. At the moment 
religious, medical and civil defence personnel have a special status under IHL.793 
They must be protected and respected at all times and special conditions cover their 
detention. While journalists are sometimes included in the groups of people who 
receive special status under the Geneva Conventions, due to being specifically 
                                                            
792 ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, 
CDDH/I/Sr 31, Para. 11. As most of the work on the drafting of art. 79 was done by a working group 
which only supplied a short report on procedural matters, little is known of the discussion at this stage. 
793 As well as, to a certain extent, Red Cross personnel. See for example: Artt. 24-32 Geneva 
Convention I. 
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named in article 79 of Protocol I,794 this is unhelpful as it suggest journalists receive 
more protection than they actually do. The provisions concerning medical and 
religious staff confer specific rights on this group, over and above those of ordinary 
civilians, such as treatment as prisoners of war, but they cannot be forced to perform 
work outside their medical or religious duties and they must be returned to their own 
party to the conflict as soon as possible, which ensures they cannot simply be 
detained until the end of the conflict.795 Independent journalists on the other hand 
receive no such special consideration and are granted only the ‘confirmation’ that 
they are civilian and should be treated as such. While they therefore are specifically 
named they do not really have a special status under the Conventions.  
 
The most frequently cited argument against opening up the limited group of persons 
who currently receive special protection under the Geneva Conventions (1949) to a 
wider category of people is that any extension of such protection is likely to weaken 
the protection for the existing categories.796 However, the mere fact that adding a 
category to those who receive special status under the Geneva Conventions might 
impact the protection offered to the currently protected groups should not be a reason 
to withhold protection to a group who may be in need of such protection.797 
 
The second most frequently cited argument against granting a special status to 
journalist under IHL is that the only groups of persons currently privy to such a 
status are providing direct humanitarian assistance to the local civilian population. It 
is often argued that journalists do not provide such direct assistance and should 
                                                            
794 See for example: ICRC, “Other Protected Persons: Humanitarian workers, journalists, medical and 
religious personnel - overview” (29 October 2010), available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/protected-persons/other-protected-persons/overview-other-protected-persons.htm; G Verchingel, 
“Towards a better Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts” (2008-2009) 45 Juridica Falconis, 
435, p. 435. 
795 Artt. 28-30 Geneva Convention I and equivalent provisions in Geneva Convention II, IV and 
Protocol I.   
796 See for example H-P Gasser, “The Protection of Journalists engaged in Dangerous Professional 
Missions” (1983) 23 International Review of the Red Cross, 3, p. 10. 
797 This argument was similarly made by the Venezuelan delegate during the drafting process, see: 
ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, 
CDDH/I/Sr 35, Para. 4 (hereafter CDDH/I/Sr 35). 
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therefore not be included in this group.798 This is however open to debate. Journalists 
do perform an important function in conflict zones, which, while not providing direct 
assistance to the civilian population, indirectly may provide significant assistance. 
The previous chapter has considered the power of the media in terms of exerting 
political pressure and influencing policy and strategy. As noted, the media do not 
have unlimited power in this context, but they can be an important influencer. 
Journalists can often be the last observers left in a conflict zone.799 They witness the 
atrocities of conflict and, unfortunately more often than not, violations of IHL.  
Reporting such situations to their potentially world-wide audiences allows the public 
to be informed and political decisions to be made. If there are no observers, there is 
less pressure to respect IHL, which is likely to impact negatively on the civilian 
population.800 As stated by Alan Modoux, former head of information for the ICRC 
and senior advisor for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) on communication and information: “I am convinced that 
public opinion, conditioned by the media, is an excellent means of bringing pressure 
to bear on belligerents and is capable of favourably modifying the attitude of 
combatants to victims protected by humanitarian law”.801  
 
While journalists therefore provide no direct assistance to civilians, indirectly they 
may certainly contribute to the protection of the local population caught up in a 
conflict. This does of course not apply universally to all journalists, as there will be 
journalists who are only producing propaganda for their government and are not 
interested in reporting on humanitarian crimes. But journalists taken as a group do 
carry out this important function of reporting a conflict to an international audience 
who cannot observe it for themselves, which is why the international community is 
                                                            
798 See for example: H-P Gasser, “The Journalist’s Right to Information in Time of War and on 
Dangerous Missions” (2003) 5 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 366, p. 380; A 
Mukherjee, “International Protection of Journalists: Problems, practice and prospects” (1994) 11 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 339, p. 436; I Düsterhöft, “The Protection of 
Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How can they be better safeguarded?” (2013) 29 Merkourios, 4, p. 18. 
799 S Kagan and H Durham, “The Media and International Humanitarian Law: Legal protection for 
journalists” (2010) 16 Pacific Journalism Review, 96, pp. 96-97.  
800 Alley further argues that a lack of reporting conflicts to wider audiences may in fact prolong such 
conflicts, thus lengthening the suffering of the local civilian population. See: R Alley, “The Culture of 
Impunity: What journalists need to know about humanitarian law” (2010) 16 Pacific Journalism 
Review, 78, p. 79. 
801 A Modoux, “International Humanitarian Law and the Journalists’ Mission” (1983) 23 International 
Review of the Red Cross, 19, p. 20. 
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concerned about their safety. Furthermore, special status is awarded by the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) to those whose assignment exposes them to great risk, such as 
military and civilian medical personnel and civil defence staff.802 It can certainly be 
argued that journalists’ assignments expose them to similar risks, especially in light 
of the rising death toll amongst journalists in conflict zones. 
 
A third argument against creating a special status for journalists under international 
law is that this would require a definition of the term ‘journalist’ in order to identify 
who would be entitled to such protection. There is currently no international 
universally accepted definition of the term ‘journalist’ and different countries define 
the term in different ways. This makes the inclusion of a definition in an international 
treaty problematic. The current definition used as the basis for article 79 of the 
Geneva Conventions is: “any correspondent, reporter, photographer, and their 
technical film, radio and television assistants who are ordinarily engaged in these 
activities as their principal occupation”.803 This definition would likely not be ideal 
as it stems from a different era of reporting and precludes those for whom journalism 
is not their principal occupation, such as some free-lancers as well as all ‘citizen 
journalists’. The convention proposed by the PEC uses a different definition. This 
draft convention defines journalists in the preamble as “all civilians who work as 
reporters, correspondents, photographers, cameramen, graphic artists, and their 
assistants in the fields of the print media, radio, film, television and the electronic 
media (Internet), who carry out their activities on a regular basis, full time or part 
time, whatever their nationality, gender and religion”. This reflects the 
recommendation of Article 19, a human rights organisation for the defence of 
freedom of information and expression, which recommends that “the term 
‘journalist’ should be broad, to include any natural or legal person who is regularly 
or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to the 
public via any means of mass communication.”804 While defining the term 
‘journalist’ would be difficult, it would not be impossible, though it would require 
                                                            
802 Gasser (2003), p. 379. 
803 Art. 2a Draft United Nations Convention on the Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous 
Missions in Areas of Armed Conflict, 1 August 1975, UN Document A/10147, Annex 1.  
804 Article 19, “The Right to Blog – Policy Brief” (2013), p. 2, available at: 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3733/Right-to-Blog-EN-WEB.pdf.  
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important choices to be made in terms of who to include in the protective scope of a 
dedicated convention, as discussed further below at 8.2.3. 
 
8.2.2 Material field of application 
Addressing the field of application of a convention for the protection of journalists, 
raises the question which situations should be covered? Given the standard 
dichotomy between international and non-international armed conflict in IHL, can a 
convention realistically cover both situations? 
 
Non-international armed conflict 
As discussed at length in chapters 3 and 4, the current legal framework covering non-
international armed conflict is fairly limited and though advances have been made 
over the past few decades in terms of applicable customary law, these conflicts are 
still only covered by basic legal norms. While there have been calls to remove the 
distinction between international and non-international armed conflict under IHL,805 
to do so would require a major overhaul of the current legal framework in its 
entirety, which is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Achieving stronger and more 
consistent protection for journalists operating in different types of conflict would 
therefore be more practical and achievable through a dedicated convention 
concerning the protection of journalists applicable to armed conflict in all settings. 
While this would not be without controversy, in theory non-state actors would be 
bound by such a convention through a variety of legal theories. Either they would be 
bound through ‘legislative jurisdiction’, which presumes non-state actors are bound 
by obligations accepted by the government of the state in which they fight, or the 
‘principle of effectiveness’ which presumes that any party wielding effective power 
in the territory of a state is bound by the state’s obligations. 806 Furthermore they can 
be bound where international rules are implemented into national legislation, or 
                                                            
805 See for an overview of this discussion: R Bartels, “Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts” (2009) 91 
International Review of the Red Cross, 35; see further for example: JG Stewart, “Towards a Single 
Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A critique of internationalized 
armed conflict” (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross, 313; D Willmott, “Removing the 
Distinction between International and Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court” (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law (online).  
806 M Sassòli, ‘Transnational armed groups and international humanitarian law’, HPCR Occasional 
Paper Series, Winter 2006:6, p. 12. See further the discussion under 3.1.3 of this thesis. 
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direct applicability of self-executing international rules.807. Common article 3 which 
applies to non-international armed conflict already binds to a certain degree parties 
which have not themselves signed up to the Geneva Conventions, where they are 
party to the conflict, as discussed in detail in chapter 3. They are bound through their 
state, whose signing of an international convention automatically binds all 
individuals under its jurisdiction.808 While this principle is not without controversy, 
the general argument against extending legal provisions concerning international 
armed conflict to non-international armed conflict, is that this tends to be problematic 
as non-state actors do not have the same capabilities and resources as states. This is 
partly why the provisions concerning non-international armed conflicts are more 
limited.809 The suggested provisions for the protection of journalists, discussed in 
detail below, are however of such a basic nature that there would be relatively few 
obstacles to application by non-state actors as it predominantly involves humane 
treatment and non-targeting provisions.  Extending the protection of the convention 
to non-international armed conflict is therefore both practical and would significantly 
improve on the lack of detailed provisions concerning the protection of journalists in 
non-international armed conflict. 
 
Internal disturbances or tensions and other violence 
Including non-international armed conflict in the scope of a new convention raises 
the question whether to include situations of international violence which do not 
meet the threshold of non-international armed conflict under the Geneva 
Conventions (1949). For conflict to be classed as non-international armed conflict to 
which common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies, there must be 
“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”810 Where the threshold is not met, the 
                                                            
807 Ibid. 
808 Pictet (1960), p. 34; Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, “Empowered Groups, 
Tested Laws, and Policy Options: The challenges of transnational and non-state armed groups”, 
Report on an Interdisciplinary Seminar on transnational and non-state armed groups (November 
2007), available at: 
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Report_Empowered_Groups_Nov2007.pd
f, p. 32. 
809 Note, however, that customary law does bind non-state actors to a significant extent. 
810 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić , Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para.70. 
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violence is classed as ‘internal disturbances or tensions’, as discussed in chapter 3 of 
this thesis. There is little reason why a dedicated convention should not include 
situations which do not meet the common article 3 threshold in its application, 
presuming the norms contained in such a convention can be applied by all types of 
actors. The dangers posed to journalists in situations of ‘internal disturbances or 
tensions’ are often similar, if not identical, to those in armed conflict. This further 
decreases the need to discuss whether a certain level of violence is reached or 
whether the required level of organisation exists within the armed non-state actor to 
trigger the application of the convention.811 A dedicated convention should therefore 
aim for a wide scope of application which is exactly what the PEC is seeking to 
achieve with its draft convention, which applies in “armed conflicts and other 
situations including civil unrest and targeted killings”.812 
 
8.2.3 Defining journalists 
A dedicated convention concerning the protection of journalists in conflict zones is 
unlikely to be able to function without providing a definition of journalists. 
Consequently decisions must be made in terms of how ‘journalists’ should be 
defined. For example, should only professional journalists be included in its scope or 
should it extend to citizen journalists? 
 
Functional definition 
As discussed above, there is no single universally accepted definition of the term 
‘journalist’ in international law. Any convention will therefore need to define exactly 
to who it applies. There is much to say for the ‘functional’ definition as advised by 
Article 19. This ensures the inclusion of both part-time, full-time, free-lancers and 
permanently employed journalists. It is further important to specifically include those 
who are not directly reporting news, but are operating in a supportive role, such as 
cameramen and technicians, as is done in the PEC draft convention and to a 
                                                            
811 See for example:  ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić , Judgement (Trial Chamber), 7 May 
1997, paras. 561-568; ICTY Prosecutor v Boskoski, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 
175. 
812 Art. 1 PEC draft convention states that its field of application shall include international armed 
conflict, non-international armed conflict and “cases of serious internal violence, which includes local 
conflicts, civil unrest, targeted killings, kidnapping, authorized and unauthorized demonstrations”. 
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significant extent by the Geneva Conventions (1949). They generally face the same 
risks as the journalists they support and accompany and fulfil and equally important 
function for the general public, as they play an important role in ensuring the 
dissemination of information.  
 
Citizen journalists 
An important question that remains is whether or not to include citizen journalists in 
a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in conflict zones. While the 
initial reaction is clearly towards including them, especially in the light of the 
increasingly important role they play in ensuring the public receives information 
from territories which are difficult to report from by the main-stream media, their 
inclusion would unfortunately be problematic. It is notoriously difficult to delineate 
between an ‘ordinary’ civilian and a citizen journalist. Those citizen journalists who 
run popular blogs or other media sites and regularly post content can still be 
relatively easily identified, but those who only occasionally function as a citizen 
journalists are much harder to separate from ‘ordinary’ civilians, as this applies to a 
large section of the modern population. Including all citizen journalists in the scope 
of a new convention would significantly blur the lines between ‘ordinary’ civilians 
and journalists who are performing a public function in conflict zones and are 
therefore entitled to and in need of special protection. Especially in an age where 
most people have smartphones, including all citizen journalists in a definition of 
‘journalist’ would mean that the simple act of filming an event on your smartphone 
with the intention of disseminating it online would result in special protection under 
the legal framework, which is not practical or realistic in terms of enforcement. It is 
further likely to lead to a lower ratification rate as such a provision significantly 
interferes in the relationship between a state and their citizens.  
 
Yet excluding citizen journalists altogether in an age where they are starting to play 
an increasingly influential role is also not ideal. This concern can be partly addressed 
by including in any definition of ‘journalist’ the requirement that they are “regularly 
or professionally engaged”, as suggested by Article 19 or “carry out their activities 
on a regular basis” as suggested by the PEC. This ensures that not all civilians 
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holding up a camera phone will find themselves within the scope of a dedicated 
treaty, which would likely lead to significant resistance from a number of 
governments and reduce the value of such a treaty, while it also ensures that those 
citizen journalists who carry out significant journalistic tasks on a regular basis and 
therefore both perform the same function in society as professionally engaged 
journalists and face many of the same risks those journalists do, are protected under 
the legal framework. 
 
8.2.4 Harmonising protection for journalists 
The major advantage of creating a dedicated convention for the protection of 
journalists in conflict zones is that it could address some of the current gaps in the 
legal framework, while harmonising protection for different types of journalists of 
different nationalities. Reporters without Borders stated in its 2003 Declaration on 
the Safety of Journalists and Media Personnel in Situations of Armed Conflict that 
“journalists have a right to identical protection regardless of their professional status 
(..), of their nationality, and of whether or not they are taken off into an 
accompaniment system” which is simply currently not the case under the legal 
framework and should be addressed. A dedicated convention can be tailored to the 
specific situation of journalists in conflict zones, rather than the general behaviour of 
civilians as is the case with the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. 
By creating a single relatively straightforward convention containing protection that 
applies to all types of journalists, regardless of their nationality, it is possible to 
clarify and reduce the rather complicated current situation to basic norms that can be 
easily communicated to state, and more importantly, non-state actors. This could in 
turn improve observance of the legal framework in practice and combat impunity.  
 
Mirroring IHL 
The content of such a convention should closely mirror current IHL,813 both treaty 
and customary law, which could lead to potentially higher levels of ratification of the 
convention than if subject matter completely new to IHL, and likely controversial, 
                                                            
813 This has been similarly suggested by Balguy-Gallois, one of the few supporters of the creation of a 
dedicated convention for the protection of journalists. See: A Balguy-Gallois, “The Protection of 
Journalists and News Media in Armed Conflicts” (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross, 
37. 
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were to be included. This is well demonstrated by the UN’s attempts at securing 
international protection for journalists in the early1950s through a dedicated 
convention, which failed to achieve political consensus as it contained the Western 
liberal view on freedom of information, which was strongly opposed by the Soviet 
countries at the time.814 While there are relevant issues that are currently not covered 
by IHL, such as access to territory and other issues closer related to human rights 
which can affect the ability of journalists to perform their professional activities, it 
would be best to leave such issues outside the scope of a new convention and address 
these at a later stage, once the physical protection of journalists is better guaranteed 
than it currently is.815  
 
What we are concerned with here is strictly the physical safety of journalists and it is 
suggested that the content of any future treaty proposal should be limited to this 
subject matter, as it can form a solid basis, on which further protection can be build. 
An additional advantage of such an approach is that it is more likely to be able to 
include protection for local journalists without raising significant concerns 
surrounding state sovereignty, as it would not confer on them any additional powers, 
only stronger protection from violence.816  
 
Unifying protection at the strongest level 
How the current differential treatment under the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols should be harmonised into a single regime suitable for all 
journalists is, however, no easy matter to resolve. In terms of the different treatment 
based on nationality the answer can be relatively straightforward. It would be most 
beneficial for journalists to receive the protection awarded to ‘protected persons’ 
under Geneva Convention IV, as this provides the most detailed protection and 
removes the over-reliance on diplomatic relations, in which factors other than simple 
                                                            
814 For more detail, see for example: Mukherjee (1994), p. 348. 
815 As noted, this is one of the main issues with the PEC draft convention, which is much more 
ambitious in this sense as it includes, as noted above, provisions such as: free access to information 
and to some extent movement (art. 3), a guarantee of operational internet services (art. 2) and 
compensation for victims of violence against journalists (art. 9) all which are likely to prove 
controversial in at least some cultures. 
816 While any inclusion of local journalists would affect the relationship between a state and their own 
citizens, by limiting the inclusion of any rights which are not necessarily available to all journalists 
everywhere there is likely to be less resistance to the implementation of such a convention. 
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concern for the safety of journalists can play a role. This is also likely to encounter 
relatively little resistance as none of the additional protection granted to ‘protected 
persons’ is controversial; it simply offers more detailed protection than that granted 
to ‘ordinary’ civilians to make up for the anticipated inability of the state to provide 
protection to its citizens on foreign (hostile) soil. Aside from removing the 
differences in protection based on nationality which complicate the detailed 
application of the current framework, it would extend the protection of article 31 of 
Geneva Convention IV, against physical or moral coercion to give up information, to 
all journalists in conflict zones, which would, at least in theory, provide valuable 
protection suited to their function.  
 
If all journalists regardless of their nationality receive the protection afforded to 
‘protected persons’ upon arrest, this ensures that when journalists are detained for 
security reasons without penal charges, they can have this decision reviewed ‘as soon 
as possible’ by an appropriate court or administrative board and there is thus limited 
scope to detain journalists long-term without charges.817 When penal charges are 
brought against journalists, protection can be derived from provisions concerning fair 
trial. While this does not necessarily protect journalists from excessive charges under 
domestic law, it does in theory at least provide reasonable protection especially in 
combination with IHRL.  
 
War correspondents  
The issue of the different regimes applicable to independent journalists and war 
correspondents when detained is more complicated to resolve, as both types of 
journalists operate in different circumstances. The prisoner of war status for war 
correspondents would be best left as is, and reiterated in a dedicated convention, as 
any changes would require a revision of the Geneva Conventions, which is not 
practical, and the current provisions do not pose a significant risk to war 
correspondents. The most significant drawback to prisoner of war status, detention 
until the end of the conflict, is however neither warranted nor desirable for war 
correspondents. It would therefore be advisable to address this issue by including a 
                                                            
817 Art. 43 Geneva Convention IV. Where a court does decide internment is necessary this decision 
must be reviewed at least twice a year.  
	   211	  
provision in a dedicated convention equivalent to that of medical and religious 
personnel, stating that while war correspondents are entitled to prisoner of war status 
under article 4A(4) Geneva Convention III (1949) they should be returned to their 
own nation as soon as practical. This would remove this concern and would bring 
their treatment more on a par with those currently having a special status under the 
Geneva Conventions. While this solution would not result in a truly single 
harmonised framework that treats all journalists the same, it would provide a base 
line of protection which is equal for all journalists in both international and non-
international conflicts, with additional protection available to those accredited to the 
armed forces during international armed conflict.818  
 
8.2.5 Protective emblem 
Should a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists include a means of 
identifying those journalists in the field, for example through the use of a protective 
emblem? This suggestion was put forward during the drafting stages of Protocol I,819 
but was rejected at the time. The argument in favour of the adoption of a protective 
emblem was that it would allow the identification of journalists in the chaos of 
combat, when checking identity cards would not be practical, which would protect 
them from ‘accidental’ targeting due to misidentification.820 The objections voiced 
by several delegates at the time were twofold: as journalists receive civilian 
protection under the Geneva Convention there is no reason to distinguish them from 
the civilian population; and secondly, making journalists identifiable might actually 
increase the risks they face in conflict zones, because it would draw attention to 
them.821 While the first concern would no longer be relevant if journalists were to 
receive protection over and above that of civilians, the second argument is still 
                                                            
818 Extending prisoner of war protection to accredited war correspondents during non-international 
armed conflict would be desirable, but is unlikely to be practical as there generally is no prisoner of 
war status during non-international armed conflict. By extending the protection of ‘protected persons’ 
to journalists in non-international armed conflict war correspondents in non-international conflicts 
will at least be entitled to protection which is significantly similar to the protection of war 
correspondents in international conflict. 
819 ICRC, “Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, Geneva (1947-1977), Vol. VIII, 
CDDH/I/Sr 31, Para. 24. 
820 CDDH/I/Sr 35, para 3. 
821 Ibid, paras. 8 and 14. Journalists themselves were also not universally in favour of wearing a 
protective emblem, which was seen as an argument against its implementation, see paras. 10, 12 and 
14. 
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relevant in contemporary discussion on the issue and must be looked at it in more 
detail. 
 
The discussion surrounding the need and desirability of a protective emblem for 
journalists has recently been renewed with the PEC’s proposed convention for the 
protection of journalists, which includes the introduction of a press emblem similar 
to the emblem currently worn by Red Cross personnel in conflict zones.822 The 
convention does not make it compulsory to wear the emblem in order to benefit from 
the protection offered by the convention. The arguments in favour and against 
implementation of such an emblem have not changed significantly since the 
discussion during the drafting process of article 79. Some journalists and 
organisations are in favour, others are against it and arguments concentrate on 
whether protecting journalists from accidental targeting outweighs the risk of making 
them an easier target to those ignoring the legal framework.823 The strongest 
argument against wearing such an emblem is that in contemporary conflicts a 
significant portion of journalists are deliberately targeted for violence, rather than 
killed in crossfire.824 Where this is the case, making journalists easier identifiable 
seems problematic and unlikely to improve their safety. Mark Willacy, a foreign 
correspondent for the Australian broadcasting company argued this exact point when 
asked about the press emblem, he noted: 
I wouldn’t wear it. In conflicts like Iraq, highlighting the fact that 
you’re a journalist was like painting a target on your forehead (…) 
I just don’t think there’s enough uniform respect for or 
understanding about, what we do. We’re seen by many sides as 
                                                            
822 Draft Proposal for an International Convention to Strengthen the Protection of Journalists in Armed 
Conflicts and other Situations Including Civil Unrest and Targeted Killings (2007) art. 7, available at: 
http://www.pressemblem.ch/4983.html.   
823 For an overview of key stakeholder opinions on the PEC proposal see: JM Lisosky and J 
Henrichsen, “Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Prospects for protecting journalists in conflict situations” 
(2009) 2 Media, War & Conflict, 129, pp. 140-143; Kagan and Durham (2010), p. 109. For a general 
overview of the discussion surrounding the PEC proposal see: Davies and Crawford (2013), pp. 2169-
2171. 
824 In Iraq, for example, nearly two out of three journalists are killed rather than caught up in the 
crossfire or “non-targeted” violence, see: F Smyth “Iraq War and the News Media: A look inside the 
death toll” (18 March 2013) CPJ, available at: http://cpj.org/blog/2013/03/iraq-war-and-news-media-
a-look-inside-the-death-to.php.   
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partisan combatants aligned with the ideology of one side or the 
other.825  
Other concerns focus on the problems of policing the use of such an emblem. As 
with granting protective status to journalists, it raises the question of who would be 
entitled to wear such an emblem: only professional journalists, or would citizen 
journalists be equally entitled to its use? The Committee to Protect Journalists has 
raised the concern that the implementation of such an emblem would require a 
licencing entity to determine who is and who is not a journalist, which could open 
the way to establishing international regulatory controls on journalists.826 However, 
providing the right to wear such an emblem to an unduly wide category of people, 
such as citizens occasionally engaging in online journalism would also be 
problematic. The lower the threshold for the right to wear such an emblem, the more 
it would be open to abuse, which could seriously affect its protective power. The 
abuse of the emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent is considered a war 
crime,827 which assists in combating unauthorised use. Any new protective emblems 
which provide significant protection in conflict zones to its wearer would need to 
have similarly strong mechanisms against abuse of the emblem, yet such measures 
could potentially restrict media freedom. Furthermore, the use of such an emblem 
could negatively affect journalists who, for example for operational reasons, choose 
not to wear the emblem as they could potentially be held to be contributory negligent 
if they were to be harmed during conflict, as they did not properly identify 
themselves as journalists. 
 
The discussions surrounding the use of a protective emblem raises the question of 
whether or not a treaty granting special protection to journalists can be implemented 
without the use of such an emblem and allow for providing proof of status through 
something less obtrusive such as an identity card. The use of the protective emblems 
of the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal are strongly recommended for those 
                                                            
825 M Willacy, personal communication, cited in: Davies and Crawford (2013), p. 2169. 
826 CPJ “Who Kills Journalists and why? Report by the Committee to protect journalists to the 
committee of inquiry” (2005), available at: https://www.cpj.org/2005/05/who-kills-journalists-and-
why-report-by-the-commit.php. Similar concerns were raised by UNESCO in the discussion in the 
1970s around the UN draft Convention which led to the adoption of art. 79, see: Gasser (1983), p. 11. 
827 Article 8(2)b Rome Statute (1998). See also art. 38 and 85 Protocol I (1977).  
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entitled to wear them under the Geneva Conventions, though not strictly 
obligatory.828 It is not the emblem which constitutes the protection. The protection is 
granted by the relevant legal framework and the emblem is simply its visual 
manifestation.829 For effective protection it is, however, essential that combatants can 
recognise those entitled to protection.830 While it is therefore not unthinkable to 
create additional protection without the absolute requirement of wearing a protective 
emblem, in terms of targeting during hostilities there can be little practical protection 
for journalists without a distinctive protective symbol, as it would be difficult to 
identify those deserving protection. However, upon capture an identity card may 
provide a similar service as a protective emblem and this could be sufficient to prove 
entitlement to specific protection. The use of an identity card instead of an emblem 
has the additional benefit of making protection less open to abuse; without an 
emblem there would be no additional protection from direct targeting, over and 
above that of civilians and this is what would be most likely to be abused by non-
journalists. Carrying an identity card, while not obligatory under the Geneva 
Convention,831 is further already common practice and a card has the advantage that 
it can be carried unobtrusively and does not set journalists apart in a crowd. As it is 
not obligatory, it does not carry the same concerns about controls as the obligatory 
wearing of an emblem does.832 A convention for the protection of journalists in 
conflict zones therefore need not be dependent on the willingness of media personnel 
to wear a protective emblem and could instead include the use of non-obligatory 
identity cards to provide proof of status. 
Due to its controversy, it may therefore be advisable not to include a protective 
emblem in a new convention as the benefits of doing so are unclear and may affect 
the support for such a convention. 
                                                            
828 Art. 40 Geneva Convention I; art. 42 Geneva Convention II; art. 20 Geneva Convention IV; ICRC, 
Study on the Use of the Emblems: Operational and commercial and other non-operational issues 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2011), p. 30. 
829 ICRC (2011), p. 30; J Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 : Commentary - Vol. 1, 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field  (Geneva: ICRC, 1952), p. 325. 
830 Pictet (1952), p. 325. 
831 See art. 79(3) Protocol I (1977).  
832 There is however some concern here about government control as the identity card under art. 79 
“shall be issued by the government of the State of which the journalist is a national or in whose 
territory he resides or in which the news medium employing him is located” thus leaving it to national 
authorities to assess who is entitled to such identification, a power which can be abused, though there 
are currently few complaints about this system. 
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 8.2.6 Loss of protection through direct participation 
A dedicated convention mirroring the content of the Geneva Conventions would 
likely reiterate the point that the media lose their right to protection when directly 
participating in the hostilities, which is both a basic principle of the Geneva 
Conventions and of Customary Law. The inclusion of such a provision should 
however provide a more concrete indication of what can be deemed direct 
participation by the media than is currently provided by the general provisions 
concerning direct participation. 
 
In the academic literature there is strong consensus on the fact that journalists 
‘ordinary’ activities are covered by the protection offered to them by IHL and can 
therefore not be deemed to consist of direct participation in the hostilities which 
results in loss protection.833 As there seems to be an increasing willingness to 
challenge this assertion in practice, it would be advisable to clearly reiterate this 
point in a legally binding document. Such a provision should make clear that the 
spreading of propaganda does not constitute direct participation and that journalists 
are not required to deliver objective an independent content to be entitled to 
protection under the international legal framework. It should, however, also reiterate 
that the broadcasting and production of content which incites to war crimes such as 
genocide is prohibited and will result in loss of protection under the legal framework. 
Here the specific incitement to war crimes should be included in the proposed 
convention, rather than the occasionally used incitement to (criminal) violence, 
which is not as clearly legally defined and is therefore potentially more open to 
abuse. 
 
A short provision in a convention concerning the protection of journalists is unlikely 
to provide clarity in all situations and prevent arguments on exactly when the media 
can be deemed to be directly participating in the hostilities or what content does and 
does not lead to loss of protection under the legal framework, as it will remain 
necessary to assess this on a case by case basis. However, by specifically stating that 
                                                            
833 Gasser (2003), p. 373. 
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propaganda is permitted content unless it directly incites to war crimes, there is at 
least a clear signal that ordinary media activities are protected. This could to a certain 
extent counter the recent public suggestions by both politicians and international 
organisations, discussed in chapter 7, that spreading propaganda is a reason to lose 
protection under the legal framework. It would further force those actors launching a 
direct attack on media personnel and/or equipment on the basis of the content they 
produce, to adequately explain the basis for a decision that in the current situation the 
content is of such an extreme nature that it directly incites to war crimes. This would 
in turn ensure that the message that journalists should not be subject to attacks and 
violence, remains as clear as possible and that only in rare and extreme cases the 





It is clear that the current legal protection for journalists in conflict zones, for a 
variety of reasons, does not provide adequate protection in practice. The death toll 
amongst journalists is increasing, rather than decreasing and international concern for 
the safety of journalists is growing. There are a number of international journalists 
organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, the International 
Federation of Journalists, Reporters without Borders and the PEC who are all calling 
for something to be done to provide better protection for journalists. Aside from 
recommending a number of non-legal measures, such as safety training, the legal 
recommendations generally focus on combatting impunity. It is clear that this is an 
area where there is room for much improvement. If the legal framework as it 
currently stands would be effectively enforced in conflict zones, this would make a 
tremendous difference to the safety of journalists. It is for this reason that most 
journalist organisations currently focus on combatting impunity, rather than 
increasing protection by amending the legal framework. Yet this should not be taken 
to mean that no further progress can be made through that route.  
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It is clear that the creation of a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists 
in conflict zones will not be easy. On the one hand, there are the general difficulties 
associated with negotiating international conventions, as well as ensuring a sufficient 
level of ratifications. On the other hand, there are clear difficulties with the subject 
matter of such a treaty that must be overcome. Specifically, identifying journalists in 
conflict zones is currently at best a double edged sword. While it may prevent 
instances of accidental targeting, due to mistaking journalists for combatants, it also 
makes deliberate targeting, a significant danger, easier. Creating a special status for 
journalists in conflict zones will clearly be challenging, especially in terms of 
defining who is and who is not entitled to this protection and will lead to extensive 
discussion by all parties involved. However, a dedicated convention for the 
protection of journalists will allow several gaps in the current legal framework to be 
addressed in a way that few other measures can. It will further raise the profile of 
protection of journalists, by providing a clear international signal that journalists are 
entitled to protection due to their specific role and function in providing information 
on armed conflicts to the public. 
  
The introduction of a convention to enhance protection for journalists along the lines 
discussed above would significantly improve the current minimalist framework. The 
convention has the potential to extend the detailed provisions of international armed 
conflict concerning journalists to non-international armed conflict and by removing 
the differences in treatment based on nationality, would further significantly enhance 
protection for local journalists. Clarification of the circumstances which lead to loss 
of protection for the media through direct participation will combat the widening of 
the scope of direct participation by journalists and marking media organisations as 
military targets and the dangerous loss of protection this entails. Finally, such a 
convention would simplify the current legal framework by creating (nearly) uniform 
protection for all journalists, regardless of nationality and type of conflict, which 
could greatly assist understanding of the legal framework, in turn increasing 
awareness of the relevant legal provisions and helping to combat impunity. While a 
protective emblem to indicate journalistic status could be included in the subject 
matter of the convention, it should not be a requirement to receiving additional 
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protection during conflict, and there are arguments for not taking this forward at this 
time. 
 
The suggested convention is designed to work alongside the Geneva Conventions, 
clarifying and extending some of its principles to provide the protection journalists 
require in modern conflict reporting. It will have an important function in reiterating, 
confirming and simplifying the legal framework protecting journalists thus 
improving the legal protection of journalists in conflict zones, while avoiding the low 
ratification rates which would likely result from including more far-reaching 
provisions concerning freedom of speech which have been a matter of contention in 
previously proposed conventions. UNESCO, given its mandate, to contribute to 
international peace and security and to further universal respect for justice, for the 
rule of law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the significant 
work undertaken by UNESCO to protect the media and freedom of expression, 
would be a suitable body to take forward such a convention at the international level. 
 
This thesis has not only set out the case for renewing efforts towards creating a 
dedicated convention for the protection of journalists, as has been suggested before, 
but has examined and set out the approach such as convention should take to increase 
its chance of reaching international consensus and thus significant ratification, as 
well as the subject matter such a convention should address. Whether the time and 
effort involved in creating such a convention would be better spent on ensuring 
effective enforcement of the legal protection that is currently already in place, is 
open to debate and no easy answer can be provided to this question. There may 
further be concerns that attempts to amend the current legal framework would cut 
across the current work plans for addressing impunity. Yet even if this is the case, the 
often repeated assertion by the ICRC and other organisations that the current legal 
framework is sufficient and that the increasing death toll amongst journalists in 
conflict zones is solely an issue of enforcement, is unhelpful in terms of enhancing 
protection. The current legal framework is not perfect and it does not currently cover 
all dangers journalists are faced with when carrying out their professional activities. 
A focus on the issue of impunity may very well be the most effective approach to 
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increasing protection for journalists, but the simultaneous assertion that the legal 
framework itself does not require improvement limits debate and research into 
enhancing protection for journalists in conflict zones in an unhelpful manner and 





	   221	  
9. Conclusion 
 
Since the rise of the civilian war correspondent during the Crimean War international 
treaties concerning the laws of war have recognised the important functions they 
perform and have attempted to protect them from the dangers of the battlefield. This 
legal protection changed little up until the Geneva Conventions of 1949. War 
correspondents were classed as civilian ‘support staff’, travelling with the military 
units they were accredited to and, like their comrades in the unit, received protection 
as prisoners of war upon capture. This protection reflected the standard practice at 
the time and as little changed in terms of the way journalists operated in the field, 
there was little reason to adapt the legal framework. This situation changed, however, 
post-1949. During the conflicts that followed WWII, journalist started to operate 
independently from the military they had previously been accompanying, preferring 
to cover conflicts with fewer restraints on their movements. Practice changed to such 
a significant extend that by the 1970s it became clear that the Geneva Conventions 
(1949) no longer provided sufficient protection from the dangers of conflict. The 
increasing death toll amongst journalist saw the incorporation of a new article in 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention in 1977, protecting journalists 
travelling independently from the military in conflict zones. Article 79 confirmed 
that journalists are civilians and should therefore receive all protection accorded to 
that class under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), but did not create any 
additional protection for journalists over and above that of ordinary civilians. 
 
Since 1977 there have been further significant changes to the way journalists operate 
in conflict zones, as well as their perceived influence on the audience at home and 
the way in which modern conflicts are conducted in general. Yet no changes have 
been made to the main body of law providing protection to journalists in conflict 
zones: the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. Most worryingly, 
there has been a significant shift in the culture of respect towards journalists that had 
previously existed amongst combatants in many conflicts: journalists have gone from 
being protected by the unwritten rule of ‘don’t shoot the journalist’ to being a direct 
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target in the hostilities.834 This change in culture has contributed to a significant 
increase in the death toll amongst journalists in conflict zones. Reporting from 
battlefields and conflict zones has always carried risks that are inherent to the 
situation, but increasing rates of kidnapping and murder are currently worsening 
conditions. The Iraq War in particular has proved deadly in this sense, as since the 
start of the invasion in 2003 to the end of the war in 2011, nearly two out of three 
journalists killed were murdered rather than caught up in the crossfire or ‘non-
targeted’ violence.835 The legal framework concerning the protection of journalists 
no longer seems to provide the protection it once did, which raises the question 
whether it might be time to revise this framework to bring it up to date with the 
current challenges of conflict reporting. 
 
There have been a number of initiatives from international organisations and NGOs 
aimed at improving protection for journalists in conflict zones, though none of them 
have resulted in changes to the legal framework. The current stance of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which receives significant support 
in the academic literature, is that the legal framework as it stands provides sufficient 
protection for journalists in conflict zones and that the main cause of the rising death 
toll is the high level of impunity in crimes against journalists. While this thesis does 
not challenge the assertion that significant improvement can be made by increasing 
the observance and enforcements of the current legal framework, it does challenge 
the notion that the current legal framework is sufficient and that there is no scope for 
increasing protection through amending that framework.   
 
 
9.1 Current legal protection   
 
The current legal framework protecting journalists consists of IHL, International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL), and to a certain extent International Criminal Law (ICL). 
                                                            
834 H Tumber and F Webster, Journalist under Fire: Information war and journalistic practices 
(London: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 167. 
835 F Smyth, “Iraq War and the News Media: A look inside the death toll” (18 March 2013) CPJ, 
available at: http://cpj.org/blog/2013/03/iraq-war-and-news-media-a-look-inside-the-death-to.php.   
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The protection granted by the legal framework differs depending on the type of 
journalist, the type of conflict, and the nationality of the journalist. 
 
Under IHL, journalists are only specifically mentioned in two articles: article 4A(4) 
of Geneva Convention III (1949) which protects war correspondents, that is those 
journalists which are accredited to a military unit without being a member thereof, 
and article 79 of Protocol I (1977) which protects independent journalists. As noted, 
article 4A(4) states that war correspondents are entitled to treatment as prisoners of 
war upon capture, which provides them, to some extent, with protection over and 
above that of ‘ordinary’ civilians under the Geneva Conventions (1949), while article 
79 Protocol I confirms that journalist not accredited to the military are civilians and 
should be treated as such. The extent and the detail of the protection based on 
civilian status differ depending on nationality, with the strongest protection granted 
to those nationals that qualify as ‘protected persons’ under Geneva Convention IV. 
The application of these provisions, is however limited to international armed 
conflict, which is no longer the dominant form of conflict. During non-international 
armed conflict only a very limited number of provisions of the IHL framework 
apply, which are predominantly concerned with basic humanitarian norms. This gap 
in legislation is, however, partly addressed by customary law, which contains 
protection for journalists in both international and non-international conflict. 
Customary law provides that all journalists operating professionally in areas of 
armed conflict must be respected and protected. While this ensures that journalists 
receive the same basic protection they do during international armed conflict, it does 
not address all issues in the same detail, nor does it fully provide the same protection, 
as, for example, accredited war correspondents are left without the additional 
protection they receive during international armed conflict. 
 
Under IHRL there are no rules specifically dealing with journalists, though the 
provisions dealing with the rights of all civilians are applicable to journalists. There 
are a number of rights that are part of the main human rights treaties which are 
relevant to journalists in conflict zones. Some of the most relevant include: the right 
to life; the right to personal liberty and security; the right to a fair trial and the right 
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to freedom of expression. Most human rights, the exception being the right to life, 
can however be derogated from during war or other state of emergency which 
‘threatens the life of the nation’. Consequently, many of these rights will not provide 
extensive protection to journalists in conflict zones. Furthermore, human rights 
norms are based on a vertical relationship between the state and an individual in 
which the state has significant power and control. Yet during conflict journalists are 
increasingly under threat from non-state actors, to which IHRL will generally not 
apply, though it depends on the exact situation. Additional problems are further 
posed by situations in which both IHL and IHRL apply, but the norms conflict. There 
is no standard practice in this situation which leads to significant uncertainty for 
those having to apply the norms in the field. This is further complicated by the fact 
that IHRL only provides general norms, rather than the more precise rules contained 
in IHL, and these norms still require a significant amount of interpretation before 
they can be applied as a legal framework. This is not ideal, especially for combatants 
with limited or no legal training, who have to establish, on the exact circumstances of 
the case, which rights apply and which conflicting rights take precedence in a given 
combat situation. Generally speaking, IHRL is therefore subject to too many 
limitations to provide significant protection to journalists in conflict zones. While 
IHRL expresses general norms, which can alert combatants to the fact that their 
actions towards journalists may be subject to legal constraints, the exact constraints 
are more clearly identified in IHL. 
 
Under ICL there are a number of limitations on the treatment of civilians during 
conflict which apply to journalists, though no norms are specifically concerned with 
them. Whereas IHL and IHRL primarily govern the relationship between the state 
and individuals, ICL focuses more on the relationship between individuals. It can 
hold individuals responsible for gross breaches of IHL and IHRL, for which states 
may or may not have concurrent responsibility. The subject matter of ICL thus 
overlaps significantly with IHL and IHRL, but it introduces individual responsibility, 
which especially in terms of non-state actors provides a valuable addition to the 
protective framework for journalists in conflict zones. As with IHL, ICL consists of 
both treaty law and customary law, which have now been codified to a significant 
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extent in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. For journalists it is 
especially relevant that crimes against humanity (article 7) and war crimes (article 8) 
are criminalised through the Rome Statute. Crimes against humanity include serious 
crimes such as murder, rape and torture when they take place as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population and war crimes include 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (1949) as well as other serious violations 
of the customs and norms of international armed conflict. The Statute specifically 
states that certain crimes during non-international armed conflict, such as murder, 
cruel treatment, torture and intentionally directing attacks against civilians are 





As discussed in chapter 5, one of the main challenges the current legal framework is 
facing, is a general lack of enforcement leading to high levels of impunity in crimes 
against journalists. IHL, IHRL and ICL are enforced through different mechanisms 
by domestic courts and international courts, as well as through non-judicial measures. 
 
IHL is primarily enforced through domestic courts: the court of the state where the 
violation in question has occurred or the state of which the alleged offenders are 
nationals. States are therefore required under article 49, Geneva Convention I to 
“enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches, of the present 
Convention”. State parties must further take measures to suppress breaches that do 
not meet the threshold of ‘grave breach’. The obligations apply to both international 
and non-international conflicts that fall under the scope of common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions (1949). Where state parties are unwilling or unable to bring 
prosecution before domestic courts there are a number of international courts, 
depending on the conflict in which the violation has taken place, which are qualified 
to hear cases on breaches of IHL.  
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IHRL is similarly primarily enforced through domestic courts with the option to 
bring a case before an international court, depending on the international human 
rights treaty in question and the ratification of provisions allowing individual 
complaints before international courts. As human rights are primarily enforced 
against states or state actors, it is important that individuals have access not only to 
national courts, but also to international courts when national courts are unwilling or 
fail to provide a remedy for the alleged violation. 
 
ICL has grown in importance over the last decades, as an interpretation and 
enforcement mechanism of IHRL and IHL, as it introduces individual responsibility 
for breaches where previously the focus was predominantly on enforcement against 
states. The enforcement of ICL is still, however, to a significant extend dependent on 
the willingness of states to cooperate with the process, which can hamper its 
effectiveness. 
 
What remains a problem in terms of the enforcement of IHL, IHRL and ICL, is that 
most international courts only offer retrospective assessments of the legality of states’ 
and individuals’ behaviour after a conflict has concluded. Their preventive function 
arises out of ensuring compliance with IHL and IHRL in future conflicts through 
punishing past breaches, which increases the importance of ensuring that as few 
breaches as possible go unpunished. Yet practice shows they only have limited affect. 
The International News Safety Institute (INSI) has noted that 9 out of 10 journalists 
are killed with impunity,836 and journalists are increasingly at risk, not just from the 
dangers inherent to conflict, but from targeted violence which the legal framework 
clearly prohibits. This leads to the question of why enforcement rates are so low. It is 
possible to identify a number of social, political and legal factors which all play a role 
in this context and can significantly disrupt the effective application of any legal 
framework. One of the primary causes of impunity is the disruption of the functioning 
of local authorities and the judicial system during conflict, when resources and 
circumstance may make it impossible to properly investigate crimes and bring 
                                                            
836 INSI, “Urgent Appeal from the International News Safety Institute” (14 September 2012), 
available at: http://www.newssafety.org/latest/news/insi-news/detail/urgent-appeal-from-the-
international-news-safety-institute-103/.  
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perpetrators to justice. On the other hand, the resources may be available, but there 
might be a general unwillingness to apply the legal framework by both state-actors 
and non-state actors for a variety of reasons, be it cultural, social or political. Finally, 
impunity can arise from a lack of a clear and concise legal framework, when actors 
are either unaware of the framework itself, or it is unclear as to how it should be 
applied. This final cause of impunity provides a strong argument for not ignoring 
improvements that can be made to the clarity and comprehensiveness of the legal 
framework when combating impunity. 
 
 
9.3 Issues with the current legal framework 
 
There are a number of situations which are not, or inadequately, addressed by the 
legal framework which can endanger the safety of journalists in conflict zones. Some 
are inherent to the structure of IHL in general, whereas others are more specific to 
the protection of journalists. 
 
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, international and non-international 
conflicts are subject to different legal frameworks, with the latter largely lacking 
detailed legal provisions. This mostly affects war correspondents, or more 
practically, embedded journalists, who in international armed conflict are entitled to 
prisoner of war status. While there are downsides to this classification, it does 
provide additional protection over and above that received by journalists not 
accredited to the armed forces. This protection is however not available to war 
correspondents in non-international armed conflicts, when they are only protected by 
the basic provisions of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), which 
apply to all civilians. While this article guarantees humane treatment, it provides 
little specific protection. The protection for independent journalists is somewhat less 
subject to change between covering international and non-international conflicts as 
they are classed and treated as civilians in both types of conflict. They therefore 
mostly suffer from the same absence of detailed protection that all civilians are 
subject to in non-international armed conflict.  
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Similar issues are caused by the fact that the protection awarded by the international 
legal framework is not uniform for all journalists. There are significant differences in 
treatment under the legal framework depending on nationality and mode of operation, 
which results in a legal framework of which the more detailed provisions applicable 
to a certain situation are not always easy to determine. The protection is strongest for 
those journalists who qualify through their nationality as a ‘protected person’ under 
Geneva Convention IV (1949)  while the protection is weakest under international 
law for those journalists who are nationals from the state they operate in. 
 
The classification of journalist upon capture further causes some problems, as 
prisoners of war or ‘ordinary’ civilians is not a particularly comfortable fit with the 
situation of embedded or independent journalists. While war correspondents’ 
proximity to the armed forces and their significant access to military information 
justifies special treatment upon capture, the status of prisoner of war is not 
particularly well suited to their situation. Prisoners of war are detained for the 
duration of the conflict in order to prevent them from being redeployed in the 
conflict. This rationale is however wholly inapplicable to war correspondents who 
upon capture can consequently be detained for the duration of the conflict without 
proper justification. Classing journalists as ‘ordinary’ civilians upon capture is 
however similarly problematic as they do not behave as ordinary civilians which can 
arouse suspicion of criminal acts, such as espionage or supporting terrorism, of which 
journalists often will be innocent. Journalists, for example, collect significant 
amounts of information, from both sides of the conflict, they are likely to run towards 
danger rather than away from it and they will seek to access areas which ordinary 
civilians are unlikely to have an interest in accessing. Such behaviour may result in 
charges under domestic law of varying seriousness.   
 
Civilians receive significant protection from the Geneva Conventions “unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” under article 51(3) Protocol I. When 
journalists are deemed to be ‘directly participating in the hostilities’ they therefore 
lose all civilian protection and can be legitimately targeted. In spite of the far 
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reaching consequences of this provision, there is little clarity, or international 
consensus, on the exact scope of ‘direct participation’ in general. Consequently, 
significant discussion persists over what actions constitute permissible indirect 
participation, what actions constitute direct participation and when participation 
commences and ends. Not all countries interpret all components of direct 
participation in the same way and though the ICRC has attempted to provide 
clarification through non-binding guidance, significant discussion remains.  
 
In terms of ‘direct participation’ by the media, there seems to be a significant 
divergence between theory and practice. According the ICRC guidance, academic 
literature, as well as rulings by international courts such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Tribunal Responsible for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 
(ICTY), general propaganda, that is propaganda which is used to generate general 
support for the war effort, does not constitute ‘direct participation in the hostilities’ 
by the media, whereas propaganda which is used for the incitement of crimes does. It 
is however difficult to draw a line between the two, leaving assessments to be made 
on a case by case basis. In practice, however, there seems to be increasing willingness 
from different actors to consider the broadcasting of general propaganda as ‘direct 
participation’ leading to loss of protection under the international framework. This 
has resulted in several attacks on television and radio stations in recent years, 
throughout different conflicts, which is a worrying development. 
 
 
9.4 Amending the law for the protection of journalists in conflict zones 
 
The suggestion that journalists would benefit from a dedicated international 
instrument to ensure their protection in conflict zones has long been the subject of 
academic debate. Interest has in recent years, however, moved away from adapting 
the legal framework and creating a new convention. The general assertion is now that 
the legal framework is sufficient but that its enforcement must be improved if we are 
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to provide better protection for journalists. Focusing on combatting impunity while 
disregarding the underlying issues with the legal framework is however unwise, as 
this ignores the influence the legal framework itself has on impunity rates. This thesis 
has shown that not only are their situations which the current legal framework 
inadequately addresses, affecting the protection of journalists, the framework itself is 
also significantly complicated and there is a lack of international consensus on the 
application of certain important components. To return to the research question:  
Is there scope for increasing the physical protection of journalists 
in conflict zones through amending the current international legal 
framework?  
The answer must be affirmative. This thesis suggests it is possible, and indeed 
advisable, to improve the physical protection of journalists in conflict zones by 
amending the current legal framework through the adoption of a dedicated 
convention, which would reiterate and supplement the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols. While creating a new international 
instrument is not a small undertaking, this alone should not be considered sufficient 
reason not to attempt it. Any international convention can only be effective if it 
receives a high level of ratification. A convention for the protection of journalists in 
conflict zones must therefore in terms of content and scope attempt to strike a balance 
between providing general, clear, protective norms, which are realistic and non-
controversial in the various cultures which will have to apply it, while still providing 
journalists with the protection they need. A convention which is over-ambitious in its 
scope is likely to provide great protection for journalists in theory, but will have little 
practical affect due to low levels of ratification and observance. It is thus essential to 
create an instrument which is realistic in its scope. This does however entail striking a 
compromise between ideal protection and what can realistically be agreed to at an 
international level and be implemented.  
 
While such a convention can address to a significant extend physical safety and 
protection from targeting for journalists, it will not be able to address some of the 
concerns which arise through the domestic legal systems of the country in which 
journalists are operating. Journalists, due to the way they operate, are particularly 
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vulnerable to accusation of significant crimes such as spying and terrorism related 
charges. While ideally a new legal framework would be able to protect them from 
these, this is simply unrealistic. Placing journalists outside the domestic legal system 
and granting them an immunity equivalent to combatant immunity in conflict zones 
would not only lead to significant international resistance, it would also create a 
situation where journalistic status would be a prime target for abuse by intelligence 
services and those wishing to do harm, which in the long run is more likely to make 
journalist suspect than to create the impression of neutral and independent observers. 
Protection from unfounded charges under domestic legal systems must therefore 
come through other means. IHRL, which offers significant protection in terms of fair 
trial and freedom of expression, will be able provide assistance here, though its 
application and observance must be improved upon. But the creation of a new legal 
instrument will indirectly be able to provide assistance with this as well. Creating a 
clear framework, which protects journalists and sets them apart during conflict as a 
group who, like humanitarian workers, deserve additional protection and should not 
be the subject of violence, starts to renew the concept of the journalists as an 
independent observer who has no part in the hostilities. The more this becomes the 
accepted norm, the stronger the presumption will be that they are not guilty of 
charges such as aiding terrorism and espionage. Journalists themselves will of course 
also need to contribute to this by ensuring their behaviour at all times matches their 
status as independent observers. 
 
The suggested framework would closely follow the protection currently provided by 
the Geneva Conventions (1949), which enhances the chance of high levels of 
ratification. It would however extend the current protection available to journalists 
acting independently in conflict zones during international armed conflict to non-
international armed conflict and, ideally, to other situations of violence and civil 
unrest. It would further simplify the current protection by taking the protection 
currently only available to those who through their nationality qualify for the status of 
‘protected person’ and extend this protection to all journalists regardless of their 
nationality, creating a clearer and less complicated legal framework. War 
correspondents would retain their additional protection during international armed 
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conflict through their status as prisoners of war, but this would be supplemented by a 
provision similar to that currently available to medical and religious personnel, that 
they should be released as soon as practical to ensure they are not detained until the 
end of a conflict without good cause. Finally, a convention should clarify the concept 
of direct participation in the hostilities by the media by specifically stating that 
journalists do not lose their legal protection through spreading ‘ordinary’ propaganda 
and will only lose protection should they engage in creating and spreading content 
which directly incites to violence and crimes. 
 
It is clear that crimes against journalists continue to suffer from disconcertingly high 
levels of impunity and that the legal framework for protection is clearly inadequately 
enforced. While it is clear that a viable alternative for the new convention is better 
enforcement of the current legal framework, we seem to lack a clear method to 
accomplish this. As noted, there are a number of causes for impunity that can be 
identified, but in tackling these we should not ignore the underlying issues with the 
legal framework, which complicate the practical application of the framework and 
thus exacerbate impunity rates. There are of course further alternative methods that 
can be employed to enhance protection for journalists. International efforts towards 
advocacy and education, supported by clear international measures and statements 
that emphasise the role of journalists as observers and messengers, rather than active 
participants in a conflict, could make a start towards reinstating the old unwritten rule 
of “don’t shoot the journalists”. This would however seek to address a significant 
cultural shift, which may not so easily be reversed and such measures on their own 
would unlikely be sufficient to address the increasing challenges journalist face. 
 
The thesis has contributed to the current research in not only setting out a case for 
renewing efforts towards creating a dedicated convention for the protection of 
journalists, but by examining and setting out the approach such as convention should 
take to increase its chance of reaching international consensus and thus significant 
ratification levels, as well as the subject matter such a convention should address. 
The proposed convention, closely mirroring the Geneva Conventions (1949) and 
their Additional Protocols, while supplementing them and ensuring more universal 
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application, would create a legal framework that is much more straightforward to 
apply, with fewer variations depending on the circumstances of the case. It would 
ensure the framework can be understood and thus applied by non-state actors and 
should simplify application for actors with limited legal knowledge and thus enhance 
awareness of the applicable norms during conflict. The importance of such a change 
should not be underestimated. In order for rules to be effective in the chaos of 
conflict, their application must be straightforward for those having to apply them in 
the field. As noted by the defence attorney of a Private accused of breaking the laws 
of war during the war in Afghanistan: “The President of the United States doesn’t 
know what the rules are (…) The Secretary of Defense doesn’t know what the rules 
are. But the government expects this Private First Class to know what the rules 
are?”837  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that journalists do not comfortably fit in the categories 
in which the current legal framework places them, leaving them without valuable 
protection when reporting from conflict zones. Yet they need this protection if they 
are to continue to fulfil their important function in society, informing and 
empowering populations to participate in society and democratic government. The 
proposed convention would address some of the main issues with the current legal 
framework, and while it would not provide significant new protection for journalists, 
it would provide a new base line of physical protection, on which further, more 
extensive, rights and protection can be built in the future. It is therefore time to revisit 
the notion of a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in conflict zones. 
 
  
                                                            








CAT  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  
Treatment or Punishment 
 
CoE  Council of Europe 
 
CPJ  Committee to Protect Journalists 
 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
 
ICL  International Criminal Law 
 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
 
IHRL   International Human Rights Law 
 
INSI  International News Safety Institute 
 
RTLMC Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines 
 
RTS  Radio Television Serbia 
 
RwB  Reporters without Borders 
 
UN  United Nations 
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